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 Under the nonideal conditions of our world, war is sometimes morally permissible, 
perhaps even required.   Just war theory aims to make sense of this.   It does so, on my view, by 
allowing war only if pursued with ‘right intention.’  In order permissibly to go to war, a state 
must not only have a just cause and limit its war-making activity to that necessary to vindicate 
the just cause, both required in order to engage in war with ‘right intention,’ but it must also seek 
to vindicate its just cause in a manner likely to yield a ‘just and lasting peace.’  To fight without 
or unconstrained by this latter aim is to fight without the required ‘right intention.’   A lasting 
peace is not possible unless certain standards of basic justice are secure.  These include those 
given by human rights, by principles of political self-determination and international toleration, 
and by the recognition of international responsibilities to protect.   I argue further that these 
norms governing ‘right intention’ should be realized as international legal norms.    
 My aim is to make the case for some needed reforms to just war theory in order to give 
more adequate content to the idea that war is impermissible unless it is engaged and fought and 
concluded with ‘right intention.’  Aligning the just war tradition with human rights is essential 
because human rights constitute the core of international justice.  Securing and respecting human 
rights; protecting noncombatants from the residual effects of war during the postwar period; 
tolerating illiberal but decent regimes; allowing for reasonable political self-determination; 
establishing when military intervention in accordance with the Responsibility to Protect is 
required; and updating, facilitating, and adjudicating a revised Fourth Geneva Convention that 
better protects civilians, can all be argued for as necessary if force is to be governed by a ‘right 
intention’ oriented toward peace with justice.   
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 The nonideal conditions we face often involve conditions or circumstances of unjust 
international attacks and/or unjust domestic institutions that might seem to call for war as a just 
response.  While war might be permissible as a response to severe injustice, there are limits on 
the conduct of war even when it is permissible (or even required) as a response to severe 
injustice.  A state pursuing a just war must do so with ‘right intention.’  The idea of right 
intention is the overarching constraint on war (that has been developing over the last century); a 
right intention aims at a just and lasting peace.  A lasting peace is not possible unless certain 
standards of basic justice are secure.   
 The aim of my dissertation is to explore certain key elements of the claim that a just war 
is one fought with the right intention of not only vindicating a just cause and doing so in a just 
manner but also reliably serving as a means to a just and lasting peace.  Fighting with right 
intention and establishing conditions for a just and lasting peace demand certain reforms to just 
war theory.  Establishing a lasting peace is predicated on safeguarding basic human rights, 
fidelity to the principle of noncombatant immunity, political self-determination and international 
toleration, and the recognition of the international responsibilities to protect.  I argue further that 
these norms governing right intention should be realized as international legal norms. 
 Just war theory has been a part of Western political philosophy for the past two thousand 
years.  Theologians such as St. Ambrose, St. Augustine of Hippo, St. Thomas Aquinas, and 
Francisco de Vitoria as well as the jurist Hugo Grotius and the philosopher Emmerich de Vattel 
have been the frontrunners in advancing moral arguments (regarding obligations, restrictions, 
and proscriptions) that states and their armies should abide by in the three phases of war: before, 
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during, and after.  More specifically, just war theory establishes a moral framework regarding 
when the use of force is not only morally justified (such as self-defense) but also sets limits to 
the destructive acts of war by appealing to standards of conduct that incorporate discrimination, 
proportionality, and necessity.  Just war theory also frames what is morally required of the victor 
and vanquished regarding rebuilding, reparations, and reconciliation during the postwar period.      
 Contemporary just war philosophers such as Michael Walzer, Brian Orend, Jeff 
McMahan, and Larry May have made considerable contributions to the just war tradition.  
Contemporary human rights philosophers such as Henry Shue, Allen Buchanan, Charles Beitz, 
and David Reidy have made considerable contributions to political philosophy.  My dissertation 
is an amalgamation of their work.  More than any other philosopher, John Rawls has 
significantly influenced my view.  Rawls’s perspective in The Laws of Peoples relating to human 
rights and just war is the template for my work, and I believe that in order to improve upon the 
just war tradition, honoring basic human rights has to be a central theme, because human rights 
are a class of rights that play a special role in foreign policy: “They restrict the justifying reasons 
for war and its conduct, and they specify limits to a regime’s internal autonomy.”1  I take 
Rawls’s articulation of traditional principles of justice (in particular the right to self-defense and 
observing certain restrictions in war and the honoring of human rights) that can reasonably be 
accepted by states that are neither internally aggressive toward their own citizens nor externally 
aggressive toward other states as my guide.     
 The human rights movement has marked the latter half of the last century and shows little 
sign of losing its history shaping force.  Political control of a territory and population no longer 
guarantees the moral right to non-intervention.  Although this was thought sufficient to 
                                                 
1
     John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999), 79.  This is just one view of 
human rights and their role, and the view that I endorse.  
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underwrite political sovereignty and so a right to non-intervention, it is now thought merely 
necessary.  The additional requirement of meeting basic human rights is also necessary.  The 
idea of sovereignty is still tied to the right to non-intervention.  However, we have come to 
recognize/accept that sovereignty is something that depends on certain moral conditions being 
met to include basic human rights being reasonably safeguarded.  In addition, resorting to war 
for reasons of self-defense does not just entail fighting until a state’s rights have been vindicated.  
Rather, “the aim of a just war waged by a just well-ordered people is a just and lasting peace.”2  
 Aligning the just war tradition with the norm of right intention is essential in order to set 
conditions for a just and lasting peace.  There can be no lasting peace without justice, and justice 
is predicated on the fulfillment of human rights which constitute the core of international justice.  
Unjust war, oppression, and genocide arise from unjust state institutions.  Hopefully, by 
engaging in discourse about right intention we can determine what “policies and courses of 
action are morally permissible and politically possible as well as likely to be effective”3 in our 
long-term goal of reaching a stable and peaceful international global order.  A just war tradition 
that places significant emphasis on human rights can be squarely made part of a state’s foreign 
policy.   
 Although the nonideal conditions that we face present some demanding challenges, I 
cannot take up all just war issues, but I want to address key issues.  These issues are pressing 
now and can all be argued for from the root idea that if force is to be governed by a right 
intention oriented toward peace with justice, various reforms are required.   
 I will focus on four main issues: that just war is governed by an overarching principle of 
right intention; that the residual effects of war continue to kill civilians after the fighting is over, 
                                                 
2
     Ibid., 94. 
3
     Ibid., 89. 
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so there are obligations to mitigate these harms; that states are morally required to intervene 
when a state has failed in its responsibility to protect its own citizens’ physical security, 
subsistence, and basic liberty rights; and that the Fourth Geneva Convention needs to be updated 
in order to reflect right intention and the human rights movement. 
 First, right intention is what unifies ad bellum, in bello, and post bellum (of, in, and after 
phases of war).  A state with right intention establishes conditions for a just and lasting peace by 
respecting human rights, taking due care to insulate civilians from the harms of war, allowing for 
political self-determination, and by educating its military and political culture.  Furthermore, a 
state’s public acts are evidence of its intention.  There is no way to determine if a state actually 
fights with right intention without looking at the totality of its conduct.  
 Second, we need to address what we owe to the civilians of a state with which we are 
militarily engaged.  The old notion of noncombatant immunity needs to be rethought within the 
context of both human rights and into the postwar phase.  For instance, although the laws of war 
declare the utmost protection of civilians, in modern war more civilians have died than soldiers.  
This has been the case in World War II (not even including the Holocaust), the Vietnam Conflict, 
the Persian Gulf War, the Second Iraq War, and in the current conflict in Afghanistan.  Over the 
past century, tens of millions of civilians have been killed in warfare.   
 Although military technological advances have grown leaps and bounds in the last 30 
years with the development and use of precision strike weapons (smart munitions, laser guided 
bombs, and unmanned aerial vehicles (drones)), even in the 21
st
 century, conservative estimates 
suggest that civilian deaths in war are at least fivefold to that of soldiers killed.  Overwhelmingly 
these high death rates (in the wars over the past 10 years) are not from civilians being 
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intentionally targeted by military forces but from the residual effects of war, many of which stem 
from the targeting of dual purpose facilities.   
 No doubt, civilians will be killed in war.  However, much more can be done during and 
after the fighting to protect civilians’ basic human rights from the ills of war.  I argue for making 
belligerents accountable ex post by requiring them to repair destroyed dual purpose facilities that 
are essential for securing basic human rights of the civilian populace.  I argue also that a 
belligerent’s targeting decisions should be reviewed ex post by an impartial commission. 
 Third, the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is the doctrine that supports intervention into a 
state that has failed (whether deliberately or not) to reasonably protect a group of its citizens’ 
physical security rights.  However, civilians—whatever their religious, national, ethnic, or racial 
group—have the basic human right to not only physical security but also subsistence and basic 
liberty.  The idea is that rights entail duties, and that the duties must be assigned to determinate 
parties but that they may be assigned to parties in a kind of order.  For example, the duty falls 
first to X, but if X fails, then the duty falls to Y (as a back-up addressee), and so on.  States have 
the initial duty to protect the human rights of persons within their borders and then back-up 
duties to protect the human rights of persons outside of their borders.  When there is a systematic 
and widespread manifest failure to protect citizens from grievous harms, other states are 
obligated as back-up addressees to protect and aid those people.   
 Although a state loses its moral right to non-intervention because it has committed acts 
that violate its citizen’s physical security, subsistence, or basic liberty human rights, only 
physical security violations (i.e., genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, or ethnic 
cleansing) entail possible military intervention.  My view is that to have a right to non-
intervention a state must secure basic human rights, but that it does not follow from its lack of a 
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right to non-intervention that any particular intervention is morally permissible or required.  It 
only follows that an intervention would not violate the state’s right to non-intervention since it 
does not have one.  When states violate basic liberty rights and/or subsistence rights but not basic 
physical security rights other states might permissibly intervene but only through less intrusive 
measures (public condemnation, economic sanctions, etc.).  A state losing its moral right to non-
intervention because it committed acts of genocide does not entail that this is a sufficient 
condition for required military intervention.  Rather, military intervention is required and so 
permissible only if a number of further necessary conditions are fulfilled.  The only sufficient 
condition is the fulfillment of all the necessary conditions.   
 Lastly, the Fourth Geneva Convention (which is the convention that specifically deals 
with the treatment of civilians during and after war) needs to be updated and revised.  It can be 
argued for from the root idea that if force is to be governed by right intention oriented toward 
peace with justice, then the Fourth Geneva Convention is currently inadequate because it does 
not reflect current human rights practices and standards which are essential if our goal is 
establishing conditions for a just and lasting peace.  Just like human rights should be realized not 
only as moral but also as (international) legal rights, so too the norms of just war that follow 
from right intention should be realized.  Just war norms should not only be realized as moral 
norms but as (international) legal norms to point parties more squarely toward justice and 
because without legal embodiment justice becomes more difficult to secure or maintain.    
 Additionally, the UN is the appropriate institution not only to facilitate this process but 
also to play a role in institutionally expressing and adjudicating the relevant treaty.  First, the UN 
is the global structure that specifically deals with fostering the cooperation of states regarding 
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issues of peace and security.  Second, the UN should monitor and report compliance failures 
much like the UN already does when it comes to grave human rights violations. 
 To some considerable degree my just war perspective is inevitably tied to and has been 
shaped by being a US soldier for over the last twenty years.  Although I take up some just war 
issues that might have some reference to the point of view of a US soldier, what I propose is my 
own view and not that which is representative of all US soldiers or even the US government.  I 
do though reference key examples from US history as a way to help substantiate certain claims 
that I make.  These empirical facts are important because they provide real world situations that 
allow us to realize moral obligations that might otherwise go unnoticed.  
 Although there are plenty of other examples, I lean on mostly US based examples 
predominately because those examples are not only applicable but also I am most familiar with 
US based operations based on my background.  In addition, being a member of the US Army I 
am better qualified to critique, criticize, and commend the organization that I am a part of than a 
foreign military of which I have never served.  However, just because most of my examples are 
US based does not suggest that right intention and the philosophical advancements that I propose 
do not apply to other states and other wars. 
 I recognize that a complete account of proposing to reorient just war theory around a 
particular idea of what it means to fight with right intention would need to address examples 
outside US history and issues (e.g., nuclear weapons, supreme emergency, outlaw regimes at war 
with one another, etc.) beyond those that I currently address.  For now, I have limited aspirations 
but hope in the future to pursue these other areas which fighting with right intention would also 
regulate.         
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 The aim of this dissertation is not that this is last word about fighting with right intention 
but rather the starting point from which I hope further discussion will follow; and my hope is that 
the exploration of what fighting with right intention entails leads to improvements in just war 
theory.   


























Right Intention and a Just and Lasting Peace 
 
 
Historically, the norm of right intention has been a constitutive part of the ad bellum 
phase of just war theory, and “aims to overcome the possibility that a state may have a just cause, 
but still act from a wrong intention.”1  Wrong intentions aim or intend acts or effects (e.g. 
punishing the state one is at war with, using the resources of that state, causing more destruction 
than what is needed, or pursuing a war longer than is necessary) that are not warranted by and do 
not serve to vindicate a state’s just cause.2 
 Having a just cause does not necessarily entail that the state leaders and citizens will not 
have ulterior motives.  A state can have a just cause and yet (its leaders and/or citizens) still hope 
for, perhaps even be moved by a desire for, many other results (securing of other national 
interests: maintaining open sea lanes, stabilizing the world’s oil supply distribution, and having 
more influence in regional or global politics) in addition to vindicating its just cause.  Achieving 
these other types of ends does not seem particularly problematic as long as these results and the 
means to achieve them are not inconsistent with the norm of right intention.  If vindicating a just 
cause with right intention can possibly be expected to bring other goods, then those are 
acceptable.   
 Although right intention has habitually been tied to just cause as a way to ensure that the 
fighting is only conducted long enough to vindicate the rights that were originally violated, this 
cannot be all that ‘right intention’ entails.  Fighting with right intention is not merely a matter of 
                                                 
1
     Annalisa Koeman, “A Realistic and Effective Constraint on the Resort to Force,” in Journal of Military Ethics, 
(Vol. 6, No. 3, 2007), 201.  
2
     “Having the right reason for launching a war is not enough: the actual motivation behind the resort to war must 
also be morally appropriate; the only right intention allowed is to see the just cause for resorting to war secured and 
consolidated” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,< http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/war/#2.1>).   
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having a just cause and fighting with the intention to vindicate one’s just cause.  On my view, 
‘right intention’ is a separate requirement from just cause, with its own content.  In order 
permissibly to go to war, a state must not only have a just cause and limit its war-making activity 
to that necessary to vindicate the just cause, but it must also seek to vindicate its just cause in a 
manner likely to yield a ‘just and lasting peace’ which is the overarching result at which acts of 
war must always be directed.  In order to establish conditions for a just and lasting peace, there 
are two elements that need to be addressed. 
 These two elements—peace and justice—place their own constraints and requirements on 
just war theory.  Intended aims of war are 1) those that derive from the requirement that states 
aim at peace (fighting with restraint, immunizing civilians from the harms of war, and educating 
its military); and 2) those that derive from the requirement that states aim at justice (fighting only 
until the rights that were violated have been vindicated, respecting human rights, leaving its 
enemy in a position to secure human rights, allowing for political self-determination, tolerating 
regimes that honor basic human rights, and supporting a public political culture that adheres to 
just war).  
 This chapter aims to accomplish the following: 1) to establish that a state with right 
intention fights only as necessary to vindicate a just cause in a manner likely to yield a just and 
lasting peace; 2) to show that public acts are decisive as evidenced criteria of right intention; 3) 
to specify that a state with right intention establishes conditions for a just and lasting peace by a) 
respecting human rights, b) taking due care to insulate civilians from the harms of war, c) 
allowing for political self-determination, and d) educating its military and political culture; and 
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4) to demonstrate that there is no way to assess whether a state fights with right intention without 
looking at the totality of its conduct.
3
   
 
1) General Conduct Required for a Just and Lasting Peace 
 In addition to having a just cause and limiting its fighting to the vindication of that just 
cause a state must fight with right intention and this means that it must, generally speaking, fight 
only as necessary and with constraint and with an eye towards peace.  A belligerent must think 
about a wide range of longer term impacts of their fighting, because any acts that “unnecessarily 
increase the destruction and bitterness of war endanger the prospects for true peace.”4  The main 
point, as John Rawls notes, is that since “The way a war is fought and the deeds done in ending it 
live on in the historical memory of societies,”5 overly aggressive and indiscriminate attacks will 
undermine peace and future relations with the state one is currently at war with.  States must not 
fight in a way likely to poison future relations, but rather their actions must be aimed at peace.  
Future justice requires peace and trust and a shared commitment to the priority of certain norms 
and human rights.   
 A state abides by right intention by vindicating the wrong that is its just cause which 
means requiring “that it behave in a certain way, specifically, that it do no more in the war than 
what would be consistent with that goal.”6  Moreover, Steven Lee remarks “The state’s actions 
should not go beyond those necessary to achieve that intention.”7  This perspective is also echoed 
in the US Catholic Bishops’ letter: The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace.  “Even in the midst 
                                                 
3
     In section 2, I address the fact that public acts are our best evidence for interpreting a state’s intention, whereas 
in section 4, I make the case that an overall assessment regarding if a state has met the requirements of right 
intention can only be done after the totality of a state’s conduct has been completed.  
4
     William O’Brien, The Conduct of Just and Limited War.  (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), 34. 
5
     John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2002), 96. 
6
     Steven Lee, Ethics and War: An Introduction, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 84. 
7
     Ibid. 
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of conflict, the aim of political and military leaders must be peace with justice, so that acts of 
vengeance and indiscriminate violence, whether by individuals, military units or governments, 
are forbidden.”8   
 Although violent acts are pursued, each state should attempt to maintain a peaceful 
disposition which will facilitate a continuation of negotiations between states.  Fighting must be 
conducted in a way that allows for a conclusion other than unconditional surrender.  Acts of war 
that continue beyond what is necessary or continue even though the rights that were originally 
violated have been vindicated violate right intention.
9
  Any excessive and wanton violence 
                                                 
8
     The Harvest of Justice is Sown in Peace, (<http://www.usccb.org/beliefs-and-teachings/what-we-believe/ 
catholic-social-teaching/the-harvest-of-justice-is-sown-in-peace.cfm>. 
9
     Unconditional surrender of the Nazi regime was a necessary and a morally justified undertaking.  In addition to 
the blatant acts of aggression, the Nazi regime propagated hatred toward some non-Aryans and was responsible for 
not only the murder of certain groups within its own borders (mentally disabled, homosexuals, Jews, and Catholic 
clerics) but also incorporated a genocide campaign that killed millions of Jews and Slavs.  Some historians see 
Germany's aims as globally, ultimately.  However, other historians believe that Germany never intended to take over 
the world.  Its realist aims were in conquering Europe, North Africa, and western Russia.  For example, Germany’s 
objectives in the East were “first, the destruction of the Russian armies in western Russia; and then an advance into 
Russia deep enough to secure Germany against the risk of air attack from the east, carried as far as a line from 
Archangel to the Volga” (Liddell Hart, History of the Second World War, (New York: Da Capo Press. 1970, 144).  It 
is hard to imagine that Germany had any desire to push the bounds of its empire further east than the Volga River or 
that it would have attempted a cross-Atlantic invasion into the US.  Although Nazi Germany’s aims could have been 
more limited than what some have suggested, Germany’s sovereignty was not recognized by the Allies. Nazi 
Germany’s sovereignty was not recognized as legitimate because of its evidenced and repeated acts of aggression 
toward other sovereign states and its extreme brutality toward civilians and prisoners of war (on the East front). 
Therefore, there were no negotiations during the war.  The Allies realized that unconditional surrender was the only 
option because the National Socialist Party’s ideology could not be rehabilitated.  The German state would in a 
sense have to be captured and its political and social institutions completely reconstructed.  Unconditional surrender 
is a punitive policy where the moral right to political self-determination is denied.  Nazi Germany is a case where 
the denial to political self-determination was morally justified.  
        However, Imperial Japan was a different matter.  It can be argued that forcing unconditional surrender on Japan 
was neither necessary nor morally justified.  Japan’s aggression was based more on the imperial aims of territory 
and resource expansion and not genocide and domination.  By late 1945, Japan’s Navy and Air Force had been 
decimated.  The Japanese Army had been beaten back to its mainland.  Japan’s aspirations of expanding its empire 
had been crushed.  According to some historical interpretations, there was definitely potential for negotiations to 
continue and for Japan to surrender with some dignity instead of the US coercing it to unconditionally surrender by 
not only firebombing Tokyo but then striking Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic munitions.  Although all three 
cities had military targets located in them, the blast radiuses of the atomic munitions and the destruction of the 
firebombing were so overwhelmingly high that to somehow consider those bombings as either necessary or 
proportionate would be farcical.  There is though, some evidence to suggest that Emperor Hirohito could not have 
negotiated with the Allies for a conditional surrendered.  If the Emperor had attempted to do so there would have 
been a military coup which might have had even more catastrophic results to the Japanese people, e.g. the Japanese 
military would have made civilians and soldiers continue to fight even after the death and destruction that unfolded 
at Nagasaki and Hiroshima  Although this may have been the case, this does not change the fact that the rights of the 
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increases the harshness of war, and has the real potential to not only escalate further violent acts 
but also significantly degrade any communication between belligerents.  Fighting with constraint 
and only as necessary does not preclude a state from fighting with other acceptable intentions nor 
does it require that the state have in mind (whatever that would mean) the specific intention of 
securing a just and lasting peace, but it does govern how a state fights.   
 
2) Public Acts  
 “It is not clear what it means for a state to have an intention, since it has no mind, and the 
mind is normally thought to be where intentions reside.”10  However, we do know—to some 
degree—the intention of the state through observing the state’s actions. 
 Underlying motives and mental states can be hard or even impossible to discern but acts 
can be observed.  This is one way in which we can understand a state’s intention conceived of in 
terms of its actions.  We cannot adequately assess a state’s intention until we observe its public 
acts.  Darrell Cole echoes the same perspective and suggests, “right intention is determined by 
observing a belligerent’s acts during and after a conflict,”11 because “right intention is a 
communal, public act, for the observable circumstances are how intention is determined.”12  We 
look to those public acts because we are keen to determine whether a state has right intention 
because right intention is what matters.  Observing public acts gives a way to assess right 
intention.  We look at public acts not only because they are constitutive of right intention but also 
                                                                                                                                                             
US had already been vindicated, but the US decided to continue the fight even though Japan had already been 
beaten.  The US continued the fight in order to press for unconditional surrender and this seems unjust.  “People 
have a right not to be forced to continue fighting beyond the point when the war might be justly concluded” 
(Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, (New York: Basic Book Press, 1977), 268).  To press the war further until 
there is unconditional surrender violates right intention, but also kills many more people (both civilians and soldiers) 
than what is in fact truly necessary. 
10
     Lee, 84. 
11
     Darrell Cole, “War and Intention,” in Journal of Military Ethics, (Vol. 10, No. 3, 2011): 174. 
12
     Ibid. 
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because they are the best (maybe even the only) evidence of right intention by states.  Observing 
public conduct can evidence acts of peace or justice or both.  Acts of war are not only observable 
to the parties to the conflicts but to the international community as well.  Observing acts provide 
evidence of what states intend.     
 The way a belligerent fights has special importance because “their actions and 
proclamations, when feasible, foreshadow during a war both the kind of peace they aim for and 
the kind of relation they seek.”13  Having right intention, a state shows a commitment to a just 
society of states oriented around human rights and peaceful, respectful international relations, 
etc.   
   
3) Specific Conduct Required for a Just and Lasting Peace 
 A state aiming at justice will respect human rights, leave its enemy in a position to secure 
human rights, exercise due care in order to further insulate civilians from war, fight only until the 
rights that were violated have been vindicated, allow for political self-determination, tolerate 
regimes that honor basic human rights, and educate its own public political culture.  
 So, a state going to war with just cause and right intention must conduct itself in a way 
that manifests its aim to secure a just and lasting peace in all of these regards.  In doing so, a 
state meets the particular substantive account of what qualifies as setting conditions for a lasting 
peace with justice.   




                                                 
13
     Rawls, 96. 
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a) Human Rights 
In order to be a member in good standing in the international community a state must 
provide a political environment that fulfills human rights obligations.
14
  “Political entities are 
legitimate only if they achieve a reasonable approximation of minimal standards of justice, again 
understood as the protection of basic human rights.”15  Not only do states have to protect the 
human rights of their own citizens—to be a member in good standing—but they must also 
respect the human rights of persons in other states as well.   
 If a state has the responsibility to protect the human rights of its own citizens and to 
respect the human rights of persons in other states in order to be considered legitimate, then these 
responsibilities do not change or diminish just because states are involved in war.  States must 
continue their commitment to basic human rights as best as possible even during war. 
 Although a just state’s immediate objective is to defend itself against unjust aggression, 
“The aim of a just war by a just liberal democracy is a just and lasting peace among peoples, and 
especially with the people’s present enemy.”16  A just and lasting peace is one within which all 
states are in full compliance with basic human rights.  In order to achieve a just and lasting 
                                                 
14
     The relevant understanding of human rights is Rawlsian.  Basic human rights are those rights that are owed to 
all people and are the minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity.  They are universal in scope but are 
not prepolitical.  Human rights are a practical political creation based on common ground and shared principles and 
provide a practical function within contemporary international relations.  Rawls mentions that the parties would 
adopt as a first principle that “all persons have equal basic rights and liberties,” and “proceeding this way would 
straightaway ground human rights in a political (moral) conception of liberal cosmopolitan justice” (Ibid., 82).  That 
is, we recognize that people have certain rights and that the instantiation of human rights is really just derivative of 
the political process.  Within the international context or as a matter of international public reason, human rights 
need not be bound up with any particular conception of the person or comprehensive doctrine.  They can be and on 
Rawls’s view are affirmed simply as conditions, affirmed by liberal democracies and other reasonable well-ordered 
polities that any polity must fulfill inside its borders and respect beyond its borders in order to enjoy a right to non-
intervention.  The Rawlsian idea of human rights tries to avoid giving human rights any particular ‘ground’ beyond 
their key role in a reasonable Law of Peoples or in reasonable principles of international relations.  Instead, they are 
constituted as a fundamental basis of foreign policy.   
15
     Allen Buchanan, Justice, Legitimacy, and Self-Determination, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 5.  
Here, I adopt Allen Buchanan’s view regarding legitimacy.  Buchanan goes on to say, “The state is not merely an 
instrument for advancing the interests of its own citizens; it is also a resource for helping to ensure that all persons 
have access to institutions that protect their basic human rights” (Ibid., 8). 
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peace, states must take some special responsibility for ensuring that the human rights of the 
civilian population of their enemy are secured (through and) after the war.  A state going to war 
with just cause should conduct itself in a way that manifests its aim to respect the human rights 
of its enemy's civilian population (and soldiers).   
 States and their armies need to set/establish certain conditions in order to actually meet or 
attempt to meet this long-run aim, because as, Larry May indicates, “If the object of war is a just 
and lasting peace, then all of Just War considerations should be aimed at this goal.”17  The goal is 
not any old peace (achieved by power, impotence, modus vivendi, or status quo ante bellum) but 
peace with justice, and it is the realization of that state of affairs that constitutes the right 
intention for how belligerents should interact during and after war. 
 A state should fight in a way that not only respects human rights but also leaves its 
enemy in a position to secure human rights.  A decimated, war-torn state will not have the ability 
to reasonably safeguard its population from standard threats to basic human rights.  Lack of 
potable water, food, sewage removal, shelter, physical protection, and medical attention are 
standard threats to basic human rights that leave civilians vulnerable to significant harm and even 
death as well as at the mercy of others.  Although civilians are not intentionally targeted, they 
inevitably suffer consequences just as serious as if they were.  It is reasonable to believe that 
even the legitimate destruction of military targets (necessary and proportionate to the military 
advantage to be gained) can still gravely affect civilians.  Even more so, the destruction of dual 
purpose facilities (those that have both a military and civilian purpose such as bridges, electrical 
grids, rail and road networks, etc.) leaves the civilian populace exposed to residual harm and 
standard threats.  The harm that this situation presents to civilians should require a commitment 
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from a state to repair its enemy’s dual use facilities (those dual use facilities that contribute to 
securing basic human rights) in order to protect those civilians.   
 Lack of potable water, food, shelter, medical treatment, sewage and trash removal, and 
physical security is detrimental to any authentic process of developing a just and lasting peace.  
The basic human rights of the people of a war-torn state need to be met before any realistic 
attempt at reconciliation and transitional justice is implemented.  Doing so will also assuage 
hostility of the enemy’s civilian populace. 
 A state that fights with right intention would commit ex ante to ex post obligations such 
as ensuring that the duration of the war does not extend longer than is actually necessary (fight 
only to the point where actually their rights have been secured), not demanding the unconditional 
surrender of their enemy when not warranted, repairing destroyed dual use facilities that are 
essential in securing core human rights, and treating and safeguarding noncombatants in a way 
that insulates them from the effects of war as best as possible during and after the cessation of 
hostilities.
18
   
 Some might say that all of this follows simply from the idea that a state should fight only 
to vindicate its just cause.  However, it does not.  My claim is that fighting with right intention 
requires more than fighting only to vindicate one’s just cause.  Of course, abiding by the 
principles of discrimination, proportionality, and necessity fit within the context of fighting only 
to vindicate one’s just cause.  However, fighting for the sake of peace with justice requires more 
than just fighting solely to vindicate one’s just cause.  Fighting with right intention requires 
positive efforts such as exercising due care which provides greater protection for civilians than 
what proportionality calculations require.  Fighting for the sake of peace with justice also 
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requires a state to repair the enemy’s infrastructure that is essential to securing core human rights 
of the enemy’s civilian populace.  Furthermore, having right intention allows for self-
determination (instead of believing that a coercive regime change can be justified within the 
bounds of vindicating a state’s just cause).  And lastly, a state educating its own military and 
political culture about fundamental just war principles is a necessary requirement of right 
intention.  Fulfilling these obligations entails an easier transition toward reconciliation and 




b) Due Care 
 Right intention not only requires fidelity to the war convention but a positive 
commitment to insulating civilians from the harms of war, and this will require that a state go out 
its way to avoid civilian casualties even if this means that their own soldiers face additional risks. 
Going out of its way, means that a state exercises ‘due care.’  Michael Walzer describes due care 
as “a positive commitment to save civilian lives.”20  Due care is “not merely to apply the 
proportionality rule and kill no more civilians than is militarily necessary,”21 but a positive effort 
to reduce further harm even if the dangers imposed are proportionate to the military advantage 
expected to be gained.  “Whenever there is likely to be a second effect [foreseen but unintended 
civilian deaths as a result of a legitimate and proportionate military attack], a second intention is 
morally required.”22  The second intention is implemented in order to reduce harms to 
noncombatant (even if the target attacked is considered necessary and proportionate and the 
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tactical bomber pilot can be considered a justified threat to the civilians who are at or in close 
proximity to the military target).   
 Just because noncombatant’s rights are straightforwardly overridden by more 
countervailing consideration does not suggest that belligerents cannot implement a second 
intention (due care) of reducing even ‘acceptable’ collateral damage.  Reducing harm to civilians 
will inevitably place soldiers at greater risk while they conduct military operations.  Although 
there is a limit to what additional risks we can ask of soldiers in order to further protect civilians, 
there are clearly some risks that could be acceptable.  “The degree of risk that is permissible is 
going to vary with the nature of the target, the urgency of the moment, the available technology, 
and so on.”23 
The urgency of the situation (bombing a particular bridge before the enemy crosses it) 
might impinge a belligerent’s ability to take due care.  However, taking due care can be applied 
in other situations such as the bombing a major munitions factory.  In such a scenario where due 
care is exercised, soldiers have taken positive action in order to reduce the harm to 
noncombatants by plausibly accepting more risks.  For example, a bomber pilot flying at a lower 
altitude or in daylight may expose himself to more risk but this could very well be reasonable to 
accept especially if the enemy’s anti-aircraft defense systems (weapons designed to destroy 
incoming aircraft) have been previously neutralized.  Flying in daylight at a lower altitude would 
improve the accuracy, because the pilot would not only be able to visually observe the target but 
flying at lower altitude mitigates the effects of wind, drift, and barometric pressure on munitions.   
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Using only the amount of force necessary (economy of force) and low-yielding collateral 
damage munitions are other viable options.  The plan for bombing a specific facility should be 
assessed ahead of time in order to determine the required amount of ordinance that is necessary 
in order to make the target inoperable.  In addition certain targets especially those nestled in 
center city locations should be targeted with appropriate size munitions that are sufficient to do 
the job but are not overkill—causing more collateral damage than what is truly necessary.   
In addition, intelligence and target acquisition officers need the proper training in order to 
be able to analyze the significance and contribution of particular dual use facilities to the civilian 
population by incorporating residual (second and third order) effects into the proportionality 
calculation.
24
  But also those officers need to be held accountable for their decisions.  This will 
hopefully further facilitate thorough target planning instead of permitting the urgency of the 
situation to dictate the decisions.  
Implementing control measures to notify civilians (e.g. dropping leaflets or transmitting 
radio broadcasts that declare when a certain facility (munitions factory) is going to be bombed so 
civilians can evacuate the area or not show up for work at the factory) of an impending attack is 
another way that exercising due care can save other innocent people from unnecessarily being 
killed.  Of course, this can only be reasonably implemented when doing so does not affect the 
likelihood of the bombing mission being successful from a military standpoint.   
Implementing these measures (in most cases) will not place unreasonable risks on 
soldiers but will, however, expose civilians to fewer risks.  Trying to implement measures that 
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further immunize and protect civilians from the harms of war is acting in a way that serves the 
cause of a just and lasting peace where such a peace is one which human rights are secured and 
respected.   
Saint Thomas Aquinas’s work regarding murder is applicable for this discussion.  
Aquinas states: 
 Nevertheless it happens that what is not actually and directly voluntary and intended, is 
 voluntary and intended accidentally, according as that which removes an obstacle is 
 called an accidental cause.  Wherefore, he who does not remove something whence 
 homicide results whereas he ought to remove it, is in a sense guilty of voluntary 
 homicide.  [This happens], when he does not take sufficient care.  Hence, according to 
 jurists, if a man pursue a lawful occupation and take due care, the result being that a 
 person loses his life, he is not guilty of that person's death: whereas if he be occupied 
 with something unlawful, or even with something lawful, but without due care, he does 
 not escape being guilty of murder, if his action results in someone's death.
25
 
Aquinas’s point regarding killing someone as a result of negligence also pertains to bombing in 
war.  If soldiers, pursuing their lawful occupation, take due care (they have made a positive 
effort (a second intention) to reduce the unintended but foreseen harms that they impose) then 
those soldiers should not be guilty for those civilians’ deaths.  Exercising due care when possible 
(as in the case of a munitions factory) is necessary.  When belligerents have a duty to implement 
reasonable due care but fail to do so, those belligerents are guilty of negligent homicide or harm 
because as Rawls states, “Strategies and tactics that lead to avoidable casualties are inconsistent 
with the underlying intention of the just-war tradition of limiting the destructiveness of armed 
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conflict.”26  States manifest right intention by securing human rights and exercising due care 
which can be evidenced through public acts.   
 
c) Self-determination 
 Vindicating a just cause with right intention means vindicating it in a way that brings 
about a lasting peace with justice and the only way to set a lasting peace with justice is to allow 
for a significant degree of political self-determination for peaceful peoples that respect human 
rights.  There are two sets of considerations in favor of prohibiting liberalization or 
democratization as intended aims of war: 1) those that derive from the requirement that states 
aim at peace by not fighting longer than necessary; and 2) those that derive from the requirement 
that states aim at justice by allowing for self-determination.   
 First, many believe that democratization is the only way to guarantee peace.  Lots of 
theorists think that a just and lasting peace is a peace between states that are just and so liberal 
and democratic.  For example, Darrell Cole states, “Thus, when one begins the business of 
regime change with the goal of a just and lasting peace, that regime must be transformed into a 
democratic one.”27  And James Turner Johnson posits, “Americans would insist that a rightly 
ordered and just society—thus one at peace within itself and open to peace with other societies as 
well—is one whose people have personal freedom and whose government is democratic.”28  
Many will argue that there cannot be a just and lasting peace until all states are liberal 
democracies, either because only such states are just or because peace is likely to obtain only 
between such states or both.   
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 Rawls, aware of the benefits of liberal democracies, recognizes the fact and states, “The 
absence of war between major established democracies is as close as anything we know to a 
simple empirical regularity in relations among societies.”29  Rawls’s democratic peace thesis is 
rooted in the empirical claim that war is much less likely to occur between two democracies 
(because of their democratic social and political institutions) than it is to occur between two 
nondemocratic states or between a democratic and a nondemocratic state.  An instrumental value 
of democracies is that they do not go to war with other democracies.
30
   
 However, even if empirical evidence suggests that democracies can be relied upon not to 
go to war with one another, it is an open question whether or not we can produce stable enduring 
democracies by coercive force.
31
  Even if history suggests that international peace is most likely 
                                                 
29
     Rawls, 52-3. 
30
     “Democratic peoples, all of whose basic institutions are well-ordered by liberal conceptions of right and justice 
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     It can be argued that democracy can in fact be achieved by military coercion.  Germany and Japan have become 
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were both forced to accept the Allies’ stipulations for unconditional surrender which included democratization.  The 
Allies refused to negotiate with the German government.  The Allies stated in the terms of surrender that, “there is 
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administration of the country and compliance with the requirements of the victorious Powers” (Terms of Surrender, 
<http://www.pbs.org/behindcloseddoors/pdfs/TermsOfGermanSurrender.pdf>).  Nazi Germany had committed acts 
of genocide against millions of civilians, committed war crimes against millions of Russian prisoners of war, 
committed crimes against humanity against millions of Slavs, and had committed acts of aggression against no less 
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determination and anything short of the Allies’ transforming the German government to democratic reform was 
irresponsible.  The decrepit Nazi political and social institutions had to be completely overhauled and developed 
anew.  The Allies were justified and their coercive efforts were warranted in transforming Nazi Germany into a 
democratic state.   
        The proclamation defining the terms for Japan’s  unconditional surrender stated, “The might that now 
converges on Japan is immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid 
waste to the lands, the industry and the method of life of the whole German people; the full application of our 
military power, backed by our resolve, WILL mean the inevitable and complete destruction of the Japanese armed 
forces and just as inevitably the utter destruction of the Japanese homeland” (Potsdam Declaration, 
<http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/policy/1945 /450729a.html#1>).  Japan initially refused these terms, but realized that it 
could no longer resist the Allies’ demands after atomic bombs were dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.  Although 
the democratization of Japan has also become a success story that does not mean that coercing the Japanese 
government into a democratic state was morally justified.  Coercing the Japanese government into democratic 
reform was a calculation in utility.             
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if the states involved are democratic, it is still not obvious that coercive military force is just or a 
likely effective means in producing stable enduring democratic states.  In any case, it is an open 
empirical question whether decent peoples could be relied upon to remain peaceful with one 
another or with a democracy, but I believe that they in fact could because they have institutional 
constitutions.    
 I agree with Walter Riker’s perspective on the matter.  Much like Rawls, Riker believes 
that the conditions that secure the peace between democracies can be found in decent societies 
too.  As constitutional republics, decent societies not only “meet minimal conditions of justice 
and legitimacy,”32 but also have “well-entrenched norms restricting the use of political power 
and regulating and defining the transfer of political power; any society committed to basic 
human rights and the equality of peoples must have constitutional restrictions on the ability of 
leaders to violate these commitments”33 which restrict aggressive state behavior.  Decent 
societies respect traditional principles of justice (safeguarding human rights, honoring a state’s 
right to non-intervention, and conducting war in only self-defense) and see all peoples as equal 
and free.  “They are non-aggressive and non-expansionist, and respect the duties of non-
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24 
 
intervention and aid; thus, the interests of decent societies are compatible with those of 
democratic and other decent societies.
34
  In any case, “if decent societies pose no special threat to 
global peace, then the democratic peace thesis does not justify efforts to democratize them.”35 
 Implementing a liberal democratic regime by coercive force runs counter to the just war 
tradition.  If right intention is supposed to guide a state against pursuing a war longer than is 
necessary and fighting only until the rights that were violated have been vindicated, and also 
includes aiming at a just and lasting peace then instituting a type of government by coercive 
force against the will of its people seems at odds with the requirement that states aim at peace by 
not fighting longer than necessary.   
 I am not suggesting that an aggressive nondemocratic state does not require 
rehabilitation.  Apparently, for one reason or another, an aggressive nondemocratic state did 
unjustly attack a liberal democracy.  Therefore, something is amiss with the state that initiated 
war.  Maybe in the imagined scenario, the resort to armed conflict is a result of a border dispute 
or an attempt to obtain more natural resources and territory.  However, rehabilitation should end 
with reform that is decent and not democratic if the people of that state do not want democratic 
reform.  Coercively transforming a nondemocratic state into a democracy is not necessarily 
consistent with aiming at an enduring peace with justice.  Democracy, might be viewed “in some 
way distinctive of western political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures”36 which has the 
potential to undermine a state’s comprehensive (religious) doctrine that fundamentally guides 
and “influences the government’s main decisions and policies.”37 
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 Furthermore, it would seem that if coercive implementation of a more liberal government 
is just, then this could possibly set precedent for democratic states to initiate war not on account 
of individual or collective defense but as a new just cause—one that attempts to transform all 
decent well-ordered nondemocratic regimes because they cannot be trusted to maintain the 
peace.  Even if a decent well-ordered regime respected human rights and was nonaggressive this 
would not guarantee its safety, because empirical evidence has suggested that only democracies 
are acceptable because they can be relied upon not to go to war with each other.  This cannot be 
a just cause to initiate a war.  The democratic state’s rights were neither violated nor has the 
decent state lost its moral right to non-intervention (since it has not been internally or externally 
aggressive).   
 Rather, pursuing such an armed conflict would be constitutive of a preventative war: 
liberal State A attacks nonliberal State B because of the possibility that sometime in the near or 
distant future nonliberal State B might attack liberal State A.  Engaging in preventative war 
disregards the moral requirement of using force only when absolutely necessary and is not in 
alignment with the just war tradition.  If preventative war is wrong and coercive 
liberalization/democratization is essentially preventative war, then coercive 
liberalization/democratization is wrong as well.  Of course, this presupposes that preventive war 
is wrong.  
 In principle the question of whether a state can aim at liberalization or democratization in 
war arises only when there is also independently a just cause for war.  However, if liberalization 
or democratization is believed to be a just aim of war, then this notion has the possibility to gain 
momentum where practical means-ends reasoning take over.  Using such practical means-ends 
reasoning it would be permissible to attack nonliberal State B, because doing so would facilitate 
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it being transformed into a democratic state.  The ends justify the means.  However, given the 
complexities of our world, it would be utterly impossible to make headway towards a realistic 
utopia if we as liberal democratic people excluded nondemocratic and nonliberal polities as 
deserving recognition as equal members in the international community of states and instead 
targeted them for a regime change.  Instead, liberal democracies should focus their finite ability, 
time, and resources toward the significant nonideal conditions that aggressive outlaw regimes 
and burdened societies present.    
   Second, fidelity to right intention requires that states aim at justice by allowing for self-
determination.  A key feature of right intention is affirming a liberal commitment to tolerating 
self-determination of nondemocratic, even nonliberal polities.  Denying a state’s right to political 
self-determination by making another society that is already well-ordered and liberal more just—
more democratic or more liberal—is not a legitimate aim of coercive international force or war.  
A state that goes to war without allowing for self-determination (of polities that respect basic 
human rights) as among its ‘intentions’ lacks right intention.38   
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       Rawls holds that a just and lasting peace is a peace between decent well-ordered states, whether liberal 
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more than what Rawls thinks it demands (that is, they think it demands that all states be just), all or nearly all 
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Others might demand more but everyone demands at least what Rawls demands regarding human rights.  It is less 
demanding and so arguably less controversial and more likely to be taken up within just war theory as part of global 
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 States have a moral right to self-determination which includes the possibility of having 
democratic institutions but the moral right to self-determination does not presuppose that 
democratic institutions and practices are the only form of permissible governance.  States have 
the moral right to self-determination provided it is a reasonable political conception which is 
“understood as an irreducibly collective right held by groups that are willing and able to perform 
requisite functions.”39  Even democratic governance “is itself an exercise in collective, not 
individual, self-determination.”40  Individuals in a democracy rule themselves through elected 
officials and a representative government which possess the power to determine the outcome of 
political decisions.  Therefore, “it is simply false to say that an individual who participates in a 
democratic decision‐making process is self‐governing; he or she is governed by the majority.”41  
It is possible that some citizens will want democracy but simply find themselves insufficiently 
powerful to bring about an internal regime change because they are governed by the majority.  
Through an exercise in collective self-determination the form of governance remains 
nondemocratic.  As long as “a nonliberal society’s basic institutions meet certain specified 
conditions of political right and justice and lead its people to honor a reasonable and just law,”42 
then this is sufficient for democratic liberal regimes not to attempt to coercively force something 
more liberal or more just.     
                                                                                                                                                             
public reason.  Some will still suggest that international justice demands more than what Rawls seems to think.  
However, one may still think it is wrong to aim at the more demanding notion of coercive regime change/denying 
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 The right to political self-determination is not tied to which form of government is more 
reliable at bringing about just political outcomes but with that of legitimacy.  Legitimacy refers 
to a state being able to perform requisite political functions that safeguard its members from 
standard threats (internally protecting human rights) as well as respecting human rights of 
citizens in other states (externally non-aggressive).  As long as a state has a legitimate form of 
government—it is at least decent—then “due to the moral right to self-determination, it is 
impermissible for an external agent to interfere with a group’s exercise of its self-determination, 
even if the external agent could do a better job of protecting human rights.”43   
 Most likely, once the war is over, a defeated war-torn state will need assistance from the 
victor (just liberal democracy) in repairing decimated essential services that secure core human 
rights of it populace, but this does not suggest that the vanquished loses its moral right to self-
determination.    
 Of course, it is permissible to gradually shape and encourage progressive reform of a 
decent regime, but this should not be done by coercive means (military force, economic 
sanctions, etc.).  Rather, a liberal democratic regime should be cooperative and provide 
assistance.  Rawls states, “A liberal constitutional democracy should have the confidence in their 
convictions and suppose that a decent society, when offered due respect by liberal peoples, may 
be more likely, overtime, to recognize the advantages of liberal institutions and take steps toward 
becoming more liberal on its own.”44  I think it is quite possible that Rawls would agree that a 
just and lasting peace is one in which all states are just but have become so as a matter of their 
own free development under conditions of peace.  That is, decent and nonliberal states have 
become just and democratic by their own efforts and progression.  Only then can we conclude 
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that a just and lasting peace is one in which all states are just.  All states have become internally 
just through political self-determination, “the mutual agreement of men acting in choice of their 
government, and forms of government,”45 and not as a result of coercion.    
 If we are trying to establish a lasting peace with justice, then allowing a state to decide 
for itself what type of reasonable political conception it wishes to pursue seems plausible.  It 
should be allowed to find its own way to justice under conditions of peace.  Forcing a state to 
become more liberal when it has already met the minimum necessary conditions of decency 
would most likely be met with hostility and animosity of the people it is being forced upon as 
well as “frustrate their vitality.”46  In addition, it could hamper any authentic reconciliation after 
the war between the two states.        
 Right intention places some restrictions on a state.  Its aim in or through war to move a 
state to liberalism or democracy against the will of its people is unjust.  It is legitimate to aim at 
ensuring that human rights are met, but once they are met, a peoples’ right for political self-
determination must be respected.   States must refrain from pursuing such ends as 
democratization or liberalization; they should aim to end the war in a way that allows for 
respectful toleration, self-determination, etc., of well-ordered states.  A just and lasting peace is 
one within which liberal democracies tolerate (in the sense of granting recognition/respect to) 
other non-liberal and/or non-democratic states provided that those states honor basic human 
rights and are well-ordered and externally non-aggressive.       
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d) Education  
 Right intention is also evidenced by a state’s education of its military and a public 
political culture that is committed to just war.  Right intention involves actions taken long before 
war, namely educating the military and supporting a public political culture committed to 
conducting war subject to constraints.  That is, a state should be cognizant of what is morally 
required of it in regard to adhering to restrictions in warfare as well as what is morally necessary 
in establishing conditions for reconciliation and peace with justice before war begins.    
 Long before politicians and generals determine strategic operations and soldiers map-out 
tactical decisions to meet those aims—just war—the moral framework for armed violence must 
be incorporated into the consciousness of the state.  Without sufficient grasp of these moral 
norms and principles governing war and its applications, it becomes much easier to acquiesce or 
resort to practical means-ends reasoning.  “Means-ends reasoning justifies too much, too quickly, 
and provides a way for the dominant forces in government to quiet any bothersome moral 
scruples.”47   
 Rawls suggests that, “These principles [regarding specific restrictions in the conduct of 
war] must be in place well in advance of war and widely understood by citizens generally.”48  
Not only do states need institutions that provide a moral education to its citizens, but also 
incorporated into that education needs to be basic just war understanding along with the 
prevalent norms and principles that apply.  “These matters need to be part of the political culture; 
they should not dominate the day-to-day contents of ordinary politics, but must be predisposed 
and operating in the background.”49   
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 For example, regardless of the fact that in 1945 when the Allies were clearly going to win 
the war against Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan, the US still decided to firebomb Dresden 
(killing an estimated 20,000 civilians) and Tokyo (killing an estimated 100,000 civilians) even 
though both targets offered little military value.  At the time that these cities were decided to be 
bombed “there was not sufficient prior grasp of the great importance of the principles of just war 
for the expression of them to have blocked the handy appeal to practical means-end reasoning,”50 
so the murder that unfolded at Dresden and Tokyo was generally accepted as merely part of war.   
 It is too late to discuss conflicting principles or the issue of subordinating proportionality 
to military necessity when the situation is already at hand and when the general public and even 
a state’s military lack the basic education and awareness of such moral issues.  It is difficult to 
respect the principles of just war when people are not even aware of such moral principles.  
 Although Winston Churchill was a dynamic and charismatic leader, his own view shows 
that there was not an awareness and recognition of just war principles in the public political 
culture.  In a 1941 London radio broadcast regarding the British Air Force’s strategy of carpet 
bombing German cities, Winston Churchill stated that the Allies were making “the German 
people taste and gulp each month a sharper dose of the miseries they have showered upon 
mankind.”51  It is very hard to argue for the rights of others as well as obligations and restrictions 
in war when the political leaders of a country lack that perspective.    
 In the US there have been improvements in the public consciousness regarding just war 
through cable news, the internet, and social media.  However, it is intermittent at best; most 
citizens have never even heard of it.  In addition, US military culture lacks education regarding 
just war and the awareness and recognition of its principles.  Of course, soldiers are given legal 
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briefings concerning the law of armed conflict, but soldiers are not taught just war.  Even the 
education of the officer corps is problematic because not all military officers are privy to just war 
training.   
 Officers are responsible for planning combat operations and leading soldiers into combat.  
However, not all officers are taught just war.  This is a significant US military shortcoming.  All 
cadets at the United States Military Academy prior to becoming commissioned officers are 
enrolled in a semester long just war class where they are engaged in the discipline.  However, 
other commissioning sources such as Reserve Officer Training Corps (college ROTC) and 
Officer Candidate School (OCS), which combined make up 2/3 of all commissioned officers in 
the US, are never enrolled in such a course.  Over 60% of US Army officers are never formally 
educated in the principles of just war.  In order to effectively recognize and deal with complex 
issues in war, just war theory should be an essential and abiding component of all officers’ 
education curriculum.   
 Rawls states, “The grounds of constitutional democracy and the basis of its rights and 
duties need to be continually discussed in all the many associations of civil society as part of 
citizens’ understanding and education prior to taking part in political life.”52  A constitutive part 
of citizens’ understanding and education prior to taking part in political life must be that of just 
war: understanding that states “have the right of self-defense but no right to instigate war for 
reasons other than self-defense and to observe certain specified restrictions in the conduct of 
war.”53   
 In order to abide by the norm of right intention, these principles must be in consciousness 
of politicians, citizens, and military officers before war even surfaces.  Otherwise, the obligations 
                                                 
52
     Rawls, 102. 
53
     Ibid., 37. 
33 
 
and restrictions that the norm of right intention demands will be undermined.  “Political leaders 
and military commanders have the chief responsibility to see that war is waged justly, but 
citizens have a responsibility to hold leaders and commanders accountable for the justice of their 
nation’s war conduct.”54  In order for citizens to take this obligation seriously they need to be 
reasonably informed and educated so it becomes a part of the public consciousness.    
 
4) Totality of Conduct 
  Although right intention is a constitutive part of jus ad bellum (justice of war), a state 
cannot suggest that it has met the conditions of right intention before the war has even begun 
which is the case for other jus ad bellum tenants.  Legitimate authority, just cause, reasonable 
chance of success, last resort, and proportionate response can all be reasonably addressed and 
answered prior to the ensuing conflict.  However, right intention is different.  Political leaders 
may believe that they have right intention, but the only real way to evaluate right intention is by 
observing a state’s action throughout all phases of war because right intention is evidenced by 
observable acts that serve the cause of a just and lasting peace.  There is no way to assess 
whether a state fights with right intention without looking at the totality of its conduct, from 
before the war, to the start of the war, through the war itself, and into the postwar context—the 
implications of the ad bellum ‘right intention’ requirement are, then, significant.        
 All jus ad bellum judgments regarding right intention are provisional until the entire 
process is concluded.  Only then can we compare the actual prosecution and termination of the 
war (the observable evidence available to the parties to the conflict and the international 
community) to see if they square with each other.  This would require the institutionalization of 
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an external impartial commission (maybe comprised of the permanent and non-permanent 
members of the UNSC as well as representatives from the parties to the conflict) which would be 
tasked with substantial ex post review and assessment of the conflict, the acts of war, and the 
rebuilding and reconciliation effort between the warring parties.  The findings and evaluation 
would then be made public and disseminated among the international community.   
 This procedure would be the only way that we could, in fact, be confident that after 
reviewing all four phases of war (pre, of, in, and after) that an impartial decision could be made 
as to whether the conflict was just.  Just because a belligerent might have a just cause to resort to 
war does not necessarily suggest that conducting the war and its aftermath will be just.  If 
anything, maybe an impartial commission reviewing belligerents’ actions might instigate further 
incentives for states to do what is morally required.   
 
Conclusion 
 Saint Augustine’s perspective that we fight so we live in peace55 may be true; however, 
there is no peace—morally desirable—without justice.  Having right intention, a state not only 
limits its war-making activity to that necessary to vindicating its just cause but also publicly 
conducts its activity in a manner favorable to a just and lasting peace. 
 The content of ‘right intention’ is given by the idea of a ‘just and lasting peace’ and the 
idea of a just and lasting peace is best understood by reference to what is required by peace and 
justice.  A state must meet both aims: peace and justice.  Aiming at both peace and justice will 
facilitate an enduring/lasting respectful relationship.  A state aiming at peace fights with 
restraint, immunizes civilians from the harms of war, and educates its military.  And a state 
                                                 
55
     St. Augustine of Hippo wrote in the De Praesentia Dei Ep. 187 (On the Presence of God: Letter 187), “Peace 
should be your aim; one does not pursue peace in order to wage war; he wages war to achieve peace” (Louis Swift, 
The Earthly Fathers on War and Military Service. (Delaware: Michael Glazier Pub., 1983), 114).  
35 
 
aiming at justice respects human rights, leaves its enemy in a position to secure human rights, 
exercises due care in order to further insulate civilians from war, fights only until the rights that 
were violated has been vindicated, allows for political self-determination, tolerates regimes that 
honor basic human rights, and supports a public political culture that adheres to just war.  In 
doing so, a just liberal democracy meets the particular substantive account of what qualifies as 
setting conditions for a just and lasting peace which can be assessed when looking at the totality 
























 War has three distinct phases: pre-war, war, and postwar.  Within the just war tradition 
the postwar period has received the least amount attention.  However, over the past decade a 
groundswell of discussion of the postwar phase has occurred.  But, as of yet, no set of moral 
principles about how previously warring parties should conduct themselves has been agreed 
upon.   
 However, the legitimate wartime ends of resisting unjust aggression, reasonably 
preventing future aggression, and establishing a just and lasting peace
1
 will inform any plausible 
account of the principles of justice after war (jus post bellum).  But before moving solely into the 
post bellum phase and looking at norms that are relevant to only the postwar phase, we need to 
look at the norm of right intention.  The aforementioned legitimate wartime ends specify not only 
going to war with right intention but also fighting with right intention as well as rebuilding 
relationships with right intention.  The norm of right intention runs through all three phases of 
war.  By having right intention, a state must not only have a just cause and limit its war-making 
activity to that necessary to vindicate the just cause, but it must also seek to vindicate its just 
cause in a manner likely to yield a just and lasting peace.  That is, there are constraints that 
follow from aiming at a just and lasting peace which entails a commitment to civilian immunity 
to the idea that civilian immunity has, for dual purpose targeting, some post bellum implications.  
Therefore, we should explore the post bellum (postwar) implications of the ad bellum (of war) 
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and in bello (in war) commitments before we move too far with post bellum thinking to distinctly 
post bellum norms which are germane to only the postwar phase.
2
 
 I will argue that a just state unjustly attacked and justly defending itself, acting with right 
intention, has an obligation to restore infrastructure destroyed as part of targeting dual purpose 
facilities if the damage done threatens core human rights.  This obligation has not been 
adequately addressed and so needs full articulation.  A liberal democracy victorious in a war 
justly fought against an unjust aggressor state has an obligation to the citizens of the unjust 
aggressor, even if the liberal democracy tried reasonably to honor necessity and proportionality 
targeting requirements, ex ante.  The impact on civilians in a warzone—given the empirical facts 
of modern warfare—extends well beyond the cessation of hostilities even if the just war is fought 
justly.
3
    
 Adhering to the jus in bello principle of noncombatant immunity which is part of fighting 
with right intention imposes significant jus post bellum obligations.  Belligerents must fulfill 
certain reconstruction obligations ex post even though those obligations arise really as a matter of 
jus in bello civilian immunity norms.  Fighting with right intention would entail a more robust 
account of securing human rights and provides some of the impetus for the idea that a victor 
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     By stating jus ad bellum and jus in bello civilian immunity norm, I am referring to the jus in bello principle of 
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3
     In the imaged case that I will be discussing, the unjust aggressor state has surrendered and the just victor has an 
occupation force.  The occupation force will be used to enforce the rule of law, to assist with re-stabilizing basic 
necessities, and to help implement a regime change or with the rehabilitation of decrepit institutions.  I recognize 
that many conflicts and wars do not have an occupation force.  However, the US had an occupation force in both of 
its last conflicts (Iraq and Afghanistan).  Iraq surrendered after only six weeks of major combat operations, but the 
postwar phase which included a US occupation force lasted over eight years.  The shortcomings of how the US 
initially planned and the executed its postwar plan is what caused the groundswell of discussion regarding the 
postwar phase and its resurgence in just war theory.  Prior to the 2003 Iraq war, contemporary just war theory 
focused primarily on the ad bellum and in bello phase which is evidenced by Michael Walzer’s Just and Unjust 
Wars (which is one of the most influential contemporary just war theory books) which does not even address the 
postwar phase except to note that there are three legitimate wartime ends: resist aggression, restore the peaceful 
status quo, and reasonably prevent future aggression (Ibid., 121).  Although an occupation force will not be the case 
in every war, it is important to discuss situations like these, since these types of wars are occurring.  But even more 
so, hopefully by shedding light on such cases, states will not only recognize their post bellum obligations but also 
better plan and implement in order to meet their moral obligations.       
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should repair necessary infrastructure.  I am not arguing for any new norms but rather arguing 
for a new requirement imposed in order to respect the core human rights of civilians which the 
principle of noncombatant immunity already recognizes.   
 Immunizing civilians from harms that threaten human rights fits into any plausible 
account of what the principle of noncombatant immunity requires.  More specifically, 
belligerents are required to restore damaged dual use facilities to a level adequate to human 
rights even if the ex ante targeting was necessary, proportionate, etc.  Not only does the new 
requirement render compliance with the existing norm much more likely than it would otherwise 
be (or has been), but also abiding by this requirement shows a commitment to a just society of 
peoples oriented around human rights and peaceful, respectful international relations, etc.  
 The following is a seven-section analysis of noncombatant immunity and its post bellum 
implications.  Sections 1 and 2 detail the distinction between combatants and noncombatants and 
the link between noncombatant immunity and human rights.  Section 3 demonstrates that 
destroying dual purpose facilities is detrimental to the civilian populace and, therefore, requires 
special treatment.  Section 4 shows that the destruction of purely military targets may also kill 
civilians, but these types of targets do not cause residual effects on civilians and so do not require 
special treatment.  Sections 5 and 6 advance the point that belligerents have an obligation to 
ensure that the human rights of their enemy’s civilian populations are not compromised after 
hostilities are over because of damage it inflicted on dual use facilities, and that routine ex post 
independent review of all decisions to target dual use facilities needs to be instituted with follow 
up to see if facilities are restored.  Lastly, section 7 distinguishes between a belligerent’s primary 
obligations regarding noncombatant immunity and other states’ back-up obligations regarding 
human rights.  
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1) The Distinction between Combatants and Noncombatants 
 From both an international law and just war standpoint, there are two distinct classes of 
persons during war: combatants and noncombatants.
4
  Soldiers are authorized to kill and liable to 
be killed by enemy combatants.  Soldiers have a collective identity and represent the political 
identity for which they fight.  As Michael Walzer states, “War itself isn’t a relation between 
persons but between political entities and their human instruments.”5  Soldiers acting on behalf 
of their state attempt to impose the will of their country upon the enemy.  Whether actively 
shooting at the enemy, sleeping on their cots, or driving trucks, soldiers are viable targets, and an 
enemy soldier is morally and legally permitted to kill them.
6
  “The claim is that if a soldier is 
morally justified in killing a person in war, that is usually because the other person has acted in a 
way that has made him liable to be killed.”7  Although combatants are allowed to be killed, 
refusing quarter to those that wish to surrender, causing injury to soldiers who have surrendered, 
and causing unnecessary suffering (e.g., by using weapons such as lances with barbed heads, 
irregular-shaped bullets, projectiles filled with glass, and poisons) are strictly forbidden.   
 Soldiers are authorized to kill because they are given power rights that enable them “to 
act in a way that makes them morally liable to defensive violence.”8  Although combatants have 
power rights to kill enemy combatants, this authorization to kill is not extended to the point that 
it allows civilians to be intentionally killed.  Rather, civilians do not occupy a recognized 
combatant role within the war convention because they neither pose a direct or current threat to 
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     Walzer, 36. 
6
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others nor have they been officially designated as an official organ of the state.
9
  Because they 
are “non-combatants and do not themselves pose a direct threat to others, they are never 
legitimate targets of force.”10  Civilians have immunity rights and are not only exempt from 




Noncombatant immunity (the right to life and liberty) is a necessary feature of just war 
and a norm binding on belligerents.  Regardless if a state enters justly or unjustly into armed 
conflict it does not forgo the noncombatant immunity of its citizens.
12
  Article 27 (Part III: Status 
and Treatment of Protected Persons) of the Fourth Geneva Convention states, “Protected persons 
[noncombatants/civilians] are entitled, in all circumstances, to respect for their persons, their 
honor, their family rights, their religious conviction and practices, and their manner and customs; 
they shall at all times be humanely treated, and shall be protected especially against all acts of 
violence or threats thereof and against insults and public curiosity.”13 
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     In some cases, civilians play an informed role when it comes to the decision for a state to go to war, but I am 
focusing on the typical citizen of a state, not political leaders who make decisions without the approval of the 
civilian populace.  
13
     Department of the Army, Field Manual 27-10.  The Law of Land Warfare. (July1976), 108.   
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Noncombatant immunity entitles civilians to a level of protection of ‘more’ than just their 
basic human rights (e.g. respecting religious conviction and practices, honoring manners and 
customs, and barring threats and insults).  Belligerents acting in accord with what the principle of 
noncombatant immunity demands, would not only have to protect civilians from the harms of 
war but also making special efforts to avoid harming their places of worship, museums, 
hospitals, schools, charities, and monuments.    
   
2) Human Rights  
Although the perspective that all persons have the right to a social minimum is not 
universally recognized, it is widely recognized.  There is widespread agreement over basic 
human rights to subsistence, physical security, and certain basic liberties.  Human rights consist 
of a combination of both positive and negative dimensions of rights that necessarily entail each 
other.
14
  Human rights just are valid claims to social guarantees against standard threats to certain 
goods, so the absence of the social guarantee just is the violation/failure to secure the human 
right in question.  The fulfillment of these rights is necessary in order to reasonably safeguard 
persons from standard threats that would otherwise impinge upon the necessary conditions 
needed for any attempt at an adequate life.  Without a social guarantee against standard threats 
one’s enjoyment of basic human rights will be significantly jeopardized.  These valid claims to 
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     Human rights can be given any number of deep philosophical, moral, or religious justifications.  For example, a 
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social guarantees against standard threats to certain goods do not change when states are at war.  
That is, the circumstance of war does not negate civilians’ entitlement to this social minimum.15   
 The notion of civilian immunity is interpreted through the idea of basic human rights.  
The idea that noncombatants should be immunized from the activity of war can probably be 
taken for granted.   While civilians are to be immune from war and its effects as best as possible, 
not all effects are equal: effects that threaten or violate basic human rights are especially 
problematic because they undercut the social guarantee that reasonably protect civilians against 
standard threats.  So while civilians are to be immune from many effects of war, the most 
important effects they are to be immune from are those effects that threaten their basic human 
rights.   
All civilians need to be able to make free decisions and choices that are void of fear, 
insecurity, strife, decimated expectations, and hunger.  But in a war-torn state where food, 
drinking water, medical attention, and physical security are luxuries, it is not possible to live in 
any state of normalcy.  In these deleterious conditions, persons are dominated or controlled by 
external factors which violate their core human rights.  It is obvious that war threatens the basic 
human rights of civilians (who are located in the state where the war is being fought).  Civilians 
who are subjected to the devastation of war cannot adequately develop, express, or follow any 
determinant rational plan until the infrastructure and other essential services are restored to a 
threshold that secures basic human rights (physical security, subsistence, and certain basic 
liberties) and enables civilians to live instead of merely exist. 
Although noncombatant immunity entitles civilians to a level protection of more than just 
their basic human rights (e.g. respecting religious conviction and practices, honoring manners 
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and customs, and barring threats and insults), civilians need to be immunized from costs that 
compromise their basic human rights, and that means that they must be left not only with potable 
water, food, shelter, access to medical attention, sewage and trash removal, etc., but also with a 
state that can effectively secure those rights for them.  Without securing core human rights first, 
nothing else can reasonably follow.   
Before any other rights can be secured, core human rights need to be safeguarded first in 
order to protect civilians from standard threats and harms.  However, conventional military 
strategies—ones that focus on destroying dual purpose facilities as a way to undermine the 
enemy state and its army—affect the basic human rights of noncombatants.  My main underlying 
concern is that if civilians are supposed to be immune from the harmful effects of war, then they 
should be immune from the harmful effects of war as best as possible.  However, this does not 
happen when dual purpose facilities are targeted.   
 
3)  Dual Purpose Targets   
 Although the laws of war declare the utmost protection of civilians, in modern war more 
civilians have died than soldiers.  This has been the case in World War II (not even including the 
Holocaust), the Vietnam Conflict, the Persian Gulf War, the Second Iraq War, and in the current 
conflict in Afghanistan.  Over the past century, tens of millions of civilians have been killed in 
warfare.  Even in the 21
st
 century, conservative estimates suggest that civilian deaths in war are 
at least fivefold to that of soldiers killed.  Overwhelmingly these high death rates (in the wars 
over the past 10 years) are not from civilians being intentionally targeted by military forces but 
from the residual effects of which many stem from the targeting of dual purpose facilities.  
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Civilians die as an effect of otherwise permissible conduct in war.  That is, many die because of 
indirect effects of conduct that does not obviously violate civilian immunity. 
 Civilians die as a consequence of military necessity and legitimate acts of war.  
Legitimate acts of war, although not directed at civilians, kill them just the same.
16
  Specifically 
what I am referring to is dual purpose (dual use) targets.
17
  Just as the name suggests, dual 
purpose targets serve dual purposes: generating plants provide electricity for residential use, but 
they also provide electricity for an army’s command and control centers and barracks.  
Destroying a belligerent nation’s infrastructure (oil and fuel depots, communication centers, 
electric grids, transportation networks, and factories that contribute to the war effort) is, in 
theory, supposed to induce the enemy to capitulate faster because its center of gravity has been 
crushed since its communication network, infrastructure, and resupply capacity have been 
crippled.   
 Although it seems reasonable to suggest that hostility should be focused directly at the 
object that is actually causing the harm (such as enemy soldiers and their tanks, planes, and 
canons), this is not always the case in modern warfare.
18
  Modern war takes place in and around 
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lose its protected status if a belligerent uses it for a military purpose, it is still best (if possible) not to attack such a 
building because of the enemy’s propaganda and media exploitation that will follow from it.   
18
     Thomas Nagel advocates, “That hostility or aggression should be directed at its true object; this means both that 
it should be directed at the person or persons who provoke it and that it should aim more specifically at what is 
provocative about them” (Ibid., “War and Massacre,” in Philosophy and Public Affairs. (Vol. 1, No. 2, 1972): 88.  
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cities, and populated areas provide essential features/facilities (power grids, road and rail 
networks, radio towers, etc.) that enable a state’s war fighting abilities.  These facilities are 
permissible targets since they contribute to military activity.  However, it does seem as if 
attacking dual purpose facilities is not directing “one’s hostility or aggression at its proper object, 
but at a peripheral target which may be more vulnerable, and through which the proper object 
can be attacked indirectly.”19  Bombing dual use facilities is seen as an opportunity or as an 
easier path to one’s goal.  A belligerent is obviously not required to bomb dual purpose facilities 
yet chooses to do so for the expected military advantage to gain by it.  Along with the usual 
considerable advantage for destroying dual purpose facilities, belligerents risk taking too 
permissive a stance toward the targeting of these facilities.    
 Belligerents bomb dual purpose facilities as a way to bringing about certain results and 
can do so as long as they abide by the war convention and apply the concepts of necessity and 
proportionality.  There has to be a military necessity—a need not a desire (that is, these facilities 
must have a clear military use even if it also has civilian uses)—in order to engage specific 
targets, e.g. radio stations and radio cell site/base station towers could qualify as military 
necessity because (if destroyed) it cripples internal military communication between forces.  
Attacks on these structures are supposed to meet the requirements of proportionality in order to 
mitigate harm and collateral damage.
20
  “Loss of life and damage to property incidental to attacks 
must not be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be 
                                                                                                                                                             
Nagel’s point is that soldiers should be directing attacking enemy soldiers and that bomber pilots should be bombing 
purely military targets (military vehicles, army headquarters, army combatants, etc.).     
19
     Ibid., 87. 
20
     I am not suggesting that a military use limited force when engaging enemy combatants.  A military’s mindset is 
to gain the freedom to maneuver and use decisive overwhelming force to impose its will on the enemy.  However, 




gained.”21  But shock and awe campaigns, although legal, have serious moral underpinning 
issues.  The side effects of attacking the belligerent’s infrastructure only become exacerbated 
over time.   
The end of major combat operations does not necessarily entail that the death and dying 
for noncombatants is over.  The devastation from the war phase carries over to the postwar 
phase.  The residual effects of warfare continue to harm the civilians long after the fighting stops, 
and months later civilians continue to die as a result of inadequate living conditions.  For 
example, “by the end of 1992 [after Operation Desert Storm], more than a hundred thousand 
Iraqi civilians died from the lack of clean water and sewage disposal, and the breakdown of 
electrical service to hospitals.”22   
A frayed or nonexistent defeated government coupled with inadequate, decimated city 
services will neither be able to enforce the rule of law nor prevent residual deaths because it 
cannot reasonably safeguard its citizens from standard threats to basic human rights.  However, 
noncombatants are supposed to be insulated against the ills of war.  As Richard Miller declares, 
“Noncombatants, whatever their political affiliation, have the right not to have war waged on 
them,”23 but this seems furthest from the reality of the situation in a war-torn state.  
The just war concepts of proportionality and necessity are essential in modern warfare 
because modern war is fought in and around cities; the battles of yore—where standing armies 
met in an open and non-populated area—are gone.  Military necessity and proportionality are 
used in order to reconcile conducting legitimate acts of war with the absolute proscription of 
intentionally targeting civilians.  
                                                 
21
     The Law of Land Warfare, 5.   
22
     George, Lopez  “Iraq and Just War Thinking: The Presumption Against the Use of Force.” in Common Wealth 
Magazine. (Vol. 129, No. 16, 2002): 17.   
23
     Richard, Miller, “Legitimation, Justification, and the Politics of Rescue.” in Just War Reader.  ed. Louis 
Schwartz.  1
st
 ed.  (Mason, Ohio: Thomson Custom Publishing, 2004), 126. 
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 However, in the context of war, it may not be enough just to have a moral and legal 
principle of civilian immunity and a moral and legal principle allowing for the targeting of dual 
use facilities when proportionality and necessity criteria are met.  The empirical evidence 
suggests a need for institutional incentives because the costs to civilian immunity and the 
incentives to abuse the permission to target dual use facilities may be too high if we do not frame 
the legal permission to target dual use facilities with something like demanding more 
accountability from belligerents.  The current way of thinking allows states to target many 
civilian facilities provided that they can point to some military use or link for military use.
 24
 
 The reason to single out dual use facilities for special treatment is two-fold: 1) their 
targeting presents a special risk of allowing war activities to slip beyond the range of 
conventional military targets, to spill over to the civilian sector.  States might willingly aim at 
key civilian installations using a remote military use as a cover to legitimize their shock an awe 
campaign.  In order to allow such targeting to continue we need to place specific heavy burdens 
(ex post stipulations) in order to justify making them targets.  After all, we need to contain the 
activities of war to recognized role players and recognized sites of conflict if we hope to avoid a 
descent into some sort of no-holds-barred chaos.  2) Dual use targeting presents a special risk of 
miscalculation when it comes to the proportionality criterion, for the long term (residual) effects 
on civilians will almost always be more substantial than is expected.  These miscalculations 
enable too permissive of a stance regarding the bombing of dual purpose facilities as if they were 
                                                 
24
     Media coverage and state and international concern has abounded regarding certain drone attacks (e.g., 
violating a non-belligerent’s airspace, killing a suspected terrorist, targeting and killing the son of a terrorist, the 
secret authorization to kill US citizens deemed as terrorists by the US government, etc.).  Drone attacks that strike or 
miss its intended target and cause excessive collateral damage such as killing innocent civilians are routinely 
broadcasted on the nightly news.  Although the use of drones has brought attention to unintended but foreseen 
consequences (as well as many other issues), belligerents are not held accountable for their destructiveness of dual 
purpose facilities.  There has been neither significant media coverage nor a demand by the international community 
for stringent accountability of belligerents’ actions regarding the targeting of dual purpose facilities especially ones 
that seem to contribute significantly to the welfare of civilians.    
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nearly purely military in nature.  That is, the importance of its civilian use is often sidelined and 
downgraded in order to conclude that the dual purpose facility should be targeted and destroyed. 
 
4) Purely Military v. Dual Purpose Targets 
 Jeff McMahan states, “Sometimes an agent acts with objective moral justification but 
nevertheless threatens to inflict wrongful harm on an innocent person—that is, harm that would 
wrong the victim, or contravene his or her rights.”25  A tactical bomber that drops a bomb on an 
important enemy military facility (e.g., an army headquarters, military vehicle motor pool, 
munitions factory, etc.) and in the process kills civilians (although unintentionally) is an example 
of what McMahan refers to as a justified threat.  In such a case, McMahan argues that legitimate 
acts of war (that meet the criteria of military necessity and proportionality) override those 
civilians’ noncombatant immunity rights.  The tactical bomber pilot is a justified threat to 
civilians and is “morally justified in acting in a way that infringes the rights of an innocent 
person as a foreseen but unintended effect.”26 
 The military planners and pilot of the aircraft know that by bombing the military facility 
they will inevitably kill some innocent civilians who live nearby.  However, the military planners 
and pilot also know that the number of noncombatant deaths is proportionate “in relation to the 
importance of destroying the facility.”27  In this case, the planners and pilot were objectively 
morally justified (they are considered to be a justified threat to those civilians) although they 
killed civilians who had done nothing to lose their right not to be killed.  The tactical bomber 
pilot justifiably threatened noncombatants because the important military facility was liable to 
attack, and there was not any other plausible way to successfully neutralize this facility except to 
                                                 
25
     McMahan, 173. 
26
     Ibid. 
27
     Ibid. 
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bomb it.  McMahan notes that this is a familiar example in “debates about the doctrine of double 
effect.”28  In deciding to bomb it, the military advantage realized is sufficiently large to justify 
the foreseeable (but unintended) death of a small number of innocent civilians.  The collateral 
damage (causing foreseen but unintended damage) was proportionate to the overall good of 
destroying the military target.   
 Although discussing these types of examples is important, it does not adequately get to 
the heart of the matter.  McMahan discusses the bombing of important military facilities but does 
not deliberate about the bombing of dual purpose facilities although he even notes that “it is 
important to identify the considerations that would be relevant in war.”29  One of the 
considerations that is absolutely important to identify as relevant in war, is dual purpose 
targeting and destruction.  Because the destruction of dual purpose facilities presents special 
problems, our discussion on bombing must evolve and incorporate the significant issues 
surrounding dual purpose targeting instead of lumping all bombing together and pointing to the 
doctrine of double effect as a way to alleviate any culpability regarding legitimate military 
targets.   
 Bombing a target that only has a military purpose (such as a munitions plant)
30
 will 
inevitably (depending on what the target is) have foreseeable harms.  Bombing a munitions 
factory would most likely kill civilian factory workers and possibly those civilians who 
happened to be in close proximity to the blast radius.  However, bombing a target, having both 
military and civilian purposes, has not only foreseeable but also residual and even unforeseen 
                                                 
28
     Ibid.  
29
     Ibid. 
30
     A munitions plant does not provide any purpose to the civilian sector such as a rail network or electrical grid 
does.  Sure, it employs civilians, but the facility itself is not needed by the civilian population.  Therefore, I refer to 
such a facility as only having a military purpose.  The factory makes bullets and bombs for its military to shoot at 
the enemy.     
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harms.  The destruction of a dual use facility will likely kill civilians who are not only in close 
proximity to the intended target as well as the civilians who actually work at the facility, but 
more so will cause residual effects to civilians long after the dual use facility was bombed.  
Plenty of empirical evidence suggests that destroying dual use facilities (specifically those 
facilities that contribute to and or secure core human rights) continues to cause harm and kill 
civilians long after the bombing or even after the war is over.  Second and third order (residual) 
effects will plague the civilian populations until the facility is repaired.  When the long term 
effects of targeting a dual use facility involve a threat to the human rights of civilians, then 
special requirements apply.   
Dual use target strategies are a mainstay in the bombing campaigns of the 21
st
 century, 
because this strategy destabilizes a state’s ability to wage war by destroying or impairing 
transportation networks, electrical grids, radio towers, oil refineries, fuel depots, industry, etc.  
But we must also recognize a way to most effectively try to compensate for dual purpose facility 
destruction, since it has lingering effects on civilians more so than the enemy military force for 
which the target was deemed legitimate to destroy in the first place.       
 It is one thing to suggest that civilians’ rights during war can be overridden if certain 
conditions are met (legitimate act of war, proportionate, military necessity, urgency of the 
situation, military advantage to be gained, justified threat, etc.).  However, it is quite another to 
continually harm civilians even after the war is over.  For example, a tactical bomber pilot can be 
a justified threat to civilians working at a munitions plant because at the moment when the pilot 
attempts to destroy the factory those civilians who will be threatened is proportionate to the 
military advantage to be gained.  That is, those civilians are allowed to be threatened, even 
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killed, because there is a military advantage to destroying the factory and denying bullets to 
one’s enemy.   
 However, in the case of bombing a dual purpose facility, it cannot be the case that a 
tactical bomber pilot is not only a justified threat to civilians when he attacks the facility but that 
those civilians are then continually justifiably threatened not only throughout the war but after 
the war is over as well.  It seems odd to suggest that civilians can continually be justifiably 
threatened by an act even after the war is over because at one point during the war the tactical 
bomber pilot was a justified threat to the civilians in or around the facility at the moment of the 
bombing.   
 Once the enemy capitulates, soldiers no longer have the right to kill enemy soldiers.  That 
is, soldiers can longer be considered a just threat.
31
  If there is no longer a just threat, then there 
is no longer an objective moral justification which means that a tactical bomber pilot can no 
longer be a justified threat to civilians either.  However, it seems as if he still is, because his 
actions during the war still continue to harm and kill civilians long after the dual purpose facility 
was destroyed.   
 After the war ends, it is no longer permissible to inflict harm on civilians as an 
unintended side effect but decisions that were made during the war continue to effect civilians 
just the same.  Destroying dual use facilities (ones that are essential to safeguarding basic human 
rights) continues to harm civilians during the postwar phase when there is not any permissibility 
to override the rights of noncombatants.  Failing to repair destroyed dual purpose facilities ex 
                                                 
31
     I am using McMahan’s terminology here.  A just threat is one in which a person is “objectively morally 
justified in posing a threat of harm to which the potential victim is morally liable” (Ibid., 174).  In other words, the 
just threat is the threat justly posed, e.g. a soldier poses a just threat to an enemy soldier. “The harm that a just threat 
would inflict would neither wrong the victim nor infringe his or her rights” (Ibid).     
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post denies civilians their immunity rights of life and liberty which are the two main entitlements 
bestowed upon noncombatants.   
 My point is that when the destruction of dual use facilities threatens or violates 
noncombatants’ basic human rights, two special obligations to correct that situation arise: 1) 
recognition of a state’s obligation to ensure that the human rights of its enemy’s civilian 
population are not compromised after hostilities, and 2) routine ex post independent review of all 
decisions to target dual use facilities.  The first obligation (when fulfilled) insulates civilians 
from the harms of war, and the second obligation (when fulfilled) holds belligerents accountable 
if they unreasonably subordinated proportionality to military necessity as well as ensures that 
repair was conducted.
32
   
 
5) Ex Post Obligation: Belligerents Should Immunize Civilians from Residual Effects  
Although military necessity and proportionality are obligatory criteria that need to be met 
before bombing of a facility is conducted, these two criteria allow for latitude and interpretation.  
Attacking dual purpose targets is a contested matter from a moral perspective but can also be 
contested from a legal perspective.  There is a lot of gray area in the law when determining if a 
dual purpose target met the nature, use, location, or purpose conditions and if, in fact, the 
military advantage to be gained actually outweighs the incidental harm to noncombatants. 
 Given these difficulties in making and monitoring proportionality judgments at the front 
end, there are good reasons to not only affirm an ex post obligation to cover certain costs of 
                                                 
32
     These are independent reforms.  Ex post review might be warranted apart from the issue of repairing damages 
that violates the basic human rights of noncombatants. 
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targeting dual use facilities but also to hold belligerents accountable for their proportionality 
determinations.
33
   
 Because unilateral actions can be problematic under international law provided that there 
is not ex post accountability, Buchanan and Keohane believe that key to authorizing force is that 
“accountability operates both ex ante and ex post.”34  In similar fashion, the key to bombing dual 
purpose facilities is accountability that also operates both ex ante and ex post.  There is a 
standing need for ex post accountability given the undesirability of ex ante authorization (which 
is usually determined while trying to account for incomplete data, the fog of war, etc.).  The only 
way we can say that attacking a dual purpose target is morally permissible is if in addition to the 
criteria of proportionality and necessity, belligerents must protect civilians from the residual 
effects of war.   
 In order to allow the targeting of dual use facilities, specific heavy burdens (ex post 
stipulations) need to be placed on the belligerents that destroy them.  Imposing ex post 
stipulations help contain the activities of war instead of allowing it to spill over unnecessarily 
into the civilian sector.  Once hostilities are over, belligerents should be held morally 
accountable for repairing the destroyed dual purpose facilities that protect civilians from standard 
threats to their basic human rights.
35
  This obligation on the part of a victor is fully consistent 
with jus post bellum considerations rooted in right intention aimed at a just and lasting peace.  
                                                 
33
     My perspective is analogous to Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane’s regarding preventive use of force 
without Security Council approval.  Although I am not discussing preventive use of force, Buchanan and Keohane’s 
concept fits nicely with my point.   
34
     Allen Buchanan and Robert Keohane.  “The Preventive Use of Force: A Cosmopolitan Institutional Proposal,” 
in Ethics and International Affairs, (Vol. 18, No. 1: 2004), 11.  Buchanan and Keohane’s paper revolves around 
comparison of international bodies (UN as opposed to an external commission).  Although I use their framework, I 
am more focused on the moral aspects than the legal aspects. 
35
     Covering ex post repair costs can be accomplished multiple ways.  Most likely it would include a combination 
of not only monies but also the use of the victor’s internal assets, e.g. some implementation and integration of the 
army corps of engineers, local construction, fabrication, and supply companies of the vanquished state, international 
and local contractors, outsourcing to private firms, etc.  I wish to bracket this subject in order to stay on topic.  
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Surely a victor will be committed to a lasting and just peace rooted in mutual respect for human 
rights, etc., and defending itself in a way that evidences that (by restoring damaged dual purpose 
facilities if the damage threatens the human rights of civilians) will advance this end.
36
   
 The victor should repair such facilities not to the level that is consistent with restitution 
(restoring what has been lost back to the status quo ante) but to the level that is consistent with 
reparations (not restoring it to the original condition, but to the good enough condition).  
Dual purpose targets (those that help secure core human rights) should have to be repaired (to a 
level that is good enough) and not the status quo ante level, because it would just have to meet 
the minimum necessary standard that is needed to secure those physical security, subsistence, 
and basic liberty rights of civilians.   
 For example, if a bridge (located along a major arterial highway) was targeted and 
destroyed, that bridge would either be repaired or a new one erected, if that bridge was necessary 
in order to secure the basic human rights of some of the civilian populace because that bridge 
was the only viable means to get to a local hospital or to a drinking water well.  The 
requirements for the bridge would only have to meet the ‘good enough standard,’ e.g. it would 
reasonably have to support commerce and vehicular traffic, but it would not have to support the 
maximum tonnage allowances which are necessary for military capabilities (the moving of 
tanks), even if the original bridge did.  If for example, a power grid was destroyed, the whole 
grid does not have to be built anew, but repaired or rebuilt so it can adequately provide electricity 
to hospitals, shelters, food kitchens, government buildings, etc.  From this point, it is up to the 
host state to do more.  That is, the belligerent who destroyed these facilities is just assisting the 
                                                 
36
     If anything, fulfilling this obligation makes the occupation force more palatable to the defeated state.  Repairing 
dual purpose facilities would help set the conditions toward reconciliation.   
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defeated state get back on its feet (by repairing destroyed dual use facilities in order to prevent 
more unnecessary deaths to civilians) as the defeated state starts to rebuild.  
 Civilians should be immunized from costs that compromise their basic human rights, and 
that means that those civilians should not only have potable water, food, shelter, physical 
security, sewage and trash removal, and access to medical attention, but they also require a state 
that can effectively secure those rights for them, e.g. courts, police precincts (which enables the 
rule of law), markets, etc. are going to have to be operational.
37
  So, it looks like a victor 
committed to ensuring the noncombatant rights of civilians within the state it has defeated and a 
just and lasting peace must not leave them without these institutional prerequisites to their human 
rights.  That is, noncombatant immunity requires immunity from residual effects and aiming at a 
just and lasting peace entails ensuring that civilians have institutions and resources necessary to 
basic human rights.  That means more than just repairing government buildings, bridges, 
electrical grids, etc.  Upon the cessation of hostilities, a defeated state will not be able to 
accomplish this restoration rapidly or effectively without the assistance of the victor.   
 Even if the state with destroyed dual use facilities was the unjust aggressor and has the 
resources to repair its own facilities, the state that destroyed them must offer to repair or pay for 
the damages if the facilities that were destroyed are needed to secure core human rights.  Doing 
so is consistent with right intention.  Not only fighting with constraint but also limiting harm to 
civilians by repairing or offering to pay for repairs is a necessary condition for establishing a 
lasting peace with justice.  Doing so has the potential to facilitate reconciliation and trust 
between the warring parties as both states work through the postwar phase together.   
                                                 
37
     Disbanding the civil service of a state is most likely detrimental to any attempt to secure core human rights of 
the people of any state because civil service employees run city, state, and federal levels of government.  Without 
these people a vacuum is created and government systems flat out fail to work.   
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 In addition, there is an obligation to repair targeted dual use facilities even if the targeting 
satisfies necessity and proportionality criteria where the proportionality criteria included residual 
effects on civilians.  For example, a bridge that the enemy is counterattacking across can easily 
meet military necessity and proportionality criteria (to include residual effects) and given the 
urgency of the situation can be justifiably destroyed.  The tactical bomber pilot is a justified 
threat to the civilians in close proximity of the bridge.  However, after that attack and after the 
war, civilians who previously used that bridge as a means to reach the local hospital are no 
longer able to reach the hospital because the closest bridge is now located ten miles away.   
 Although this was not only a legitimate dual purpose target but also met proportionality 
(to include residual effects) and necessity guidelines at the time of the bombing, a belligerent 
should repair that bridge after the war to the extent that allows local civilians access to their 
hospital.  Necessary and proportionate military action poses a justified threat to civilians but this 
should only be the case during the time of the war, not after.  The bombing of the bridge was a 
justified target at the time of the bombing, but after the war the bridge’s destruction continually 
impairs civilians’ chances of obtaining medical attention.  And once the war is over it is no 
longer acceptable or justifiable to continuingly inflict harm on civilians as an unintended side 
effect because of a decision that was made during the war.  In the postwar phase a tactical 
bomber pilot can no longer be classified as a justified threat because the war is over.  However, 
the destruction that the tactical bomber pilot justifiably caused in the midst of war continues to 
harm civilians in the postwar phase when such damage can no longer be claimed to be acceptable 
or justifiable.   
Although the victor should be held morally accountable for repairing dual purpose 
destruction that it caused, this does not suggest that the victor is responsible for fixing the 
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aggressor state back to the status quo ante.
38
  Belligerents do not have obligations to cover the 
costs of destroyed infrastructure that was not essential to safeguarding core human rights.  Of 
course, history is dotted with such cases where the victor has rebuilt, even transformed, the 
government of the unjust state, but this falls outside of the parameters of what is morally owed 
by the victor to the vanquished.  Many of these endeavors—where the victor rebuilt the 
vanquished—were based on prudential considerations and a nation building ideology but not 
moral stipulations.  Nation building, securing economic privileges, or using land as power 
projection platform for one’s own troops are beneficial to the victor, but these are not morally 
necessary undertakings. 
 Larry May posits that it seems unfair to hold victors responsible for restitution and 
reparations; this is an undue burden.  May advocates a compensation fund and proposes a 
‘world-wide-no-fault insurance scheme’ akin to something like a no fault insurance policy from 
which these restoration costs would be paid.  This fund disconnects paying the costs from the 
question of ‘fault’ because all states (victor, vanquished, and bystander) would pay into this 
fund.  May states that, “All parties in a war have equal responsibilities of restitution or 
                                                 
38
     It could very well be the case that by just ‘repairing’ basic infrastructure necessary for securing core human 
rights instead of restoring it to the status quo ante that civilians’ quality of life will likely be much less than what it 
was before the war.  That is, the extent of non-basic rights that these civilians had before the war will most likely be 
curtailed for quite some time after the war.  There is a worry though, that a victor that does not restore infrastructure, 
etc., to more or less the status quo ante will risk enmity from civilians who, when faced with blaming their own 
leaders or blaming another country for their losses may be all too easily baited into blaming another country.  Just 
because the civilian populace blames the just victor for its decimated condition, does not suggest that more is 
required than repairing infrastructure that protects civilians from standard threats to core human rights.  However, 
setting the stage for a just and lasting peace, the victor might have to do more than what is required on account of 
the civilian immunity norm.  Postwar norms associated with reconciliation might require more than just rebuilding 
dual purpose facilities and basic institutions to a level that is just ‘good enough’ in order to assist a state return to its 
status quo ante as well as attenuate animosity. 
        On another note, in a different imagined scenario, it could be the case that civilians of the unjust aggressor state 
did not enjoy basic human rights on the front end before the war.  Maybe this outlaw regime funneled all of its 
money into its military and neglected its citizens’ right to have a social minimum.  In such a case, whatever dual 
purpose facilities that the just victor destroyed would have to be returned to the status quo ante, because even 
returning it to this level (status quo ante) is still subpar with a social minimum.  Returning it to anything less than 
what those civilians already had ex ante is clearly wrong because it would be decreasing the already inadequate 
capacity of that state.  Human rights norms would require more from not only the victor but also the international 
community as the back-up obligee for securing core human rights.   
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reparations whether they were defenders or aggressors during the war.”39  May further goes on to 
say, “All States are complicit in war and no States can be fully said to be without fault 
concerning the ravages of war or mass atrocity.”40   
 First, I empathize with May’s concern that holding victors responsible for restitution and 
reparations seems unfair because it is an undue burden.  However, states committed to setting 
conditions for a just and lasting peace have an obligation to repair certain infrastructure (dual use 
facilities that safeguard core human rights).  This might be a burden on the victor but it is not an 
undue burden.  Although this places a burden on belligerents to repair the damage ex post that 
they caused, it is warranted.  Belligerents do not have to destroy dual use facilities that gravely 
affect the basic human rights of the civilian population but choose to do so for the advantage to 
be gained.  Holding belligerents accountable by incorporating an ex post commitment to 
repairing dual use facilities is fair and reasonable.   
 Second, on another note, maybe as a way to have all states agree to a compensation fund, 
we do not propose that all states are complicit in war.  In some fashion we can say that states 
such as Switzerland, Finland, Luxemburg, etc. are complicit (at varying levels) in war especially 
during the middle ages.  But I think that in order to get all states to agree to contributing to a 
compensation fund we should approach it from a different perspective.  One that comes with 
realizing that our world is faced with many nonideal situations and some of those situations will 
inevitably lead to war.  That being the case, then collectively all states should contribute to a 
fund that allocates reparation monies that can be used to help rebuild states that have been 
devastated by war as a way to help those states rebuild, secure basic human rights, and establish 
conditions for a just and lasting peace.  This way, we do not universally place blame on all states 
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     Larry May, Reparations, Restitution, and Transitional Justice, 2011, 19-20. 
40
     Ibid., 22.   
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for their warring nature.  Rather, we just recognize that a system is necessary, so states contribute 
financially to a fund that is designed to alleviate civilians from the ill effects of war.   
Regardless of how the belligerent entered the fray (acting in self-defense or initiating an 
unjust war) all belligerents must be morally accountable for their actions.  Just as a liberal 
democracy defending itself has a legal right to bomb dual purpose targets so does an aggressor 
state,
41
 but it too then should be morally obligated to cover the ex post reparation costs.  There is 
a moral requirement of reparations regardless of financial hardship for both victor and 
vanquished.  Of course suggesting that belligerents are morally obligated to cover those costs is a 
separate matter from whether pragmatically there is a way to make them pay or whether other 
issues might force us to the conclusion that overall it is best for the moral obligation to go unmet, 
e.g. the unjust state is destitute after the war, the just state although victorious has suffered 
overwhelming damage to its own infrastructure and needs to tend to it first, etc.  The pragmatic 
consideration to forgo or temporarily suspend restitution because of financial hardship does not 
negate the moral obligation of belligerents.  It also could be the case that when belligerents have 
extensive financial burdens other states might assist.
42
  
Although implementing ex post restoration obligations on belligerents that destroy 
important dual use facilities to the enemy’s civilian population is important, so too is 




                                                 
41
     I am referring to belligerent’s legal rights regarding the law of armed conflict.  I do recognize though that an 
aggressor state can be charged with the crime of aggression because the war is unjust.  However, legally speaking in 
war all belligerents (whether just or unjust) have the same set of legal rules governing conduct.     
42
     I will discuss this in more detail in section 7. 
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6)  Ex Post Obligation: Belligerents Should Be Responsible for Gross Miscalculations 
 We need to shore up the moral requirements for dual purpose targeting by incorporating 
residual effects into proportionality criteria.
43
  Henry Shue and David Wippman suggest that the 
criteria for bombing dual purpose targets “unduly favors military efficiency over protection of 
the civilian population.”44  Once a target is determined to be military, its relationship to the 
civilian community and its concurrent civilian contribution is usually sidelined.  Doing so creates 
an obvious tendency to find any military use in order to legitimize attacking almost any target. 
However, dismissing the facility’s contribution to the civilian community does not change the 
fact that the damage to civilians, although “incidental or unintentional, is still real damage.”45    
 Moreover, emphasis is given to the immediate effects rather than the residual effects most 
likely because this data is easier to ascertain.  The tendency to ignore long term effects gives the 
targeting of a dual use facility a misleading look of permissibility, at least in terms of 
proportionality.  Shue and Wippman suggest that if military planners correctly did the analysis 
regarding the permissibility of attacking a dual purpose target, the “expected incidental civilian 
harm [to include cumulative effects] would be excessive in relation to an anticipated military 
advantage”46 to be gained.   
Shue and Wippman would just as soon prohibit most dual use targeting.  However, their 
position might be too restrictive because “if the law of armed conflict prohibited everything 
necessary to the effective conduct of warfare, it would simply be ignored and would quickly fall 
                                                 
43
     Shue and Wippman indicate that “the indirect costs stemming from the long-term effects … are less visible and 
more difficult to ascertain and so often ignored” (Henry Shue and David Wippman, “Limiting Attacks on Dual-Use 
Facilities Performing Indispensable Civilian Functions,” in Cornell International Law Journal, (Vol. 35, 2002), 
564).    
44
     Ibid., 560. 
45
     Ibid. 
46
     Ibid., 574. 
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into disuse.”47  If the bombing of dual purpose targets was no longer authorized, belligerents 
(whether the unjust aggressor or the just liberal democracy) would not abide by these guidelines 
because it significantly degrades their war making ability.  States would claim that they need to 
decisively engage their enemy.  That is, it is a matter of necessity to strike such dual purpose 
targets, while others would claim that these targets violate proportionality.
48
  In order to meet the 
demands of both necessity and proportionality, we need a system that works and that states will 
                                                 
47
     Ibid., 559. 
48
     I believe that Shue, in a more recent article, attempts to press his point too far.  Shue suggests that, “Current 
doctrine represents at least in part a daring attempt to return to moral-bombing” (Targeting Civilian Infrastructure 
with Smart Bombs: The New Permissiveness, 6).  The goal of moral-bombing (directly bombing populated areas) is 
to break the psychological will of the people, hoping that the citizens will in turn demand that its government sue for 
peace.  This tactic was used by the Allies and Nazi Germany during WWII.  One of the reasons that this tactic was 
accepted as part of war was that collateral damage was incredibly high in the first place even when bombing military 
targets because of the limited technology associated with bombing at the time.  In the 1940s there were not any 
smart or precision guided munitions so belligerents used carpet bombing.  At best, American bombers could 
reasonably guarantee that only twenty-five percent of their payload would strike within three city blocks of the 
desired military target.  Dropping hundreds if not thousands of bombs during a bombing run increased the likelihood 
that the military target would be destroyed.  Collateral damage and incidental loss of civilian life was extremely 
high.  It many cases, it would have been hard to tell if a specific bombing run was focused on a military or a civilian 
target because civilian deaths would be very high in both cases.     
       Shue wants to suggest that military forces—in particular the US—are now resorting back to indiscriminate 
bombing tactics like those used in WWII.  In his paper, Shue reveals the United States’ joint targeting (“Joint” refers 
to all military forces: Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines) doctrine which states, “Civilian populations and 
civilian/protected objects, as a rule, may not be intentionally targeted, although there are exceptions to this rule” 
(Ibid., 6).  However, the US Joint Targeting doctrine further stipulates what qualifies as an exception to the rule.  
“Acts of violence solely intended to spread terror among the civilian population are prohibited; the protection 
offered civilians carries a strict obligation on the part of civilians not to take an active part in armed combat, become 
combatants, or engage in acts of war; civilians engaging in combat or otherwise taking an active part in combat 
operations, singularly or as a group, lose their protected status (emphasis added)” (Joint Targeting, E-2).  That is, 
the exception to the rule that allows for the bombing of civilians is that those civilians have lost their protected status 
because they have picked up a weapon and joined the fight similar to the role of militia member, an insurgent, or a 
thug. 
        Shue’s point does have some merit though because the bombing doctrine does seems to suggest that bombings 
can cause terror so long as there is some military advantage that can be cited.  Then again it seems hard to suggest 
that there would not be terror associated with any bombings.  Even a purely military target such as a munitions 
factory that killed civilian workers as an unintended side effect would cause unease, fear, terror, and duress among 
the civilian population because civilians have neither control or insight into what will happen next.   
        US doctrine does attempt to mitigate harming the civilian population by incorporating a military lawyer (staff 
judge advocate (SJA)) into the target planning.  “The SJA should be immediately available and should be consulted 
at all levels of command to provide advice about law of war compliance during planning and execution of exercises 
and operations; early involvement by the SJA will improve the targeting process and can prevent possible violations 
of international or domestic law” (Ibid., E-6).  In addition to having a military lawyer review targets for legal 
permissibility, a plausible way forward is to better train and educate intelligence analysts (the military staff 
personnel who determine the facilities to be targeted) about the civilian contribution and residual effects imposed on 
the civilian population if specific facilities are targeted and destroyed.    
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also agree to.  Although ex ante targeting criteria might be somewhat interpretative, belligerents 
should be accountable for gross errors in their proportionality calculations.   
 Discussing preventative force, Buchanan and Keohane suggest that there should be an ex 
ante impartial commission comprised of a group of states with diverse interests that can review 
and investigate the current situation in order to determine if preventive force is warranted.  An ex 
post commission would then review the action of the initiator of the preventive war to determine 
if there were any unjust or unfounded activities and cover cases of emergency action when the ex 
ante tribunal is bypassed.  If force was not warranted, sanctions would follow.  Sanctions are 
essential, because without them, as Thucydides has remarked, “The strong do what they can and 
the weak suffer what they must.”49 
Although Buchanan and Keohane’s external commission (outside of the UN) could quite 
possibly be used to determine if preventive force is warranted, the same concept for the ex ante 
requirements of dual purpose targeting cannot be used.
50
  Belligerents wanting to bomb dual 
purpose targets should not be required to provide information to an impartial commission for 
their approval.  It is nearly impossible to see how an external commission could police the 
tactical decisions of belligerents during combat.  Ensuring that targets meet legal criteria and 
requirements should be left to the belligerent and not an external commission.   
 With this comes the fact that we will have to basically accept belligerents likely flawed 
ex ante judgments of proportionality given the inevitable fog of war (limited information, 
confusion, impulsiveness, lack of long term (residual) effects considerations, etc.).  However, an 
                                                 
49
     Buchanan and Keohane, 12. 
50
     Military lawyers, versed in the law of armed conflict, are a constitutive element of military planning cells.  
These planning cells do not need or require outside control and oversight in determining legitimate military targets.  
It seems that trying to set up an ex ante external committee to oversee and analyze the full complement of potential 
dual purpose targets is way too demanding on any external committee and would severely hamper a belligerent’s 
rapid responsiveness which is critical in war.    
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ex post external commission should be created which could then review dual purpose target ex 
ante proportionality judgments to determine  any unjust or unfounded activities in the targeting 
decision as well as review widespread effects on civilians of legitimate attacks on dual use 
facilities.
51
  Furthermore, there needs to be ex post accountability even if legal criteria and ex 
ante necessity and proportionality requirements were met.
52
   
 If there is no accountability ex post besides just repairing infrastructure, it could possibly 
be the case that targeting determinations grossly err on the side of military advantage.  That is, if 
the only accountability is nothing more than repairing a structure compared to that of an external 
commission’s review and investigation of belligerents’ actions, then belligerents might be apt to 
destroy even more dual purpose facilities.  The point is that ex post review and sanctions will 
alter ex ante decisions/reasoning.   
 These stringent requirements might impact belligerents’ decisions to bomb certain dual 
use facilities  (e.g., a major highway interchange and an electrical generation plant), so 
belligerents instead bomb alternative dual purpose targets (multiple smaller road junctions and 
electrical substations (switching units)) that would have similar effects and military gains 
without causing as much collateral damage (residual effects).  Of course lives will still be lost in 
the actual bombing, but lingering side effects would be minimized in the absence of the bombing 
of larger dual use facilities.
53
  
                                                 
51
     The bombing of purely military targets would not have to be reviewed by an ex post commission unless 
collateral damage is prima facie excessive.   
52
     An ex post review would be used just to enforce the ex post obligations.   
53
     On another note, there will be hard cases.  There will be cases that need to be reviewed to determine whether 
damage to a dual use facility caused by an attack or some other action is what threatens human rights.  For example, 
suppose State A destroyed a power plant that is dual use (it provides civilian electricity but also provides the energy 
for a major munitions plant) in State B.  After it is destroyed, State B opts not to divert power from another electric 
plant to its civilian population previously dependent on the damaged facility but rather to divert that power to the 
munitions plant.  State B should be held accountable for taking electricity away from its own citizens to power the 
munitions plant.  It is possible that State A will be obligated to repair the power grid if it decides to bomb it again in 
order to render no electricity to the whole geographical vicinity.  Or if State A decides to bomb and destroy the 
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 If the belligerent fails to acquiesce to ex post requirements of repairing infrastructure or 
an external commission’s ex post investigation and findings, then the belligerent should not only 
be morally culpable for its failure but also be subjected “to sanctions according to rules that have 
been established in advance.”54 
Although a belligerent that destroyed dual purpose facilities has an obligation to ensure 
that the basic human rights of its enemy’s civilian population is safeguarded, this does not 
suggest that decimated human rights conditions in a vanquished state impose duties on other 
states outside of the belligerent that caused the damage.   
 
7)  The Difference between Noncombatant Immunity and Human Rights 
General human rights’ responsibilities should be fulfilled by back-up obligees if the 
primary addressee cannot fulfill its responsibility.  If other states which were not involved in the 
war want to help or assist with the rebuilding and restoring in order to secure basic human rights 
or other needs of the vanquished state, then these obligations are fulfilled by obligations to 
human rights and not noncombatant immunity.  Other states (those outside the parties to the 
conflict) that wish to do so are not required to do so because of the principle of noncombatant 
immunity.  Rather, these other states, acting as back-up obligees, would be driven by human 
rights norms, not noncombatant immunity norms.   
States not parties to the conflict can have two obligations: 1) helping the vanquished, and 
2) holding the primary obligee accountable for its destruction.
55
   Third party states have the 
                                                                                                                                                             
major munitions factory, State B can then divert that power back to its civilian populace since the major munitions 
plant has been completely destroyed.       
54
     Buchanan and Keohane, 11.  How institutionally to take up that moral terrain is through the use of some sort of 
international body which would review potential injustices.  However, the organization and composition of such an 
external commission along with its rules and authoritative nature would have to be worked out. 
55
     But also, it is possible, that if the victor was destitute after the conflict, other states would volunteer to assist the 
victor with repairing the dual purpose facilities in order to protect civilians from residual harms. 
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ability to pressure and push for the triggering of specified sanctions against the primary obligee 
(belligerent) if it fails to uphold its ex post, jus in bello, obligations.  Back-up obligees should 
first pressure the primary obligee to fulfill its special obligation if the primary obligee does not 
initiate this on its own or to the extent that is needed.   
If the primary obligee refuses or needs assistance, the back-up obligee should help as a 
matter of general human rights’ assistance.  States are the back-up addressee for other states that 
need assistance in securing the basic/core human rights of their citizens.  If the primary obligee 
refuses to fulfill its special obligation, then back-up obligees should not only attempt to enact 
peaceful measures (public condemnation, targeted sanctions, etc.) against the primary obligee for 
its failure but also those back-up obligees now have the obligation to assist the vanquished state 
in safeguarding its citizens’ basic human rights.   
Noncombatant immunity norms are only between parties to the conflict.  War is a special 
relationship between parties and with it comes a set of special entitlements, restrictions, and 
obligations.  The principle of noncombatant immunity does the justificatory work and is 
particular to those two states—victor and vanquished—and their relationship in the context of 
the war.  This special duty is constitutive of this type of special relationship.  Of course 
noncombatant immunity is derived from human rights.  However, noncombatant immunity is not 
ubiquitous.  It only manifests as the driving norm within a specific special relationship: war.    
 
Conclusion   
War promises death not only to combatants but to the innocent as well.  Francisco de 
Vitoria stated, “To see that greater evils do not arise out of the war than the war would avert”56 is 
                                                 
56
     James Brown Scott. The Spanish Origin of International Law: Francisco De Vitoria and His Law of Nations, 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934), 231. 
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essential to fighting a just war.  During the war phase, the civilian population is vulnerable and 
fatally exposed to the harms of war.  However, it does not end there.  Months after the conflict, 
civilians continue to die as a result of inadequate living conditions brought about by indirect and 
unintended results from major combat operations which involve the bombing of dual use 
facilities.   
There is a lot going on when two states clash in armed conflict.  However, they should 
not acquiesce to the exigencies of war.  Derived from human rights, the principle of 
noncombatant immunity is an essential part of the war convention.  Without it, force would be 
unconstrained, and wanton violence and destruction would ensue.  Although noncombatant 
immunity is derived from human rights, the distinct principle of noncombatant immunity 
pertains to only the determinant parties to the conflict (the belligerents).   
When destroyed dual use facilities threaten or violate the basic human rights of 
noncombatants, then special obligations apply to belligerents.  Implementing ex post 
accountability is twofold: a) belligerents must immunize civilians ex post from the ills of war by 
repairing dual use facilities that contribute to securing basic human rights, and b) belligerents 
must be held accountable ex post if they grossly subordinate proportionality to military necessity.   
 Belligerents should acquiesce ex ante to these ex post requirements in order to insulate 
civilians from the lingering effects of war.  Otherwise, there is no moral underpinning to support 
dual purpose target destruction since the residual effects of war will continue to harm the 
innocent long after the fighting stops.  These obligations surface on account of abiding by the 
norm of right intention and the principle of noncombatant immunity.  Although it is not 
particular to the post bellum phase, the post bellum or ex post implications of the immunity rights 
of civilians are more robust than we have commonly thought.     
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CHAPTER 3  
Negative and Positive Corresponding Duties of the Responsibility to Protect 
 
 In the spring of 1994, the Hutus viciously slaughtered almost 800,000 Tutsis in a 
genocide campaign in Rwanda as the international community sat back and let the madness 
unfold.  Not only were the Hutus morally culpable for their heinous acts, but every state (to some 
extent) was also morally to blame for the United Nations’ failure to stop or even attempt to stop 
the Hutu rampage.  Four years after the genocide in Rwanda, President Clinton apologized for 
the Western world’s inaction in the face of such terrible acts.  Then a year later as an ethnic 
cleansing campaign swept across Kosovo, and with the members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) divided on the decision to intervene, NATO decided to stop the Serbian ethnic 
cleansing of Albanians.  However, NATO’s bombing campaign produced thousands of civilian 
deaths by causing a lack of potable water, electricity, and medical necessities.  In both cases the 
UN failed to act.    
 Even though NATO acted in Kosovo, it caused more harm than it should have.
1
  In an 
attempt to respond to the international community’s lack of action to the tragedies of genocide 
and crimes against humanity, Secretary-General Kofi Annan, during the 2000 United Nations 
General Assembly, made a plea to the international community “to try to find, once and for all, a 
                                                 
1
     The intervention in Kosovo only consisted of a NATO air campaign.  No ground forces were used.  The 
bombing focused on destroying dual use targets (electrical grids, highway interchanges, oil refineries, bridges, fuel 
depots, etc.) as a way of undermining Slobodan Milosevic’s ability to wage war on the civilian population.  
Although this strategy brought the capitulation of Milosevic’s forces, it also caused the death of thousands of 
civilians due to foreseeable but unintended results as well as residual effects (lack of potable water, food, shelter, 
and medical attention). 
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new consensus on how to approach the issue of humanitarian intervention and to forge unity 
around the basic questions of principle and process involved”2 when it is required. 
 In 2000, the International Commission for Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) 
was formulated to grapple with the surrounding legal, moral, operational, and political issues of 
the use of external military intervention for human protection.  Many issues come into play when 
determining if using force to stop force is necessary.  Nonetheless, I will focus on the moral 
aspects of military intervention.  I will show that a state can lose its moral right to non-
intervention, and when a state loses its moral right to non-intervention, military intervention can 
be required if further necessary conditions are met. 
I plan to make the case for the Responsibility to Protect as well as examine its conditions 
and content in an eleven-section analysis.  Section 1 shows the evolution of the emergent norm 
of the Responsibility to Protect but also exposes some of the worries raised by the doctrine.  In 
sections 2 and 3, I will show where the conditions of sovereignty fail there is no right to 
recognition or right to non-intervention, but that the absence of a right to non-intervention is not 
sufficient to establish either a right or duty to intervene.
3
 
The focus of this chapter turns to rights and duties in sections 4 through 8.  Securing 
physical security rights taking precedence among basic rights is the topic of section 4.  In 
sections 5 and 6, I will propose that safeguarding basic rights requires the fulfillment of both 
negative and positive duties while advocating that the international community can and plausibly 
should fulfill this duty via existing voluntary international institutions such as the UN.  Later, I 
                                                 
2
     “The Responsibility to Protect,” International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
December 2001, vii.  
3
     In my view, there are a number of necessary conditions which are, when taken all together and fulfilled, 
sufficient to justify military intervention.  These include the following: there must not only be serious, widespread 
violations of physical security rights but in order for a military intervention to be required and so permissible it must 
have a reasonable chance of success, must be a last resort, must be welcomed by those being harmed, must be all 
things considered proportionate, must be undertaken voluntarily by states, must not abridge the rights of the soldiers 
it involves, and the target state must have had ample opportunity to redress the problem itself.    
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suggest that the duty to intervene is not necessarily a military duty.  I then turn to a discussion of 
the rights of soldiers.  
  In the remainder of this chapter (sections 9, 10, and 11), I will discuss aspects of the 
obligation to intervene by looking at the availability of resources which are provided by states 
voluntarily as bearing on whether the international community is obligated to intervene.  I then 
explain that in the event that the international community fails to act where required, individual 
states may act.  The chapter ends with my proposal that the UN also has a duty to improve in 
order to more efficiently and effectively respond to this obligation. 
 
1)  The ICISS, World Summit, and Implementing the Responsibility to Protect 
 In 2001, the ICISS published “The Responsibility to Protect” which replaced the term 
Humanitarian Intervention with the term The Responsibility to Protect (RtoP or R2P).
4
  The 
ICISS replaced the term because “1) state sovereignty implies primary responsibility for the 
protection of citizens rests with the state itself, and 2) where a state is unable to or unwilling to 
avert grievous issues,
5
 the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility 
                                                 
4
     The terminology changed because the commission believed that arguing for or against the right to intervene by 
one state into another was outdated and unhelpful.  Humanitarian agencies have also had strong opposition to the 
term since it militarizes the word humanitarian.  Military action, the intentional killing of others, should be seen for 
what it is—intervention or military intervention—but should not be called humanitarian because it denigrates the 
actual meaning of the word ‘humanitarian’ which should denote actual relief and assistance, not assistance by way 
of killing those who are trying to kill others.  
5 
    In order to justify the use of military force, there has to be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human 
beings.  Grievous issues—in this context—refer to genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity.  Genocide is “any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group including: killing members of the group; causing serious bodily or mental harm to 
members of the group; deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical 
destruction in whole or in part; imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and forcibly 
transferring children of the group to another group” (The 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Article 2), <http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/genocide_prevention.shtml>).  War 
Crimes “are namely, violations of the laws or customs of war; such violations shall include, but not be limited to, 
murder, ill-treatment or deportation to Wave labour [foreign forced labor] or for any other purpose of civilian 
population of or in occupied territory, murder or ill-treatment of prisoners of war or persons on the seas, killing of 
hostages, plunder of public or private property, wanton destruction of cities, towns or villages, or devastation not 
justified by military necessity” (Charter Nuremberg Trial 1945 (Article 6), <http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/WebSearch? 
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to protect.”6  The Responsibility to Protect doctrine consists of three specific responsibilities: 1) 
The responsibility to prevent—to identify early warning signs of trouble and take action to 
mitigate underlying issues; 2) The responsibility to react—to respond to the situation with 
appropriate measures; and 3) The responsibility to rebuild—to provide (after military 
intervention) full assistance with restoration efforts.
7
  In order to justify the use of military force 
(the react phase), there has to be serious and irreparable harm occurring to human beings: 1) 
Large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product 
either of deliberate state action, or the neglect or inability to act, or a failed state situation; or 2) 
Large scale ethnic cleansing, actual or apprehended, whether carried out by killing, forced 
expulsion, acts of terror or rape.
8
   
 In addition, the ICISS states that the UNSC should take into account that if the UN fails 
to discharge its R2P obligations, then the UNSC may not rule out other means (states acting 
unilaterally, sub-regionally, or regionally) to meet the seriousness of the situation.  Although the 
ICISS states that there is no better or more appropriate body than the UNSC to authorize military 
intervention for human protection, it recognizes the case that other states might act if the UN 
fails to and that this would greatly undermine the credibility of the UN. 
                                                                                                                                                             
SearchView&Query=war+crimes&SearchFuzzy=TRUE&SearchOrder=4>).  Crimes Against Humanity “are 
namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian 
population, before or during the war, or persecutions on political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of 
the country where perpetrated” (Ibid).  Furthermore, “Leaders, organizers, instigators and accomplices participating 
in the formulation or execution of a common plan or conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes are 
responsible for all acts performed by any persons in execution of such plan” (Ibid).  Ethnic Cleansing is “the 
planned deliberate removal from a specific territory, persons of a particular ethnic group, by force or intimidation, in 
order to render that area ethnically homogenous."  (Genocide Prevention Project, <http://www.preventorprotect. 
org/overview/definitions.html>. 2009).  However, “there is no formal legal definition of ‘ethnic cleansing,’ though 
its scope is within the definitions of war crimes and crimes against humanity” (Ibid.).     
6
     ICISS, xi.  Although the ICISS states that the principle of non-intervention yields to the international 
responsibility to protect, I will make the case for an international responsibility to protect based on basic human 
rights as what we all owe to one another.     
7
     Ibid., xi. 
8
     Ibid., xii. 
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 In 2005, at the World Summit (WS) the UN General Assembly agreed that the 
responsibility to protect was an important feature in safeguarding the innocent, and unanimously 
agreed (Resolution 63/308) to paragraph 139 of the 2005 WS regarding R2P: “The UN will be 
prepared to take collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security Council, 
in accordance with the Charter, on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional 
organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity.”9  
 The ICISS suggested that the duty to intervene was not only required in actual cases of 
genocide but also in large scale loss of life without genocidal intent.  However, these stipulations 
that were incorporated in the 2001 ICISS were attenuated during the 2005 World Summit.  
Although the ICISS’s proposal was discussed during the 2005 WS, member states unanimously 
agreed to provisions that were less demanding than what the 2001 “The Responsibility to 
Protect” proposed.   
The 2001 ICISS suggests that the UNSC has a duty to intervene.  However, in the 2005 
World Summit it seems that the UNSC only has a right (not necessarily a duty) to intervene.  The 
justification for force is no longer large scale loss of life, ‘actual or apprehended’ with genocidal 
intent or not,
10
 but in cases of ‘actual’ genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansings and crimes against 
humanity.
11
  Also reacting to a crisis does not seem as paramount as it did in 2001 when the 
ICISS stated that the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to 
protect.  Instead the 2005 WS consensus was that the UN will be prepared to act on a case-by-
                                                 
9
     United Nations General Assembly 2005 World Summit, para 139. <http://www.un.org/summit2005/documents. 
html>, 2005. 
10
     ICISS, xii. 
11
     UN GA 2005 WS, para 139. 
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case basis.  On another note, the World Summit does not make any reference to the international 
community’s ability to take independent action if the UNSC fails to take action.  This makes it 
seem as if the UN wants to position itself as the only institution that can decide when 
intervention is warranted.   
 In 2009, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon issued “Implementing the Responsibility to 
Protect” to the General Assembly in an attempt to transform the results of the 2005 World 
Summit into a R2P operational policy.  The operational framework consists of three pillars: 
Pillar One—the protection responsibilities of the state (secure and protect human rights and 
support work of the UN Human Rights Council); Pillar Two—international assistance and 
capacity building (develop mutual and active partnerships and assist those failing states that are 
“under stress before crises and conflicts break out”12); and Pillar Three—timely and decisive 
response (which can involve not only peaceful measures (UN Charter (Ch VI)), but also coercive 
measures (UN Charter (Ch VII)).
13
   
 Sovereignty implies responsibility.  However, “it is the responsibility of the international 
community to take timely and decisive action to prevent and halt genocide, ethnic cleansing, war 
crimes and crimes against humanity when a State is ‘manifestly failing’ to protect its 
population.”14  But essential to employing coercive action when necessary is for the permanent 
members of the UNSC “to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the veto in situations 
                                                 
12
     “Summary of the Report of the Secretary-General on ‘Implementing the Responsibility to Protect,’” 
International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), <http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/files/ 
ICRtoP%20Summary%20of%20SG%20report.pdf>, 2009, 2. 
13
     While things like 'freezing assets' may be 'peaceful' they do seem to involve compulsion or coercion.  Within 
the context of the R2P doctrine, ‘peaceful measures’ refers to measures/actions that do not involve military 
intervention.  Peaceful measures—depending on how intrusive they are—can be used as a form of persuasion or as a 
form of coercion; although possibly coercive, they are a lesser form of coercive means compared to that of military 
intervention.  
14
     Ibid., 3.  Additionally, “The Security Council and the General Assembly can appoint fact-finding missions to 
investigate and report on alleged violations of international law; the Human Rights Council may also deploy a fact-
finding mission as well as appoint a special rapporteur to advise on the situation” (Ibid., 4). 
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of manifest failure to meet obligations relating to the Responsibility to Protect, as defined in 
paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome, and to reach a mutual understanding to that effect.”15  As 
of 2009, the General Assembly reaffirmed its respect for the UN’s Charter, recalled the results it 
had reached for R2P during the 2005 WS, and decided to continue its consideration of R2P. 
 In 2010, the Secretary-General published “Early Warning, Assessment and the 
Responsibility to Protect” not only to inform but also to strengthen interactive dialogue in the 
General Assembly.  This was followed in 2011 by “The Role of Regional and Sub-regional 
Arrangements in Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.”  Three key points in this document 
detailed below are the essential nature of the regional and sub-regional actors, peaceful measures 
as a strategy to mitigate situations, and the necessity of coercive means to stop genocide. 
 First, the UN recognizes that regional and sub-regional actors are not only essential in 
monitoring human rights violations and assisting in capacity building, but also have a stake in a 
neighboring state’s protection of its citizens because violations or grave failures could possibly 
have spillover effects (refugees and potential violence) into one’s own state.   
 Second, the report recognizes that enacting peaceful measures can be a strategy to 
mitigate the situation; however, the UN wholeheartedly recognizes the shortcomings these 
measures have.  “Financial tools like travel bans, targeted sanctions, and restrictions on arms and 
equipment often take too long to become effective, are difficult to implement and monitor, and 
can cause collateral damage to trading partners and neighboring countries.”16 
 Third, cognizant that sanctions can be problematic and unreliable, the report recognizes 
(although it is used as a last resort) the importance of coercive means, but also recognizes its lack 
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of procedural development regarding the implementation of coercive means (military 
intervention) to stop genocide.  “The Report notes that these methods [military intervention] are 
necessary but underdeveloped, needing further discussion.”17  This point is critical to explore 
since coercive means will on occasion be needed to stop or prevent acts of genocide, but the UN 
has no effective standing military capacity.  
 Although the UN has recognized this emergent norm and has taken positive steps to 
develop such a framework, it is still is unclear on how the responsibility of using sanctions or 
using military force should be distributed, planned, resourced, and executed.  Paragraph 139 of 
the 2005 WS (as the basis for the R2P doctrine) is inherently problematic because it states that 
the UNSC will review each violation on a case-by-case basis instead of universally declaring that 
it will take appropriate measures regarding all manifested failures to protect.    
In addition some of the UN literature is ambiguous.  Article 2.7 of the UN Charter states: 
“Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the 
Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter.”18  In addition, Article 
138 of the 2005 World Summit, (which comes before Article 139 on R2P) declares that, 
“Individual sovereign states still bear the primary responsibility to protect their populations, and 
we accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.”19  The ambiguity in the doctrine 
encourages some to believe that the notion of sovereignty always entails a right to non-
intervention instead of the realization that sovereignty is itself conditional on securing human 
rights, among other things.  “Not surprisingly, governments tend to be very keen on the idea of 
political sovereignty; they tend to assume that they have an automatic right of military resistance 
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to any violation of national sovereignty”20 or perhaps they just believe that they are in fact 
legitimate.   
 Either way, I am not discounting that states should bear the primary responsibility for 
protecting their own citizens.  However, better articulation and clarity of that concept is needed.  
Articles 2.7 and 139 have been cited by countries that do not consent to external coercion.  In 
certain situations, when the UN has contemplated the use of external force to remedy human 
rights violations, the states that are responsible for these violations have posited that granting the 
use of coercive means is too rash because it is the state that has the primary responsibility to fix 
the issue and not the international community.  Jennifer Welsh notes that some state violators 
have attempted to dissuade the international community from getting involved by trying to 
“delegitimize external involvement in their internal crises; in the case of Darfur, for example, the 
Sudanese government claimed that it had not yet manifestly failed to exercise its primary 
responsibility to protect its population and that outside intervention was therefore premature.”21  
 
2) Sovereignty and the Right to Non-intervention is Conditional    
 Shortly after the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia, which denounced external influence into 
domestic affairs and established state sovereignty, Thomas Hobbes and John Locke developed 
their own nuanced version of the state sovereignty concept.  Hobbes suggests that since man is 
always competing for honor and dignity he must be subdued and coerced in order to compel his 
obedience and performance.  Hobbes states, “Coercive power is used to compel men equally to 
the performance of their covenants, by terror of some punishment, greater than the benefit they 
                                                 
20
     Richard Norman, Ethics, Killing and War, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 156. 
21
     Jennifer Welsh, “A Normative Case for Pluralism: Reassessing Vincent’s view on Humanitarian Intervention,” 
in International Affairs, (Vol. 87, No. 5: 2011), 1200. 
75 
 
expect by the breach of their covenant.”22  Establishing a common power is the only way to 
protect citizens against the injuries by others and against an invasion by foreigners.  The only 
way to establish such a common power is for members of a state “to confer all their power and 
strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce all their wills, by plurality 
of voices, unto one will.” 23  The sovereign commands his subjects but is himself above the rule 
of law.  All of the subjects will obey those items which “concern the common peace and safety, 
and therein submit their wills, every one to his will, and their judgments, to his judgment.”24   
 What follows is that, “nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what 
pretence [sic] so ever, can properly be called injustice, or injury,”25 because the sovereign has 
ultimate power to decide what is best.  Furthermore, a sovereign ruling and controlling a piece of 
territory has the right to rule as he sees fit, because for Hobbes the international domain is a state 
of nature, and no one really has secure rights in a state of nature.  Not only does a powerful 
sovereign have absolute domestic power, but also international unchecked freedom since there is 
no global sovereign.  States can be interfered with, aggressively attacked, and so on, without any 
violation of a right to non-intervention.  Justice does not prevail.  Rather, the international 
domain is predicated on survival of the strongest where wealth, power, and rational interests 
guide actions instead of justice.  Peace between states is achieved by power, impotence, or 
modus vivendi.   
 Locke’s account of sovereignty is much different.  For Locke, a state’s people are not 
considered subjects but citizens.  Men voluntarily unite into a community of government—a 
body politic—for public good and safety.  It is the consent of the people from which a ruler 
                                                 
22
     Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. J.C.A. Gaskin, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 95. 
23
     Ibid., 114. 
24
     Ibid. 
25
     Ibid., 141. 
76 
 
derives his power.  As Locke posits, “The governments of the world, that were begun in peace, 
had their beginning laid on that foundation, and were made by the consent of the people”26 and 
not by absolute unchecked power and coercion of the people, because men agree to join and 
unite into a community “for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, 
in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it.”27  
 Some reciprocity exists between ruler and citizen and both are subject to the rule of law.  
Citizens not only have certain basic constitutional rights but also have the right to evaluate, 
criticize, dissent, and even secede from their body politic.  The sovereign’s rule, “in the utmost 
bounds of it, is limited to the public good of society; it is a power, that hath no other end but 
preservation, and therefore can never have a right to destroy, enslave, or designedly to 
impoverish the subjects.”28   
 If a sovereign uses its power to destroy, enslave, or impoverish its citizens, then that 
sovereign—failing to uphold the standards of conduct that it was charged with—will not only 
cause alarm and concern domestically but also internationally among the free system of states.  
“Actions of men and of rulers must be in conformity to the laws of nature.”29  A sovereign who 
has renounced the way of peace and who has used force to accomplish his unjust ends such as a 
despot, “renders himself liable to be destroyed by the injured person, and the rest of mankind, 
that will join with him in the execution of justice, [against] any other wild beast, or noxious 
brute, with whom mankind can have neither society nor security.”30  Locke’s view, arising out of 
natural law, supports a conditional notion of domestic sovereignty or legitimacy, and the idea 
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that the international order is bound by various moral norms rooted in natural law, supporting, 
perhaps, a right to non-intervention for legitimate sovereign states. 
 The Lockean notion of sovereignty has slowly taken hold of and begun to shape 
international law and politics and practice.  This constrained notion of a state’s power (subjecting 
itself to a limited authority both domestically and internationally) would inevitably become the 
world order that we have today.  The Lockean conception of sovereignty is conditional upon the 
fulfillment of certain moral criteria.  That is, we have moral criteria governing the legitimacy and 
recognition/standing of states.  “Political entities are legitimate only if they achieve a reasonable 
approximation of minimal standards of justice, again understood as the protection of basic 
human rights.”31  States that adequately protect core human rights are recognized as “a member 
in good standing of the system of states, with all of the rights, powers, liberties, and immunities 
that go along with that status.”32  David Luban points out: “When State A recognizes State B’s 
sovereignty it accepts a duty of non-intervention in B’s internal affairs; in other words, it 
commits itself to pass over what B actually does to its own people.”33  If a state does not meet 
this minimum standard of justice then that state loses its moral right to non-interference, because 
“a state must be legitimate in order for a moral duty of non-intervention in its affairs to exist.”34 
Sovereignty, insofar as it entails a right to non-intervention, presupposes legitimacy and 
legitimacy presupposes the effective realization of core human rights, including physical 
security, subsistence, and basic liberty rights.  “Human rights set a necessary, though not 
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sufficient, standard for the decency of domestic political and social institutions.”35  This 
necessary standard implies a dual responsibility: “externally—to respect the sovereignty of other 
states, and internally, to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state.”36  
A state that adequately protects and respects the human rights of its own people as well as 
respects the human rights of citizens in its external relations with other states can be a considered 
a member in good standing in the international community because “it successfully carries out 
the requisite political functions,”37 needed in order to guarantee its legitimacy.  
 
3) Intervention is Required 
 Although members of the international community share principles and common ground, 
these states do not take interests in everything other states do.  However, they do take interest 
when states fail (whether deliberately or not) to reasonably secure these basic rights of their 
citizens.  The key point here is that to guarantee a state’s right to political self-determination and 
non-intervention it must reasonably honor the core rights of its people.   
 States that manifestly violate core human rights (whether intentionally or not) lose their 
moral right to non-intervention because they not only violate the basic rights of their citizens but 
also “pose a fundamental threat to peace and stability within the international order.”38  A state 
that has failed the moral conditions of legitimate sovereignty leaves the state system with a gap: 
there is a population neither organized nor represented by a legitimate state resulting in the 
destabilization of the state system/international community.  It is as if a population becomes 
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‘stateless’ since its state fails to fulfill certain conditions necessary to recognition as a legitimate 
state in the international arena.  The state system is a system of states.  If we have moral criteria 
governing the recognition/standing of states, then the system is compromised where those 
conditions are not fulfilled.     
 There are many conditions, including a fairly wide range of human rights conditions, a 
state must fulfill in order to merit recognition and a right to non-intervention.  Failing any of 
these will leave it without a claim to recognition and without a right to non-intervention.  But 
other states cannot justify an intervention by simply pointing out that the ‘state’ they are 
intervening into has no right to non-intervention.  That it has no such right to non-intervention is 
a necessary condition of the permissibility of an intervention, but not a sufficient condition.  
 Military intervention is required and so permissible only if a number of further necessary 
conditions are fulfilled.  In my view, there are a number of necessary conditions which are, when 
taken all together and fulfilled, sufficient to justify intervention.  I am not arguing for a view that 
picks out any one condition as sufficient to render intervention permissible.  Rather, the only 
sufficient condition is the fulfillment of all the necessary conditions.  In addition to a state’s 
inability or lack of intent to secure basic physical security rights, other necessary conditions must 
be satisfied, e.g. a military intervention should be a last resort, should have a reasonable chance 
of success, should be proportionate (all things considered judgment), should not abridge the 
rights of soldiers who are implemented, should be undertaken voluntarily by states that have the 
resources to do so, should be reasonable to suppose that the victims of the genocide campaign 
would actually welcome military intervention as a form of rescue, and the target state should 
have had ample opportunity to address/correct the problem itself.
39
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4) Physical Security Rights take Precedence  
Security, subsistence, and basic liberty rights, according to Henry Shue, are all necessary 
to the existence of any rights at all.  If anyone is to have any rights at all then they must have 
basic security, subsistence and liberty rights which are necessary to the existence of any rights at 
all.  The idea is that you cannot enjoy any rights as a matter of right unless you enjoy the basic 
rights as a matter of right.  “Basic rights, then, are everyone’s minimum reasonable demands 
upon the rest of humanity; they are the rational basis for justified demands the denial of which no 
self-respecting person can reasonably be expected to accept.”40    
Although on Shue’s account genocide might engender our sympathies in an especially 
dramatic way, the human rights violation is not any more ‘basic’ than where subsistence or basic 
liberty rights were also violated.  In a sense, the rights violation of any basic physical security, 
subsistence, or liberty right is equally ‘basic’ for Shue, so if societies are committed to honoring 
any rights, then they must be committed to honoring security, subsistence, and liberty rights 
since these are the most basic.  However, R2P doctrine, as it currently stands, does not support 
this.  But as a moral matter, R2P doctrine should be extended in order to cover all basic rights 
(physical security, subsistence, and basic liberty) violations because all of these rights are 
equally basic.   
The widespread systematic violation of subsistence and basic liberty rights seems just as 
much a threat to agency as widespread killing, etc.  Agency is “the capacity of each individual to 
achieve rational intentions without let or hindrance.”41  Agency is “individual empowerment.”42  
When individuals have it, Michael Ignatieff states, “They can protect themselves against 
                                                 
40
     Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy. (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1980), 19. 
41
     Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 57.     
42
     Ibid. 
81 
 
injustice, and they can define for themselves what they wish to live and die for.”43  Without a 
reasonable guarantee of protecting subsistence, basic liberty, and physical security rights there 
cannot be any possibility of any type of agency or political agency by a population.   
 However, as a pragmatic matter, we should limit military intervention to that of 
protecting persons from widespread and systematic physical security rights violations.  
Resources are finite and to expand the list of what would require R2P military intervention to 
include subsistence and basic liberty rights violations is beyond the scope of what the 
international community can muster.  Instead the international community can use lesser forms 
of intervention (political persuasion and pressure, sanctions, etc.) as part of the R2P platform in 
order to hold states accountable for their gross subsistence and basic liberty failures that do not 
have an immediate and irreparable impact on civilians like acts genocide do.  
 For a military intervention to be pragmatically acceptable and morally required it must be 
aimed at immediately occurring systemic physical security rights abuses of the most serious sort: 
genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  R2P military intervention 
should be reserved for grave cases where not only is a basic right being violated but so too is 
agency and the harm imposed is immediate and irreparable. 
 The physical act of murder cannot be undone nor can the psychological effects of being 
tortured, raped, or witnessing love ones being killed, maimed, tortured, or raped be undone.  Not 
all harms are equal.  Some are more destructive, and R2P military intervention should be 
reserved for the most serious of harms.  The basicness of the right, the irreparable, immediate, 
and grave harm incurred, and the deliberate stripping of agency is why the securing of physical 
security rights should pragmatically take precedence over all other basic rights.    
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Of course, lack of freedom of movement (being quarantined) or lack of food/shelter cause 
harm but this is not the same kind of harm as being slaughtered.  Pragmatically, physical security 
rights should be considered as having a special status compared to other basic rights.  Genocide, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity impose significant physical and psychological 
dimensions of harm that are immediate, extreme, and irreversible.  Malnourishment or lack of 
freedom can be fixed, not discounting the fact that extreme malnourishment and quarantine (e.g., 
starving a population as a form of slaughter, keeping a group captive in a camp and subjecting 
them to forced labor, etc.) could possibly be used as a calculated means to achieving genocide or 
ethnic cleansing.  In such a case, R2P military intervention should still be triggered because it is 
still a situation in which one groups intends and has enacted the physical destruction (genocide) 
of another group, but instead of using machetes or gas chambers, this group uses starvation and 
forced labor as the vehicle to accomplish it.    
This does leave at odds though some serious physical security rights violations of ethnic 
cleansing (e.g., quarantine, displacement, prevention of sexual relations, deportation).  These 
violations could be resolved through the use of other peaceful/ less coercive measures instead of 
military intervention because these physical security rights violations are neither immediate (as 
in losing one’s life) nor necessarily irreparable.  Rather, these types of violations require time in 
order to produce the desired results.  Therefore, implementing measures short of military 
intervention have the potential to resolve the situation.   
 
5) Safeguarding Basic Rights  
 We can say that all persons have the right to life.  All persons have the basic right to 
subsistence, physical security, and basic liberty but “the proclamation of the right is not the 
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fulfillment of the right.”44  Rather, there needs to be assurance that the right is honored, because 
basic human rights are universal in the sense that they set the conduct for all states to “prevent, 
or to eliminate, insofar as possible the degree of vulnerability that leaves people at the mercy of 
others.”45  The fulfillment of basic human rights is necessary for any attempt at an adequate life.  
All legitimate states are committed to the human rights of their citizens.  This commitment 
requires states to do more than simply not violate the human rights of their own citizens.  It 
actually requires the institutionalization of positive action.  Otherwise, basic human rights cannot 
be reasonably safeguarded. 
 A basic right such as physical security entails both negative and positive corresponding 
duties in order to effectively safeguard that right and actually guarantee its fulfillment.  The basic 
idea behind positive and negative duties is that the positive ones “require other people to act 
positively—to do something—whereas another kind of rights [the negative ones] require other 
people merely to refrain from acting in certain ways—to do nothing that violates the rights.”46  
The underlying distinction between the two categories is one of action and omission of action 
 Living in a polity, a person has a negative duty to refrain from intentionally harming 
others “but it is impossible to protect anyone’s rights to physical security without taking, or 
making payments toward the taking of, a wide range of positive actions.”47  If the fulfillment of 
honoring these security rights is solely based on the negative duty to avoid doing harm, the 
negative duty would not reasonably guarantee the fulfillment of those rights.  If there is not an 
institutional apparatus that protects citizens against threats to physical security, then some 
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citizens might choose to violate this duty for various reasons, e.g. because of a lack of moral 
education, a lack of a willingness to comply, or a lack of penalty for noncompliance. 
If the right not to be killed is taken seriously then efforts to enforce its correlate duty not 
to kill must be made.  There has to be a social guarantee against standard threats that jeopardizes 
one’s enjoyment of physical security rights.  The institutionalization of positive duties helps 
enforce the negative duty.  A society can safeguard the security rights of its members by way of 
restraint and protection against non-restraint.  To ensure that security rights are honored, 
action/positive steps are taken to accomplish this since we realize that this will be an effective 
and efficient way to protect persons against non-restraint.  Positive duties are used to stop and 
punish, and the most effective and efficient way to do this is by designing institutions to do just 
that.  Members of the polity understand that the institutionalization of positive duties is necessary 
because it is the best way for coordinating requirements that are essential.   
 Members of the polity pay taxes which are used to fund a professional police force, 
criminal courts, prisons, educational system for criminal justice professionals, and the moral 
education of all members.  States are the primary addressees for the implementation and 
operation of positive duties.  That is, states are obligated to protect their citizens.  Insofar as the 
positive duties can be most reasonably fulfilled by a state, then it follows that in order for there 
to be any rights at all there must be states or at least some type of social form that effectively 
distributes duties.  Although they may not be absolutely necessary, states are the most obvious 
candidate since we not only live in a world comprised of states, but they also effectively 
distribute duties (enforcement, remediation, back-up addressees etc.).  If we are going to have 
states, then they must protect core rights.    
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 Persons not only have a negative duty to refrain from doing harm, but also a positive duty 
not to allow such action.  If a perpetrator attacks someone and others witness the attack, they do 
not necessarily have an obligation to stop the ensuing attack but do have an obligation to assist 
when required, e.g. calling the police, providing an eyewitness account, testifying in court, etc.  
The negative duty to refrain from harm coupled with a basic social structure that protects the 
right provides a reasonable guarantee of a person’s basic right to physical security.  Murders 
although tragic will still occur.  However, as long as that state is reasonably doing what it is 
expected to do in order to protect its citizens from violations of physical security rights that state 
meets a necessary condition towards legitimacy.
48
   
 States that invest a reasonable amount of resources in order to arrest, prosecute, and 
punish perpetrators for their failure to comply with physical security rights meet a necessary 
condition of legitimacy since they not only sufficiently protect the security rights of their 
members but the state also aids/remedies the situation in which the victim has had his security 
rights violated.  The state incarcerates the perpetrator as a form of retribution but also to prevent 
recidivism.  The victim may also receive medical treatment, counseling, and even restitution.  By 
protecting physical security rights, we can say that even a violated person’s right to life/security 
was honored since the perpetrator has been brought to justice.  Even if there is murder, or even 
potentially widespread but isolated murder, it does not necessarily mean that these are human 
rights violations.  If a state reasonably fulfills its duty of policing, prosecuting, imprisoning 
criminals and aiding the victims, then it has acted reasonably within the domestic jurisdiction.     
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6) The International Community should fulfill this Duty via the UN 
 Human rights are a practical political creation based on common ground and shared 
principles which are “minimum reasonable demands upon the rest of humanity.”49  If states are 
committed to realizing human rights, then they must be committed to protecting them.  This 
commitment requires them to do more than simply not violate the human rights of 
noncompatriots.  States must also act together to ensure that there is some international system in 
place that will reliably protect the human rights of noncompatriots, remedy violations, etc.   
Without any effective international system that takes positive action to protect those rights, basic 
human rights will be violated by governments that either do not care or that are unable to provide 
for their people at one time or another.   
 This being the case, it is not enough for states to only be the primary obligee without any 
back-up addressees.  Having back-up obligees provides a level of guarantee and protection of 
subsistence, basic liberty, and physical security rights that could not be met otherwise.  This is 
important because basic human rights impose the same duties on all states.  It binds all of us 
together.  Human rights are what we owe each other.  Every person is a duty bearer, so if a state 
fails in its responsibility then others have a duty to help through the auspices of their state. 
 In order to manage this responsibility and coordinate behavior we have two options: 1) 
create a new global institution to oversee the international community or 2) use the existing 
global structure that we have.   
 The practical choice is to use an existing global structure that is familiar with human 
security issues.  The United Nations has been instituted to facilitate cooperation between states 
with regard to international law, trade, security, human rights, and peace.  While it does seem 
problematic in many ways, the UN, ideally conceived, works in conjunction with regional and 
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sub-regional arrangements by supporting dialogue, education, and negotiation.  One major 
problem of the UN is that its membership includes some outlaw states and that its Charter 
language is ambiguous.  Also problematic is the current veto rule of the permanent members of 
the Security Council.  Furthermore, the UN’s original purpose was mainly to facilitate 
diplomatic engagement, not to function as a vehicle for something like R2P.  However, with 
modifications and improvements, the United Nations can make headway in order to adequately 
address and remedy R2P cases. 
 Having an organization of states reduces the burden on any one state.  Using an 
institution that has the organization, potential military capacity, and ability to fulfill the positive 
duty is a plausible way to fulfill the obligation that the duty demands.  Without any hierarchal 
organization to oversee the obligations, there are not any feasible strategies for most states on 
their own to fulfill their obligation to this duty.  An international unified effort is more effective 
because it is equipped to implement a course of action that is not only necessary but also 
sufficient and feasible. 
 First, the use of a collaborative process (whether it is sub-regional, regional, or global) 
would help assuage concern that the hegemonic US would monopolize R2P and use it as a cover 
for advancing imperial ambitions.  In addition, a collaborative process has the potential to 
encourage a state to assist that might otherwise be focused on self-interested motives (economic 
costs, public opinion, war fatigue, national interests).  Furthermore, a cooperative effort can also 
mitigate other forms of inaction.  For example, the bystander effect is the phenomenon that 
happens when people witness a person in distress.  As the number of bystanders increases in a 
given situation, the possibility that one of the bystanders will assist the person in need decreases.  
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The more spectators the greater the chance for inaction because there is a false belief that another 
will intervene.   
 Each state waiting for another state to take the lead could lead to idleness.  Moreover, 
entertaining the idea of conducting unilateral action could be so overwhelming (exorbitant 
economic costs, no clear exit strategy, lack of experience in dealing with these types of issues) 
that it leads to inaction.  Although regional and sub-regional alliances, coalitions, and 
organizations can mitigate the bystander effect and play a considerable role in monitoring human 
rights violations and assisting in capacity building, they are not a global federation of states.    
 Regional and sub-regional alliances and coalitions can attempt to or possibly alleviate a 
particular situation, but the UN should be not only cognizant of such action but should also have 
the ability to agree to such action.  Otherwise, cases could be hit or miss if left up to regional and 
sub-regional organizations.  Leaving R2P implementation to regional or sub-regional alliances, 
coalitions, and organizations could quite possibly lead to inconsistent responses and to a varying 
degree of assistance just because of a state’s particular geographical location.  Hopefully, the UN 
as a federation of states can oversee all R2P cases and apply a level of impartiality, consistency, 
and uniformity to all states in duress.   
 It could also be the case that a state (in addition to supporting the actions of the UN) still 
wants to further assist in some fashion (maybe because of historical, political, or geographical 
ties).  If a state decides to go above and beyond of what is required of it through the UN, this is 
permissible, supererogatory even, provided that the state is not doing so for personal gain.  Risks 
may be associated with states acting unilaterally, even if supererogatorily though.  The initiation 
of unilateral action, particularly extensive unilateral action (e.g. sending military advisors, 
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weapons, and equipment) should have to be agreed upon by the UN to assure that no ulterior 
motives are present, and if they are, to assure that those personal gains are not reached.   
 
7) Intervention is All Things Required  
 In addition to the existence of severe, widespread, and systematic violations of basic 
physical security rights, it is necessary for the UN to evaluate the remainder of the necessary 
conditions that need to manifest in order for military intervention to be considered required.50   
Reasonable Chance of Success: Can the R2P military force not only defeat the target 
regime but also be able to accomplish such a task with limited loss and damage to its own force 
and resources?  In cases where the failing state allows foreign military intervention or does not 
have a large modernized force to stop the military intervention, the peace-enforcing force51 has a 
greater chance of success because it can adequately interdict the harm to civilians without having 
to defeat the target state’s large standing army.  However, in other cases, military intervention 
will not be successful, e.g. a despot who not only refuses access to a foreign military force but 
also has a large modernized army with a significant air defense capability.  In such as case, 
                                                 
50
     Necessary conditions which are, when taken all together and fulfilled, sufficient to justify intervention are as 
follows: there must be serious, systematic, and widespread violations of physical security rights; the military 
intervention must have a reasonable chance of success;  must be a last resort; must be welcomed by those being 
harmed; must be all things considered proportionate;  must be undertaken voluntarily by states; must not abridge the 
rights of the soldiers it involves; and lastly a stipulated timeline in which the state has an opportunity to redress its 
violations but fails (whether deliberately or not) to do so.  Once the evidence establishes that the state either has no 
intention to fulfill or cannot fulfill its members’ basic physical security rights then military intervention is required.       
51
     ‘Peace-enforcing’ and ‘peacekeeping’ forces are terms used by the UN and NATO.  A peace-enforcing mission 
usually involves non-permissible borders.  That is, at least one party to the conflict (the targeted state) does not 
welcome outside intervention, so the foreign military force is not given permission to enter the target state’s 
territory.  As a result, the peace-enforcing military unit enters the target state by force.  A peace-enforcing mission 
will most likely involve combat operations in order to subdue forces that not only have failed to follow UNSC 
resolutions but also continue to pursue their unjust and aggressive aims.  Peacekeeping missions are usually 
welcomed by the parties to the conflict.  These parties have usually agreed to an armistice and prefer the assistance 
of UN sponsored troops to keep the peace between the two parties.  Both peace-enforcing and peacekeeping 
missions are not necessarily about peace but about enforcing rights.  R2P military intervention is limited to severe 
violations of physical security rights, so there is a sense in which it secures some measure of peace (in the sense of 
stopping a certain sort of violence), but the goal is vindicating the rights, not merely securing peace (which could be 
obtained perhaps by making large cash payments to despots, etc.). 
90 
 
military intervention seems counterintuitive, and intrusive conventional coercive measures 
should be ruled out by the nature of the adversary since success (if one can call it that) would 
come at a very high cost of loss of life to soldiers of the peace-enforcing force as well as 
significant destruction to back-up addressees’ finite resources.  At any rate, this does seem 
problematic because the use of R2P military intervention will be preferential toward weak or 
failing states as compared to those that pose a moderate to powerful military.  
Last Resort: Have all other alternatives been tried before initiating a military 
intervention?  The initiation of a military intervention should not be premature.  Less intrusive 
(peaceful) measures should first be initiated in order to hold the offending state accountable.  In 
addition, the offending state must be given an adequate amount of time to redress the situation.  
The UN should make every effort to achieve a pacific settlement because it recognizes that a 
full-scale military intervention is the last resort.  However, this does not suggest that other less 
intrusive coercive measures are a last resort.  It could be the case that peaceful measures coupled 
with less intrusive coercive measures (no fly zones, naval blockade, drones, etc.) are employed 
as a way to stop a state’s conduct after initial diplomatic, cultural, and economic sanctions have 
failed to work.   
Just because a state (as the primary addressee) has manifestly failed to protect the 
physical security rights of its citizens does not suggest that there is no other recourse for the UN 
(as the back-up addressee) but to expeditiously take on the actual requirement of fulfilling the 
human rights of those whose rights are violated.  Rather, the UN as the back-up addressee can 
fulfill its duty by either pressuring the failing state to fulfill its primary obligation or by rescuing 
the victims because the state has failed in its obligation.    
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Given these two choices, the UN/international community will of course first attempt to 
persuade (e.g., negotiations, public criticism or condemnation (this is what James Nickel refers 
to as jawboning)
52
 and if needed compel/coerce the state (e.g., economic sanctions, withholding 
of assets, denying trade, etc.) to fulfill its primary obligations before any attempt at 
implementing military force to rescue the innocent and to physically force the culprit to change 
its behavior.
53
  The UN cannot license intervention at the very first sign of a state’s failure to 
secure basic human rights.  This would essentially undercut a state’s status as the primary 
addressee. 
 Welcome the Intervention: Do civilians who are being harmed by their own state actually 
welcome the military intervention?  That is, would civilians reasonably subject themselves to 
further danger knowing that the force that is intervening is there to stop the genocide and 
ultimately protect them?  I believe that in such an imagined scenario where other implemented 
actions (negotiations, sanctions, etc.) have not worked, civilians realize that they will continue to 
be harmed by acts of genocide, and so would willingly accept a military intervention even if 
there is a possibility of being unintentionally killed by UN forces for the chance to be saved from 
the horrors from which they currently suffer.  Civilians in this dire circumstance recognize that if 
there is not a military intervention the murdering of the innocent will continue. 
 Stipulated Timeline: Military interventions should not be launched prematurely.  States 
that have failed in their duty to reasonably safeguard the physical rights of their citizens are 
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     James Nickel, “Are Human Rights Mainly Implemented by Intervention?” in Rawls’s Law of Peoples: A Realist 
Utopia? eds. Rex Martin and David Reidy. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2006), 271. 
53
     Although “the primary aim is to rescue not to punish,”
53
 (Larry May, Genocide: A Normative Account, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 231) there is a worry in the language that ‘rescue’ is too weak.  
Establishing refugee camps or no fly zones could temporarily rescue civilians from harm, but this does not solve or 
stop the problem; it just creates different problems.  Any adequate long term solution will have to address the 
rehabilitation of decrepit political and social institutions as well as try offenders in the International Criminal Court.  
Military intervention should not be a never ending commitment or blank check, rather only what is adequately 




pressured to fulfill their duty to protect and fulfill the duty to aid/remedy the situation.  The 
notion of allowing states to remedy internal issues is important.  Giving states a chance to fulfill 
their duties as primary addressees of their citizens’ human rights seems consistent with R2P and 
the Lockean conception of sovereignty.    
 However, a reasonable assessment and timeline must be stipulated to the offending state.  
If a timeline is not dictated to a state, then it is the state once again that has unlimited authority 
over its citizens, and this should not be the case.  The question though is how much of an 
opportunity a state should have to bring itself into compliance with human rights before it loses 
its right to non-intervention.  It seems reasonable to suggest that a state’s moral right to non-
intervention is questionable until the evidence establishes that the state either has no intention to 
fulfill or cannot fulfill its members’ human rights.54  We should assume no right to intervene 
unless it can be shown that there are widespread human rights failures and that there is no local 
prospect of them being corrected in a reasonable time frame.  Once we see certain facts that 
establish a right to intervene, that state has lost its right to non-intervention, and military 
intervention is required (as long as all necessary conditions have been met).  Implementing a 
military intervention would not only be used to stop the irreparable, immediate, and grave harm 
but also to secure the rights of those people.  The international community only fulfills that 
obligation after the attempt to pressure the state has not worked and systematic and widespread 
harm remains.    
                                                 
54
     I endorse the existing R2P doctrine which limits application to only actual rather than apprehended widespread 
violations of physical security rights.  This seems to be a better choice instead of allowing belief or perception to 
dictate that R2P intervention is necessary.  It is not just enough that the state (primary duty bearer) fails the duty but 
that persons actually lack the object of the right.  That is, the content or object of the right is not secured for them.  
Persons that are the victims of a genocide campaign are denied the object of the right, namely physical security.  
Specifically, civilians are actually being harmed by acts of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against 
humanity.     
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All Things Considered Proportionate: Will the military intervention save and protect 
more lives than it will harm?  If a military intervention has to first defeat a large standing army, 
the bombing of dual use facilities will be the lynchpin of such an operation in order to degrade its 
adversary’s ability to communicate, resupply, and move forces.  Such action would most likely 
kill thousands of civilians from unintended results and residual effects which clearly undermines 
why the UN used military force in the first place.  This could very well violate the notion of 
proportionality.  Of course this depends on what good is achieved on the other side of the 
balance.  However, prima facie this type of strategy seems overly destructive.  
In addition to analyzing this type of proportionality, an ‘all things considered’ 
proportionality analysis must be conducted as well.  The proportionality analysis should not only 
pertain to the states that are about to take up arms.  Evaluating the proportionality criteria must 
be an all things considered analysis that encompasses the effects on not only the warring parties 
but also takes into account sub-regional, regional, and global effects.  The proportionality 
analysis pertains to the ability to secure the just cause in light of the harm (to include accounting 
for destructive second and third order effects not only to the parties to the conflict but to other 
states in the region as well).  I call this an ‘all things considered’ judgment to draw attention to 
the fact that second and third order effects (instigating greater regional instability, escalating a 
sub-regional conflict into a regional war, etc.) need to be accounted for instead of myopically 
relegating the proportionality analysis to merely the initial belligerents of the conflict. 
It could quite possibly be that the UN has pro tanto reasons in favor of committing 
forces.  However, in conducting a thorough all things considered judgment, the UN recognizes 
that although it has a genuine reason for committing troops it is not so decisively because by 
doing so it could instigate a larger conflict in the region or even a World War III type scenario.  
94 
 
The UN has a genuine reason for action, but the implementation of force does not necessarily 
override competing reasons that are also present.  In such a case, the expected good to be 
achieved does not outweigh the harm done.  
In sum, military intervention is required and so permissible when all necessary conditions 
have been met.  If one of the necessary conditions is not met then a full-scale military 
intervention is not justified.  However, just because a robust military intervention is not justified, 
this does not suggest that the UN is excused for inaction in situations that fall within the scope of 
R2P.  The UN must fulfill its duty to protect and aid as best as possible in every situation.  
However, the extent of the intervention can change depending on the situation.  It is possible that 
lesser coercive forms (naval blockade, weapon caches, drones, etc.) are required (if they do not 
trigger worse results) even though a conventional R2P military intervention could not be 
justified.  There will also be cases where pacific means have been or will be exhausted but with 
little effect but are really the only reasonable options to pursue.  Sometimes the UN as the back-
up addressee—although it might have potential peaceful and coercive measures at its disposal—
will not be able to fully intervene to the extent necessary to stop severe physical security rights 
violations because of one or more of the necessary conditions not being met.  However, the UN 
is all things considered required to intervene to some degree for all R2P cases.     
The UN has a positive duty to protect and aid in every case of genocide, ethnic cleansing, 
war crimes, and crimes against humanity, but this leaves unanswered the question of how other 
states ought to treat a state’s failure of sovereignty arising out of something other than a 
systematic widespread violation of physical security rights.  A possible proposal is tying certain 
sorts of failures to meet the conditions necessary to sovereignty to certain sorts of treatment in 
order to effect the delinquent state to reform its current practices or failures.  One possibility is to 
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create a kind of sanctions scale ranging from low- to mid- to high-level sanctions/actions in order 
to compel a state to redress its widespread and systematic violations.  R2P peaceful measures is 
appropriate/permissible in response to a certain kind of failure of sovereignty (widespread and 
irreparable violations of basic rights (physical security, subsistence, and basic liberty)) but that 
R2P coercive measures (military intervention) is only appropriate/permissible in response to only 
widespread and systematic violations to physical security rights: genocide, (some forms of) 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  (See Table 1. Sanction Scale).
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Table 1. Sanction Scale 
Human Rights Violation Initial Response Follow-up Response 
 
Religious discrimination, 
violations of free speech 
rights, arbitrary arrests and 
imprisonment, sexual and 
gender based violence, 
summary executions, etc. 
Low-level 
Peaceful Measures 
Diplomatic and cultural 
sanctions—e.g. concern, non-
recognition, refusal to participate 
in cultural exchanges, exclusion 
from various undertakings within 
global civil society, etc. 
 
These human rights violations although serious do not 
constitute military intervention.  Depending on the 
severity though the international community would 
implement low-level and possibly mid-level peaceful 
measures.  These would be implemented as a result of 
triggering R2P.  
 
Large-scale recruitment and 
use of child soldiers,  
refusal of humanitarian aid to 
its people, widespread gender 
based violence, and R2P 
specific issues: genocide, 
ethnic cleansing, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity 
Mid-level 
Peaceful Measures 
Diplomatic, cultural, and economic 
sanctions which include public 
criticism and condemnation, denial 
of trade, freezing assets, etc. in 




Coercive measures which include implementing 
peacekeeping envoys, naval blockades, providing arms 
and supplies to the civilians who are being harmed, etc. 
  Mid-level 
Coercive Measures 
Coercive measures which in include  establishing no fly 
zones, disabling electronic network systems, using drones 
and special forces advisors, etc. in addition to 
implementing  low-level coercive measures 
  High-level 
Coercive Measures 
Coercive measures which include destroying the targeted 
state’s air assets (jetfighters and attack helicopters) to a 
full-scale military intervention in addition to 
implementing  both low- and mid-level coercive measures 
* Coercive measures are only implemented once all necessary conditions have been met.  Coercive measures range from low- to 
high-level depending on what level of force is reasonable and proportionate and in alignment with all things considered.     
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     Demarcating measures into peaceful and coercive is consistent with R2P doctrine terminology.  As stated 
earlier, some peaceful measures are coercive in nature.  However, the distinction between the two categories lies 
with the use of military force which is deemed as a ‘coercive measure.’  Everything short of implementing military 





At the less intrusive end would be various low-level forms of diplomatic and cultural 
measures/sanctions (non-recognition, refusal to participate in cultural exchanges, exclusion from 
various undertakings within global civil society, etc.) that would be initiated in order to show the 
international community’s intolerance for violations of free speech rights, arbitrary arrests and 
imprisonment, sexual and gender based violence, etc.  These infractions would trigger R2P 
peaceful measures designed to deal with the aforementioned human rights violations.
56
   
 Mid-level sanctions would be focused on undermining serious widespread and systematic 
violations such as large-scale recruitment and use of child soldiers, refusal of humanitarian aid to 
its people, widespread gender based violence, and R2P specific issues: genocide, ethnic 
cleansing, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  In these type scenarios, both low-level 
(diplomatic and cultural sanctions) and mid-level (public criticism and condemnation) and 
economic sanctions (from denial of trade to freezing assets, etc.), would be implemented in order 
to pressure the state in violation to redress the situation.
57
   
 If the targeted state does not redress its violations and widespread and systematic 
violations continue such as genocide and crimes against humanity, then in addition to the 
previous sanctions listed various forms of coercive sanctions as the most intrusive form of 
correction should also be implemented.  Coercive sanctions range from low-level (peacekeeping 
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     While a state that widely denies free speech rights will fail to satisfy the conditions of sovereignty thus will 
have no right against intervention, other states may not permissibly intervene militarily since that is not the kind of 
human rights violation that justifies military intervention though it might justify cultural, diplomatic, or economic 
sanctions or some other sort of response.   
57
     Cases of genocide could quite possibly invite ‘high-level’ action, but ‘mid-level’ sanctions could be initiated 
right away.  It is not that genocide only calls for ‘mid-level’ sanctions.  Rather, the UN implementing its R2P 
doctrine could start pressuring the failing state by imposing peaceful but stringent ‘mid-level’ measures right from 
the start.  Implementing these measures would show the state in question that the international community does not 
tolerate a state’s failure to safeguard core physical security human rights.  It would have the added benefit of giving 
the UN time to evaluate that states’ compliance with the international community’s demands before deciding 
whether some level of military intervention has met all necessary conditions.    
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envoys, blockading sea routes, supplying weapons to the civilians that are being harmed, etc.) to 
mid-level (creating no fly zones, disabling electronic network systems, using drones and special 
forces advisors, etc.) to a high-level (from destroying the targeted state’s air assets (jetfighters 
and attack helicopters) to a full-scale military intervention). 
Developing a detailed account here of such a spectrum by listing all of the various sorts 
of failures that could jeopardize or revoke a state’s moral right to non-intervention along with the 
various sorts of sanctions that should be applied at each level of transgression would be difficult, 
if not impossible.   
Rather, these suggestions offer a framework for the proposed R2P military intervention 
previously defined.  The international community led by the UN has a series of sanctions 
(peaceful and coercive) that it can implement depending on the given situation.  When there is a 
case of genocide, ethnic cleansing, war crimes, or crimes against humanity, intervention of some 
sort by the international community is all things considered required.  Sometimes peaceful 
measures will be the only viable actions.  Other times it might be possible to implement mid-
level peaceful sanctions along with low-level coercive measures (naval blockade and providing 
weapons).  
Although it would be nice to think that the UN will always initiate a military intervention 
to stop acts of genocide, this is more of an ideal than realistic.  However, in cases where the UN 
has done what it reasonably can and the killing continues, the moral stain—blame—rests with 
the state (primary addresses) which is killing its citizens rather than with the international 
community which as the back-up addressee has fulfilled its positive obligations as could 
reasonably be expected.   
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Although the UN is all things considered required to intervene, “how much sacrifice can 
reasonably be expected from one person for the sake of another, even for the sake of honoring 
the other’s right?”58  This question leads to the two remaining necessary conditions that must be 
addressed—not abridging the rights of the soldiers it involves and using one’s resources for 
someone else.  
 
8) Rights of Soldiers  
 Charles Beitz indicates that, “The experience of the period since 1990 is mixed and 
suggests that the prospects for success vary with the particular political aims of an intervention, 
the circumstances of the society intervened in, and the military capabilities and political will of 
the intervening agent.”59  As Beitz suggests, the political will of those that intervene plays a 
serious role in determining if intervention will even take place or if it does, then to what extent.  
Thomas Hill and Kok-Chor Tan both raise points about this issue.  Tan posits that, “The right of 
a state not to intervene, or its right to remain neutral, is an aspect of its sovereignty.”60  And Hill 
raises a broader point: “Should we use the state’s resources to help others?”61  Additionally, it 
maybe one thing to spend money and provide supplies to another state in order to assist its 
population, but it is definitely quite another—as Larry May notes—to jeopardize/sacrifice the 
physical security rights of one’s own soldiers in order to protect non-compatriots.   In these 
military intervention type scenarios, Jeff McMahan notes that it would not be hard to imagine 
that soldiers would want to resist taking part in such an operation even by falsely claiming to 
oppose it on moral grounds.   
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     Shue, 114. 
59
     Charles Beitz, The Idea of Human Rights, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 39. 
60
     Kok-Chor Tan, “Military Intervention as a Moral Duty,” in Public Affairs Quarterly, (Vol. 9, No. 1: 1995), 31. 
61
     Thomas Hill, “Kant and Humanitarian Intervention,” in Philosophical Perspectives, (23, Ethics, 2009), 230.   
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No doubt, if coercive means are used, the UN peace-enforcing force will have casualties, 
but this should not be seen as a reason to forgo coercive measures if warranted.  However, a 
state’s soldiers dying on behalf of non-compatriots do raise some concerns that need to be 
addressed.  May states, “It is especially problematic for one state to abridge, or risk of abridging, 
the special human rights of its own citizens so as to protect the general human rights of the 
citizens of another state.”62  May further advances, “A State’s soldiers and other citizens have 
human rights that may, and sometimes should, be taken into account whether to wage 
humanitarian war,”63 because “the justness of the cause does not mean that the rights of those 
that serve in defense of that cause should always be overridden.”64  It is not that the rights of 
soldiers should be an overriding concern, but they should not be dismissed either.  Rather, they 
should factor into the analysis of whether initiating a military intervention is morally acceptable.  
Some believe that sacrificing the basic rights of soldiers to save non-compatriots—in most 
cases—seems like a disservice to a state’s soldiers.  For this reason, May believes, “It is 
especially difficult to justify jeopardizing the lives of soldiers and the basic interests of civilians 
when we are talking not about wars of self-defense but about wars undertaken for humanitarian 
reasons.”65   
Fundamentally the role of soldiers is to defend their state from acts of aggression by other 
state or non-state actors.  That is, by defending their state’s political sovereignty and territorial 
integrity, they protect the lives of their innocent compatriots.  Another way that soldiers protect 
the lives of their innocent compatriots is by participating in R2P military interventions.  The 
volatility of an outlaw regime has the potential to effect the stability and order of the 
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     Larry May, “Conflicting Responsibilities to Protect Human Rights,” 2012, 7. 
63
     Ibid., 1.  May states that not only are soldiers’ rights being affected but citizens’ rights as well since they will 
have to bear the financial burden of the military intervention.   
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     Ibid., 11. 
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     Ibid., 13. 
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international domain.  Outlaw regimes do not abide by arrangements or treaties nor do those 
states effectively control their population from instigating aggressive and criminal acts 
domestically.  So soldiers that are implemented as a R2P military intervention force to stop acts 
of genocide and end an outlaw regime’s reign are—in a sense—defending their homeland and 
the international community against instability and spillover effects as was the case with the 
Allies against Nazi Germany.   
Multiple states working in tandem form a collective self-defense force that is used not 
only to stop acts of genocide but also to protect the international community.  However, there is 
a limit to this perspective.  The actual threat that Nazi Germany posed cannot be generalized to 
all cases of genocide, since most cases—like that of Rwanda, Darfur, and Cambodia—did not 
truly affect the international community.  In most cases, soldiers used in an R2P mission will not 
be indirectly defending their homeland, and ultimately in most cases soldiers would be placed in 
harm’s way in order to save noncompatriots.  Although we can recognize that soldiers accept risk 
in helping others, it is one thing to volunteer for military service and yet quite another to be 
dragooned into it. 
Conscripts are forced to serve the state (such is the case in Russia, Austria, Brazil, 
Turkey, and Norway).
66
  A state may have the right to force its citizens into military service and 
make them fight to defend their compatriots and government.  However, it seems unreasonable 
to suggest that they should fight in a distant land to save civilians of another country when they 
never volunteered for military service in the first place.    
A volunteer force is different.  Some believe that there is a high-level of patriotism 
among those citizens who freely elect to enlist.  Whether there is a high level of patriotism or 
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     Russia, Austria, Brazil, Turkey, and Norway have compulsory military service for all males.  The period of 
enlistment is limited to twelve months of service.  However, the officer corps of these states is comprised of an all-
volunteer force.    
101 
 
not, one can reasonably understand why—as McMahan suggests: “Professional soldiers would 
not be tempted to try to exploit a provision for selective conscientious objection as a means of 
evading service in a just war of national defense,”67 because by fulfilling one’s role as a soldier 
in a just war of national defense, that soldier not only has fulfilled his professional obligation but 
more importantly has protected friends and family, compatriots, and one’s way of life.  However, 
key factors such as protecting one’s compatriots and one’s way of life in a just war of national 
defense are immaterial when it comes to R2P military intervention into another state.   
For this reason, McMahan suggests that, even if the military intervention is just, “it 
would not be surprising if some soldiers sought to exempt themselves from fighting in such a 
war by spuriously claiming to be opposed to it on moral grounds.”68  That is, some soldiers 
would want to shirk their professional obligation because they would believe that protecting 
others in a distant land is not what they in fact enlisted for and falls outside of the scope of their 
responsibility.
69
  Therefore, they would in any way imaginable figure out how not to participate 
in such an operation.   
I understand McMahan’s concern that some soldiers would attempt to evade or believe 
that they in fact have no obligation.
70
  However, before we rush to impose significant penalties 
against those soldiers as McMahan advocates, I think that we need to first take into account 
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     Jeff McMahan, Killing in War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 100.   
68
     Ibid. 
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     In order to hold these soldiers accountable for their lack of willingness to fulfill their professional obligation, 
McMahan indicates that a partial solution is “to impose significant penalties on active-duty conscientious objectors; 
soldiers granted selective conscientious objector status after receiving wages, training, and so on from the military 
would have to submit to these penalties as a means of demonstrating their sincerity; penalties could range from 
forfeiture of the benefits of military service, such as educational assistance and retirement funds, through 
compulsory public service to imprisonment” (Ibid., 101).  McMahan does go onto to say “If, on the one hand, he 
refuses to fight and the war is in fact just, he will fail in his duty, as a soldier, to protect innocent people” (Ibid., 
141).  If he refuses then someone else will have to replace him. “Perhaps the real victim of his refusal to fight would 
be the person who would have to replace him and be exposed to the risks of war in his stead” (Ibid.)   
70
     Soldiers, at least those conscripted and perhaps those who volunteer to get out of poverty or without any real 
knowledge of what they are volunteering for, will deny that they have any obligation to risk their lives for the human 
rights of noncompatriots. 
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soldiers’ basic human rights as Larry May does.  Key to honoring soldiers’ rights is that the 
peace-enforcing force (military intervention) should be comprised of volunteers; a detailed 
mission analysis should be conducted prior to disembarkation; and the justness of initiating 
military intervention operations should be decided by the international community.  Fulfilling all 
three of these requirements still places soldiers’ basic rights in jeopardy, but it precludes 
unnecessary risks or rights abridgment.
71
    
My own view is that states have an obligation to participate in R2P efforts to protect non-
compatriots, but sending troops to save non-compatriots is only permissible if a state’s soldiers 
actually volunteer for military service and that those that volunteer are aware of the many types 
of missions that they might be involved in before they enlist.  That is, soldiers have a duty to 
save non-compatriots but only if they freely volunteer and are cognizant of the fact that they 
might be implemented for R2P efforts.  
Although there has been a growing trend over the last few decades of states (e.g. the US, 
United Kingdom, France, China, Canada, New Zealand, Sweden, Poland, Japan, and Australia) 
having an all-volunteer military, the term volunteer is still problematic in two ways: 1) we can 
say that citizens freely choose to enlist, but wherever unjust background conditions exist we can 
infer that low-income citizens with less opportunities will most likely make up the 
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     Only then (after these three conditions have been met) can we justifiably subject soldiers to significant penalties 
for refusing to participate in military intervention operations. 
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preponderance of a state’s military,72 and 2) of those who enlist, they may not fully understand 
the role (in addition to national self-defense and natural disaster relief) that they might play.
73
   
Of course we can give some weight to the fact that they voluntarily enlist.  However, we 
cannot place the whole crux of the point that they volunteered unless those two conditions have 
been met.  In order for a citizen to be truly deemed a volunteer, that citizen would not only have 
to reside in a state which has just background conditions but also that citizen would have to be 
aware of all of the potential roles that a soldier could be used for.
74
   
 Maybe currently there are only a few countries that have just background conditions.   
If citizens, as co-legislative members of the state (with just background conditions and fully 
understanding what they are volunteering for) freely consent without mental reservation to enlist 
to serve their state, then we can say that those soldiers actually comprise an all-volunteer force.  
Therefore, in either case, defending their state and compatriots or defending non-compatriots in a 
distant land, an all-volunteer force is not being used against its will.  However, as it currently 
stands, the preponderance of military forces will most likely be comprised from states that have 
substantial militaries like that of the US and China, but these states do not have just background 
conditions.  
                                                 
72
     Citizens who enlist might be patriotic.  However, there are other reasons that attract low-income persons to join 
the military as well, e.g. college money, financial bonuses, job security, occupation training, family medical 
insurance coverage, or even a ticket out of an economically depressed town are reasons that play a considerable role 
(in addition to being patriotic) in determining if one should enlist or not.  In such cases, are citizens freely deciding 
to enlist or is it that given these unjust background conditions, many citizens really do not have many alternatives to 
joining the military? 
73
     Being cognizant that as a soldier one will defend one’s own country or assist one’s compatriots is one thing.  
However, being implemented as a UN peace-enforcing or peacekeeping force in a distant land or as a part of 
collective defense to assist an ally is quite another.        
74
     Recruiting commercials, literature, and brochures would have to express this reality in order for it to be 
prevalent in public culture.  There would have to be a shared understanding of both state and citizen regarding all of 
the potential operations (police force, intervention, etc.), so citizens who were thinking about enlisting understood 
the multifaceted nature of a state’s military.  Soldiers should not be significantly penalized for not wanting to 
contribute in a military intervention when a person enlisting was not even aware of being involved in such a role.  
Defending one’s state is by far the first priority, but if one’s compatriots are secure from harm (they are not being 
attacked by another state), then it is possible that soldiers could be implemented in a peace-enforcing/peacekeeping 
force if such a situation arises.    
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Second, a detailed mission analysis is needed.  Subjecting soldiers to risks is one thing, 
sending them to their death is quite another.  As Michael Walzer states, “Risking one’s life is not 
the same as losing it.”75  By suggesting that troops should be committed to a peace-enforcing 
force in a distant land, I do not believe that states should not give special weight to the human 
rights of its own soldiers, but giving special weight to the rights of soldiers does not entail that 
soldiers should not be implemented when needed.  Rather, a state honors the rights of its soldiers 
not only by using military intervention as last resort but also by developing clear attainable 
military objectives, fully analyzing the risks and costs associated with the operation, and having 
a coherent exit strategy that avoids an endless entanglement.  Development of a unified and 
synchronized plan helps achieve political and military aims and saves soldiers’ lives because it 
neither needlessly places soldiers in harm’s way nor continually exposes them to the ills of war 
while politicians figure out what the next step is.   
Third, the choice to initiate military intervention should be decided by the international 
community.  Not only is this decision the result of collective reasoning but also such a decision 
may in fact epistemically assist soldiers that are to be involved in the intervention.   
McMahan suggests, “We should offer soldiers a source of guidance about the morality of 
war that would be more impartial and more authoritative than their own government, this could 
provide a basis for holding them accountable for their participation in unjust wars—perhaps 
accountable in law but certainly accountable to their own consciences.”76  Although McMahan’s 
point is about establishing an impartial international court that would review all matters of jus ad 
bellum (justice of war) for all wars in an attempt to prevent the initiation of unjust wars by 
                                                 
75
     Michael Walzer, Obligations: Essays on Disobedience, War, and Citizenship, (Harvard: Harvard University 
Press, 1970), 83. 
76
     McMahan, 154. 
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eliminating epistemic excuses available to unjust combatants, we can also use an international 
collective body to epistemically reinforce the justness of R2P military intervention.   
A collective body or the UNSC might on some level seem more authoritative than a 
state’s own government but it is highly unlikely that soldiers from State A would agree with the 
international body requiring military intervention if its own state did not.  State A’s soldiers are 
not going to agree to going to war if the political leadership and even popular consensus of State 
A does not agree with it in the first place.  In addition, if State A does not endorse the 
intervention, then its soldiers are not going to war.  There is little prospect of an international 
commission ordering a state to participate in an R2P mission against its own will and so soldiers 
will never face the prospect of going into an R2P mission solely because an international 
commission judged it warranted.  
However, a collective body (the international community) deciding all things considered 
that military intervention is warranted provides some assurance to soldiers that the intervention 
their state is asking them to undertake really is justified and is not just an attempt to pull off 
some sort of imperialistic land grab, etc.  This is assuming that it is reasonable to suppose that 
the international community, or UNSC, can be trusted.  Even if it can be trusted more than any 
one state or one’s own state, it may still not be particularly trustworthy.  However, if there is a 
level of trust, then soldiers could reasonably believe that what they were doing was morally 
justified.  Soldiers acting as part of a R2P force would be able to satisfy their own consciences 
regarding the moral justification of the operation that they were involved in since the 
international community in addition to their own state has collectively recognized that action 




9) The Volunteering and Availability of Military Resources 
Tan’s point is broader and focuses on whether a state has a right to remain neutral.  The 
international community has an obligation to protect and aid when a state has failed to do so, 
regardless if the host state is unable or unwilling to avert grievous acts.  However, each state 
should be left to judge for itself if it can assist or not.  The international community should in 
good faith defer to a state’s own judgment about its ability to assist.  Within this decision making 
process there must be some scope for reasonable disagreement.   
That is, if a state decides that it is not able to assist, then the international community 
should accept this answer.  Reasonable disagreement parameters encompass a state’s capability 
to assist.  If a state believes that by assisting another state, it could possibly jeopardize the 
fulfillment of basic human rights (such as subsistence rights) to its own people then it is not 
required to assist.
77
  If states simply refuse to contribute to R2P efforts but have the resources to 
do so, then these states are morally culpable for their inaction.  Refusing to assist is unreasonable 
and such states should be publicly criticized for their failure.  Although a capable state has a duty 
to act, other states do not have the right to compel/coerce that state to fulfill its duty.    
Even if a state is not capable of supporting an R2P mission with money, soldiers, or 
supplies, it can still show solidarity by publicly supporting the UN’s decisions to implement R2P 
efforts.  To remain absolutely neutral—neither denouncing a state that is committing acts of 
genocide nor supporting UNSC resolutions to stop such a state—is reprehensible. 
                                                 
77
     If states simply claim that they do not have the ability to assist so as to ‘free ride’ on the willingness of other 
states to bear the burden, then those states are morally culpable for their inaction.  Assuming states have a right to 
decide for themselves whether they have the ability to assist, and even to make a (reasonable) mistake about whether 
they have such ability, there is still the problem of states making an unreasonable mistake or simply refusing to 
assist so that others bear the burden of R2P.  When this is the case, those states that are assisting have the right to 
jawbone or publicly criticize those states that prefer to free ride or make an unreasonable mistake. 
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 Some states might disagree because this places R2P efforts and the rights of others ahead 
of one’s own compatriots.  However, “the objection that a state can never have a duty to sacrifice 
some of its own for others no matter how grave the situation is rests on the false premise that 
moral duties begin and end at the border of states.”78  Tan declares that (of course) states have a 
responsibility to their own people.  Nevertheless, if a state’s people are adequately cared for (this 
includes its army being comprised of a volunteer force) and somewhere in the world innocent 
people are being slaughtered, then that state’s ability to assist and protect should be focused 
toward those that need its assistance urgently, since its own members have already been provided 
for.
79
   
 Tan does not specify what he means by adequately cared for, but if a state reasonably 
protects its members’ basic rights, then this is the tipping point where those states should help 
those whose basic rights are being violated.
80
  In such a case, “our priority ought to shift from 
our immediate community to the larger community of humanity.”81  That is, “our general duties 
to humanity in these cases ought to override our special duties to compatriots.”82  I adopt Shue’s 
position here.  Shue argues for the priority of basic rights (physical security, subsistence, and 
basic liberty) over non-basic rights, such that states like the US must take measures in 
international relations aimed at securing the basic rights of others around the world before they 
can permissibly invest in various non-basic rights of their own citizens.
83
  Wealthy states such as 
                                                 
78
     Tan, 39. 
79
     There may be cases where citizens of a certain state want to invest in a space program or attempt to find a cure 
for cancer.  These are great programs.  However, R2P should not be discounted on account of these projects.  I 
recommend that a portion of the monies and resources that would go to these projects needs to be diverted and then 
allocated to R2P.  If states do not recognize the importance of protecting persons against widespread physical 
security rights violations, then R2P is a hollow concept.     
80
     States in this position might have the potential to assist.  However, I recognize that some states that secure their 
own members basic rights might have very little military resources. 
81
     Tan, 39. 
82
     Ibid. 
83
     Shue, 111-18.   
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the US would be not only able to fund R2P efforts but also secure the non-basic rights of its own 
citizens.  Most likely US citizens and citizens of comparable states aiming at securing the basic 
rights of others around the world would only lose some of their own satisfaction preferences.
84
    
 Over two and a half centuries ago, Emmerich de Vattel, a distinguished thinker whose 
writings are influential to international law and political philosophy, recognized this fundamental 
point.  Vattel posits a similar concept: “Hence whatever we owe to ourselves, we likewise owe to 
others, so far as they stand in need of assistance, and we can grant it to them without being 
wanting ourselves.”85  No state can invoke the non-basic rights of its citizens as a ground for not 
acting to secure the basic rights of others, because in the case of basic rights “the duty to avoid 
deprivation must be universal.”86  So states that affirm R2P maybe be putting the non-basic 
rights or at least preference satisfaction of their citizens at risk.  Most likely, very many states 
and their citizens will not be happy about this, especially those states that provide extensive non-
basic rights and preferences to their citizens.   
 What I conclude from these critical points that May and Tan both present, is twofold:  a) 
there is no algorithm for determining whether a particular state ought all things considered  
contribute, as often the issue will be difficult and subject to reasonable disagreement, and b) 
given the voluntarist nature of the international community, states have a right to act on their 
own reasonable judgments here, even if those judgments are viewed, even correctly viewed, by 
others as incorrect.   
                                                 
84
     Of course, as Shue suggests, there must be limits and guidelines set.  Otherwise, “it is possible for the costs to 
be unreasonably high if the scope and magnitude of alleged duties is indefinite and open-ended” (Ibid., 111-12).   
Able states would deny assistance because it would be a never ending commitment to help others in every way 
imaginable.   
85
     Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations. trans. and ed. C. G. and J. Robison Paternoster-Row. (London, 1758, 
trans in 1797), (Bk II, Ch1), 135. 
86
     Shue, 112.  Shue states, “One is required to sacrifice, as necessary, anything but one’s basic rights in order to 
honor the basic rights of others” (Ibid., 114). 
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 The international community has no right to compel any state to contribute militarily to 
an intervention that it, the international community, has a duty to undertake.  This is one sense in 
which one might say that states retain a right to remain neutral.  However, it is not the traditional 
idea of neutrality in the sense of taking no moral stance. 
 
10) If the UN Fails to Act Individual States May Act 
 States in the international context are analogous to individual persons in the domestic 
context.  Just as individual persons cannot fulfill their duties to secure and protect the rights of 
one another except through coordinating their efforts together and constituting/acting as a 
domestic state, so too individual well-ordered states cannot fulfill their duties to secure and 
protect the rights of persons beyond their borders except through coordinating their efforts 
together and constituting/acting as an international community or federation of states (e.g., the 
UN).  A world state is not required since we already have a system of states, and most of those 
states adequately protect their citizens’ basic human rights.  Forcing states into a nonvoluntary 
global/international order is similar to conscripting civilians into military service.  It violates 
their autonomy.  In addition, it does not seem any more practical than the system of states that 
we already have.  Both the strength and weakness of the UN comes from the voluntary aspect of 
it.  If the international community or federation of states fails in its duties, then individual well-
ordered states may have a duty to act individually (indeed, it was their duty to act individually 
that they were rationally fulfilling by coordinating their efforts with other well-ordered states).   
 This is, presumably, analogous to the domestic case: if a state is functioning as it should, 
then a person has no duty perhaps to do more than call the police or testify in court as a 
contribution to protecting the rights of his fellow citizens.  But if the state fails, then a person 
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may have a duty to do more to actually come to the aid of those whose rights are being violated.  
For example, if there was a house fire and if members of the local fire department were on strike, 
then citizens would have to attempt to alleviate the situation without state assistance.    
 
11) The UN’s Duty to Improve  
 Awareness goes a long way.  The international community recognizes that R2P is a 
positive duty, and with that the UN has a duty to improve.  The UN recognizes that one of the 
best ways to reduce R2P cases is by not only working directly with countries but by also 
involving regional and sub-regional communities which assist in the education and monitoring of 
neighboring states.  The UN has made positive gains by addressing its concern for physical 
security rights of all people.  Just as there is legal enforcement at the state level—a positive 
obligation to protect—there also needs to be legal enforcement at the international level as well.  
Beitz states, “It is unrealistic to believe that analogous conditions are likely to be satisfied at the 
global level in the absence of global institutions that enforce them.”87  I believe what Beitz is 
referring to is that there is a strong demand for competent global institutions that decisively 
enforce positive duties when states fail to.  Human rights are supposed to be capable of guiding 
political action.  If states not only fail to adequately protect basic human rights but even more 
so—commit genocide—there needs to be a global institution that is capable of stopping the 
situation.   
 Recognizing that R2P is a positive duty also gives impetus to develop operational—not 
just conceptual—doctrine because if the UN recognizes that it has a positive duty to act in every 
case (using peaceful or a combination of peaceful and coercive measures) then it would want to 
develop a system that could plausibly do just that by responding to grievous violations in an 
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     Beitz, 151. 
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efficient and effective manner.  As it currently stands, the UN is more prepared to implement 
peaceful measures although these are less effective, so it would need to operationalize coercive 
measures.  However, the practical problem is the fact that the UN does not have a standing 
military.  The state system constrains what sort of military capacity the UN can have at its 
disposal.  States have argued about an array of military concerns: command structures issues, 
costs, unclear mission objectives, troops committed to the UN ex ante, etc.
88
  Although working 
out this issue is no small task, it needs to be done in order for the UN to effectively and 
efficiently handle military intervention if warranted.   
 McMahan points out that one possibility would be to create “a special force under 
international control whose only purpose would be to carry out humanitarian military 
operations.”89  He further goes on to say that, “This would have to be a volunteer force 
composed of individuals who would not be members of any national military force.”90  Along 
with McMahan, I too believe that there needs to be a specific force for R2P.  However, I believe 
that his concept is impractical.   
 It is difficult to imagine that many countries would fund such a force.  In addition, what 
soldiers get paid in the US and in the UK is much different from what they get paid in countries 
like Bangladesh and the Republic of Sudan.  Whatever salary the UN would be able to muster for 
this special force (a result of state contributions) would most likely only draw enlistment from 
third world countries.  The result would be as if the UNSC had outsourced R2P missions: first 
                                                 
88
     For example, “During the 2004 Presidential election, candidates Bush and Kerry raised concerns about any 
measures that might tie US hands in advance, thereby compromising the sovereign right of the US to decide when to 
go to war” (Jennifer Welsh, “The Security Council and Intervention,” in The United Nations Security Council and 
War, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 557).  On another note, state autonomy is probably one of the key 
factors that led to “state representatives failing to endorse the Secretary-General’s set of criteria for the use of force 
at the UN Summit of World Leaders, held in September 2005” and instead unanimously agreed to relegate 
intervention to a case-by-case basis (Ibid., 557).   
89
     McMahan, 100-01 
90
     Ibid., 101.   
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world nations would pay third world enlistees to fight in order to implement their policies.  In 
addition, such an international volunteer force would lack expertise, top-notch training, and state 
of the art military equipment.  It would be comprised of a motley lot of people from some of the 
poorest nations on earth looking for work.  In addition, who would lead such a force? 
Like McMahan, I also believe that there is a need for a standing R2P force.  However, the 
preponderance of money, special equipment, and military trainers for this force should come 
from the permanent members of the UNSC.
91
  The benefit of having more political control and 
power should also come with the burden of funding, equipping (to some extent), and training the 
military force for R2P missions.
92
  In addition, the ten non-permanent members of the UNSC 
should be tasked to provide logistical support (sea and airlift capabilities, training facilities, etc.) 
for the R2P force.  Soldiers for R2P would remain as members of their own state’s military but 
would be assigned to an R2P role under the direction of the UN.   
One benefit of this type of approach would be that the R2P force composed of soldiers 
from third world states could quite possibly have regional or sub-regional commonalities with 
the failed state that they are to militarily intervene in.  An R2P force having cultural, historical, 
and/or political ties with the failed state as well as possibly a common language would only 
                                                 
91
     Fair cost sharing definitely needs to be thoroughly addressed; however, I will bracket this topic for now except 
to note that a plausible way forward would be to institute an international tax system to support R2P missions.  
Although there has been a lot of discussion about changing/updating the UNSC, I do not foresee the five permanent 
members’ status as changing in the near term.  That is, I believe that they will remain permanent members.  Maybe 
additional members (e.g. Germany, India, Brazil, etc.) will be added as permanent members.  Regardless of what 
changes to the UNSC will occur, the permanent members will continue to play a decisive role in global politics.  On 
another note, the UN’s Military Staff Committee (which consists of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of 
the Security Council) can advise in the development of such a R2P force. 
92
     The permanent members of the UNSC would equip the R2P force with state of the art equipment for 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance but also with armed drones.  In addition, the permanent members of 
the UNSC would also incorporate their own air assets (fighter, bomber, and refueling aircraft) into an R2P 
campaign.  Soldiers (from the five permanent members of the UNSC) would be used in an advisory and trainer role 
in order to develop this cosmopolitan R2P force (of which the preponderance of soldiers would come from third 
world nations) with the necessary skills needed to be implemented successfully.  Other first-world nations would 
also be required (but to a lesser extent than permanent members of the UNSC) to contribute monies and equipment 
to funding this R2P force.    
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further benefit the situation.  On another note, not having American soldiers deployed to some 
distant country for an R2P mission might actually help the situation because many states view 
the hegemonic US as unjustifiably having its hand in everything.  Many people view US soldiers 
deployed in other states as imperial expansionism or as the securing of natural resources for its 
own use.          
 Having an earmarked R2P force that is properly funded, trained, and equipped would not 
only be operationally ready to engage in military intervention in a timely and decisive manner, 
but even more so, it might be seen as a deterrent to states that intend to deliberately harm a group 
of people in their own state. 
 
Conclusion 
 The honoring of basic rights (physical security, subsistence, and basic liberty) can only 
be adequately protected by institutionalizing positive measures which provides protection from 
and punishment for non-restraint.  It is essential to the very idea of a right that there are not only 
negative duties not to harm but positive duties to create institutions to protect and that these often 
involve the institutionalization of back-up-addressee obligations to protect and aid where 
primary addressees fail to protect their members.   
 The Lockean notion of state sovereignty and right to non-intervention is predicated upon 
securing core human rights.  Sovereignty implies responsibility.  States that violate any basic 
rights in a systematic way lose their standing as states with a right to non-intervention.   
However, military intervention is not considered permissible just because a state has lost its 
moral right to non-intervention.  In addition to widespread systematic violations of physical 
security rights, there are further necessary conditions (a last resort, a reasonable chance of 
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success, all things considered proportionate, the rights of soldiers, undertaken voluntarily, 
welcomed, and a reasonable timeline) that would have to be satisfied before a military 
intervention was required and so permissible.  Intervention is all things considered required, 
although depending on the situation the response might be limited, but that does not change the 
fact the back-up addressee (the UN) must assist in some fashion (negotiations, condemnation, 
sanctions, etc.) when military intervention is not a viable option.  
  Having an institution that can reasonably deal with every nonideal case is a step toward 
this goal.  The UN is an organization which is united together to protect and promote the basic 
human rights of all persons.  As Vattel states, “Nations or states are bodies politic, societies of 
men united together for the purpose of promoting their mutual safety and advantage by the joint 
efforts of their combined strength.”93   
 Over the past decade, the R2P norm has emerged and is continuing to evolve.  When a 
state does not reasonably safeguard the basic rights of its citizens, the international community, 
headed by the UN, must make timely decisions and take decisive action (peaceful or a 
combination of both peaceful and coercive) in order to protect and aid those who have been 
targeted.  Regardless of what group is the victim of these atrocities, all persons should be 
respected and their basic human rights should be observed with equal weight and equal concern 
because “basic human rights bind all states regardless of their consent.”94   
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Updating the Fourth Geneva Convention 
 
 The postwar phase has an established history in just war theory but has also received a 
considerable amount of attention over the last decade.  Although the postwar phase seems to be 
the focus of many current just war debates and philosophical work, law and practice concerning 
the postwar phase has received considerably less attention over the same period.  International 
law regarding the ad bellum and in bello phases is currently more developed than international 
law stemming from the moral principles that are relevant to the post bellum phase.
1
 
 Both the ad bellum and in bello phases have both moral and legal force but the post 
bellum phase is currently inadequate.  This can be fixed by not only expanding the range of jus 
post bellum moral norms to include fighting with right intention but also by giving legal 
embodiment to those norms.  That is, obligations stemming from the norm of right intention 
should be realized not only as moral norms but as (international) legal rights as well.  If 
civilians/noncombatants are to be “at all times humanely treated, and protected against all acts of 
violence or threats thereof,”2 then belligerents should attempt to immunize civilians from the 
harmful effects of war as best as possible.  Although civilians are to be protected, belligerents’ 
obligations to civilians can be ambiguous because the current international treaties regarding the 
                                                 
1
     For instance, in the pre-war phase, the international community oversees the implementation of war by its 
charter that specifically declares when a state has a moral and legal right to resort to war (collective or self-defense 
according to UN Charter Art 2.4 & 51).  States overwhelmingly recognize that they should petition the UN for 
approval before initiating any military endeavor that is different from the traditional definition of acting in collective 
or self-defense, i.e. preemption, law enforcement, military intervention, etc.  Regarding the war phase, the 
international community has signed treaties (Hague and Geneva Conventions) derived from moral norms and 
customary law regarding how states and their armies can morally and legally fight a war.   
2
     The Laws of War: A Comprehensive Collection of Primary Documents Governing Armed Conflict, eds. W. 
Michael Reisman, and Chris Antoniou, New York: Vintage Books, 1994, (Art 27, Part III: Status and Treatment of 
Protected Persons, GCIV), 240.   
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treatment of civilians do not adequately express the necessary undertakings that belligerents must 
fulfill.    
 This shortcoming needs to be addressed because ultimately it is civilians who die as a 
result of threats that compromise their basic human rights.  The fulfillment of core human rights 
is necessary in order to reasonably safeguard persons from standard threats to certain goods that 
would otherwise gravely affect the necessary conditions (such as having food and water, shelter, 
security, medical attention, basic liberties, etc.) for any attempt at an adequate life.  There needs 
to be a social guarantee for a social minimum.  The absence of which is a failure to secure human 
rights.    
 States acting with right intention recognize that basic human rights need to be reasonably 
safeguarded during and after war.  Fighting with right intention entails a more robust account of 
securing core human rights which the principle of noncombatant immunity already recognizes.  
Immunizing civilians from harms that threaten basic human rights fits into any plausible account 
of what the principle of noncombatant immunity requires, because  noncombatant immunity 
even entitles civilians to a level of protection of ‘more’ than just their basic human rights (e.g. 
respecting religious conviction and practices, honoring manners and customs, and barring threats 
and insults).  Therefore, belligerents acting with right intention and in accord with what the 
principle of noncombatant immunity demands would have to reasonably protect civilians from 
the harms of war.
3
     
                                                 
3
     I am not suggesting that war cannot be waged when civilians are in the proximity.  Article 28 (Part III: Status 
and Treatment of Protected Persons) of the GCIV states that, “the presence of a protected person 
[noncombatant/civilian] may not be used to render certain points or areas immune from military operations” (The 
Laws of War, 240).  However, belligerents should be accountable for their destruction and should take reasonable 
measures (as the situation dictates) to insulate civilians from standards threats to their basic human rights (physical 
security, subsistence, and basic liberty).   
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 Although there has been a lot of work regarding the moral principles of jus post bellum, 
the norms governing the transition
4
 and postwar need to be informed by not only the aim of 
lasting peace but also of justice.
5
  Legal embodiment of those governing norms is also essential.  
Without legal embodiment of those relevant moral norms governing transition, postwar 
expectations, and obligations are left to the interpretation of powerful states.  
 Furthermore, occupation law which is the primary legal rules for governing the postwar 
period is outdated, inadequate, underdeveloped, and vague.
 
 As it currently stands, there is a 
normative gap in the law of transition from war to peace.  Although current occupation law 
possibly provides a framework which if fulfilled would achieve some level of peace, it surely 
does not aim at peace with justice.  Moreover, if the long-term aim of just war is establishing a 
just and lasting peace then substantive legal embodiment of the relevant moral principles is 
necessary in order for occupation law to be aligned with meeting this long-term aim.  This is a 
necessary undertaking not only as a way to point parties more squarely toward justice but also to 
inform parties of what is required of them.  If we do not have clear legal rules then justice 
becomes much more difficult to secure or maintain.  Without clear governing rules, a state’s 
duties, obligations, and restrictions are somewhat left to interpretation and bargaining.     
 As it currently stands occupation law neither adequately addresses the positive efforts 
needed for basic human rights fulfillment nor does it address reasonable political self-
determination—both of which give content to peace with justice.  As a result, “the law of 
                                                 
4
     “Transitional justice concerns situations where a State, or a people, tries to move from a conflict situation to a 
post-conflict situation” (Larry May, After War Ends: A Philosophical Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 2012), 44). 
5
     Elements of justice are required by right intention and so required in the period of transitional justice as well as 
the post bellum phase.  Transitional justice and jus post bellum overlap and “both concern how to regard just 
practices and institutions after war” (May, 6).  Although both transitional justice and jus post bellum are focused 
toward a just and lasting peace, “transitional justice often concerns the way to move from an authoritarian regime 
that did not respect the rights of the people to a regime that does respect rights, and jus post bellum normally 
concerns how to move to a situation of stability after war” (Ibid). 
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occupation is inadequate to the realities of modern occupation, and to the demands of modern 
peacebuilding and post-conflict reconstruction.”6   
 My argument is a three-section analysis of relevant postwar moral norms and their legal 
embodiment.  In section 1, I will show that the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War
7
 (which is the treaty that covers the treatment of civilians during 
and after war) does not reflect current moral norms regarding human rights.  Therefore, the 
Fourth Geneva Convention needs substantive reform and legal embodiment of relevant moral 
principles.  In section 2, I will argue that ad hoc legal arrangements are problematic because 
these obligations are determined ex post which is too late.  Rather overarching legal rules (ones 
that always pertain to any conflict) should be formulated and instituted ahead of time.  In 
addition, these ad hoc legal arrangements cite specific treaties that belligerents should comply 
with, but those very treaties favor the victor and do not allow for political self-determination.  In 
section 3, I will propose that the UN needs to take a larger role in postwar operations.  This 
reason is twofold: 1) the UN is the global structure that specifically deals with fostering the 
cooperation of states regarding issues of peace and security; and 2) the UN should monitor and 







                                                 
6
     Kristen Boon, “Obligations of the New Occupier: the Contours of a Jus Post Bellum,” in Loyola of Los Angeles 
International and Comparative Law Review, (Vol. 31, No. 57: 2009), 63.   
7
     This treaty is commonly known and referred to as the Fourth Geneva Convention or the GCIV. 
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1) Revised Geneva Convention 
 The 1907 Hague Convention IV and 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention (Section III: 
Occupied Territories) are commonly referred to as occupation law.
8
  Occupation law “establishes 
the rights and duties of the occupier, the duties of the civilian population of the occupied lands, 
the limitations on exercises of power against the civilian population, and the continuing rights of 
the ousted sovereign.”9  However, these stipulations only help maintain the status quo ante 
(negative duty of do not harm) and focus on conflict termination but not on peacebuilding.  But 
as Kristen Boon notes “peace is no longer limited to a minimalist negative core but increasingly 
contains positive duties linked to the conditions that make peace practicable.”10    
 Although occupation law, in particular the GCIV, was ratified in 1949 after the 
implementation of the 1948 UDHR, the GCIV needs to be revised so it is consistent with the 
human rights movement that has gained considerable momentum over the last forty years.  The 
realization that human rights are essential to developing and maintaining international peace and 
stability has since been slow and intermittent.  It has taken decades to move from the UDHR to 
the two main conventions
11
 and then decades more for those conventions to become anything 
                                                 
8
     At the conclusion of a conflict, there may or may not be an occupation force because it is not obvious that such a 
force is permissible or required as a transition to peace with justice in every case.  Moreover, I am not suggesting 
that every war that has a clear victor will have an occupation force.  For example, the 1991 Gulf War did not result 
in the Coalition forces having an occupation force but the 2001 war in Afghanistan and the 2003 war in Iraq did 
have a US lead occupation force.  However, the implementation of an occupation force (if warranted) can play an 
essential role in enabling a war-torn state to become autonomous once again.  The role of an occupation force is 
generally focused on six main areas: conducting combat operations against any hostile state or non-state actors that 
have refused to surrender; re-establishing the rule of law; training the vanquished state’s internal defense forces; 
repairing of essential facilities and infrastructure that secure core human rights; fostering legitimate governance; and 
promoting economic pluralism.  The final post bellum goal is restoration of the losing state as an independent 
sovereign state that is internally legitimate and externally peaceful.  Depending on the situation, an occupation force 
may or may not contribute to bringing about this end.   
9
     The Laws of War, 231. 
10
     Boon, “Obligations,” 66. 
11
     1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 1966 the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 
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close to effective.  But human rights standards have taken hold, and “the rise of human rights 
obligations have set certain benchmarks for behavior.”12   
 Human rights “provide protections of basic human interests against standard threats to 
those interests; the character of the standard threats and what serves as adequate protections 
against them both reflect the nature of the kind of social world in which human beings now find 
themselves.”13  Just as human rights should be realized not only as moral but also as 
(international) legal rights in order to hold states accountable for providing adequate protection 
against standard threats, so too the norms of just war that follow from right intention should be 
realized not only as moral norms but as (international) legal rights.  If we can adequately identify 
the character of standard threats in our social world then we can also adequately identify the 
character of standard threats that harm civilians during and after war.   
 Empirical evidence provides plenty of reliable information “about what makes for human 
misery and degradation” 14 in modern war.  As Allen Buchanan notes, “Once we appreciate the 
importance of factual premises, it becomes clear that the task of specifying human-rights norms 
is ongoing: as conditions change, new threats to basic interests may present themselves and new 
institutional arrangements for countering them may be needed.”15   
 Just as we have updated and revised human rights treaties that better reflect our world, we 
must do the same with treaties that concern human rights and the welfare of civilians in the 
postwar period.  The point is that we need to update and revise international treaties regarding 
war in order to adequately accommodate our commitment to right intention and human rights.  
                                                 
12
     Carsten Stahn, “Jus Post Bellum: Mapping the Discipline(s),” in American University International Law 
Review, (Vol. 23, No. 2: 2007), 325. 
13
     Allen Buchanan, “Human Rights and the Legitimacy of the International Order,” in Legal Theory. (Vol. 14, No. 
1: 2008), 56. 
14
     Ibid., 58. 
15
     Ibid., 60. 
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Moreover, if resorting to war justly is more than vindicating a just cause but is also conducting 
war in such a manner that will set necessary conditions for a just and lasting peace then new 
(updated) institutional arrangements are needed in order to counter those new or at least newly 
recognized threats to basic interests.   
 On another note, institutionalizing norms is not “merely a mechanism for translating 
independently justified moral rights into legal ones.” 16  Rather, these institutions constitute, as 
Buchanan notes, “modes of public practical reasoning [structured by legal institutions] that 
contribute to our understanding of moral rights and to their justification.”17  Public practical 
reasoning allows for greater “inclusive representation of interests and viewpoints than is likely to 
be available at the domestic level and to that extent can mitigate the risk of culturally biased 
understandings of basic human interests, of what threatens them, and of what institutional 
arrangements are needed to counter the threats.”18  Allowing for public practical reasoning 
structured by legal institutions can help us know “what our obligations are regarding human 
rights by providing principled, authoritative specifications of human rights when there is a range 
of reasonable alternative specifications.”19  Of course there will be differences, even reasonable 
disagreement, but public practical reasoning provides a forum to discuss the issue of occupation 
and transition law as the two components of a legally embodied jus post bellum regime.  
Engaging in such a discussion, would not only (hopefully) shed light on the current inadequate 
legal protection that the GCIV specifies for civilians in the postwar phase but also what 
                                                 
16
     Ibid., 48. 
17
     Ibid. 
18
     Ibid., 64. 
19
     Ibid. 
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authoritative specifications are needed in order to adequately account for protecting civilians’ 
core human rights (physical security, subsistence, and basic liberty).
20
  
 Historically, the GCIV was instituted as a way to capture all of the necessary 
considerations that the 1907 Hague Convention IV Military Authority Over the Territory of the 
Hostile State never addressed, because “the experience of Axis belligerent occupation during 
World War II made it clear that more precise standards and enforcement mechanisms were 
necessary for the security of civilians and their property in occupied territories.”21  But even so, 
the 1907 Hague Convention IV left much to the imagination and interpretation regarding the 
rights of the civilians in occupied territory.  Articles 43 and 46 of the Hague Convention IV state 
that the “lives of persons must be respected, private property cannot be confiscated, and that the 
Occupying Power shall take all measures to ensure as far as possible public order and safety,”22 
but it does not provide a specific account of what constitutes public order and safety.  In 
addition, it does not make any reference to ensuring that the civilian population has food, water, 
shelter, or medical supplies or that the occupying power has any positive obligation to facilitate 
these necessities. 
 Since the ratification of the CGIV
23
 in 1949, occupation law has applied in the Six Day 
War (1967) where Israel occupied former territories of Egypt (the Gaza Strip), Jordan (the West 
Bank), and Syria (the Golan Heights); the 1976 Syrian occupation of Lebanon; the invasion of 
                                                 
20
     It is permissible for basic liberty to be somewhat restricted in an occupied territory.  Displaced persons might 
be temporarily placed in a refugee camp or restricted from travel for their own safety until essential infrastructure 
services are restored.    
21
     The Laws of War, 233.  Even if there were treaties that required more stringent accountability and 
responsibilities of the occupying powers prior to WWII, it is hard to imagine that Nazi Germany would have 
actually abided by them then during WWII.    
22
     The Laws of War, (Hague Convention IV), 233. 
23
     The primary focus of occupation law is the following: The occupier must take necessary steps to identify and 
register children in an attempt to reunite families, ensure food and medical supplies of the populations, maintain 
public health and hygiene services, ensure that penal laws of the occupied state remain, allow relief schemes by 
other states and/or the Red Cross, not compel protected persons (civilians) to work unless they are over eighteen 
years of age, not restrict employment opportunities, and must not conscript protected persons into its own army (The 




Kuwait by Iraq (1990), the US invasion of Grenada (1983) and Panama (1989), as well as the 
invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) by the US and UK.
24
   
 Though more explicit than the Hague Convention IV, the CGIV neither fully reflects nor 
aligns with the human rights movement.  Article 55 of the GC IV states, “To the fullest extent of 
the means available to it, the Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring the food and medical 
supplies of the population; it should, in particular, bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical 
stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate.”25  In addition, 
Article 56 states that, “The Occupying Power has the duty of ensuring and maintaining, with the 
cooperation of national and local authorities, the medical and hospital establishments and 
services, public health and hygiene, with particular reference to the adoption and application of 
the prophylactic and preventive measures necessary to combat the spread of contagious diseases 
and epidemics.”26 
 Although Articles 55 and 56 of the GCIV are clear improvements to the Hague 
Convention IV, this still is inadequate.  For example, ensuring the food and medical supplies of 
the population does not mean that the occupying power has to provide any particular sort of  
access to these supplies.  It just suggests that the occupying power has to provide these supplies 
most likely at centralized locations such as refugee or displaced person camps.  In addition, 
Article 56 notes that prophylactic and preventive measures need to be enacted in order to combat 
the spread of contagious diseases and epidemics.  But this Article does not elaborate on what that 
actually entails.  Administering vaccinations, washing hands, breast feeding, and eating fruits 
                                                 
24
     Some states have flat out denied occupation law.  For example, Israel believed that occupation law was not 
relevant because it had a legitimate claim in annexing the occupied territories that it gained during the Six Day War, 
and “Iraq did not apply the law of occupation to Kuwait, insisting that it was the nineteenth province of Iraq” (Laws 
of War, 232).       
25
     Laws of War (GCIV), 247. 
26
     Ibid., 248. 
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and vegetables are all prophylactic and preventive measures.  Is an occupation force that only 
supplies vaccines, hand soap, and fruits and vegetables doing all that is required within the spirit 
of the law?   
 It may be the case that articles rarely specify details because that is left to other 
documents and procedures.  However, again this sounds like a bargaining process where 
powerful states have the upper hand in negotiating those procedures.  I am not suggesting that 
articles in a general convention must incorporate all details.  This would not only be overly 
taxing but most likely impossible.  The level of specificity appropriate to a general convention 
must be at least to a level which addresses essential requirements.  Otherwise, the article fails to 
give any definitive guidance.  For example, articles governing the conduct of an occupation must 
include baseline criteria such as identifying the rudimentary prophylactic and preventive 
measures that are required as well as provide more detail about what ‘access’ to food and 
medical supplies actually requires.   
 Infrastructural services are an essential element to prophylactic and preventive medicine 
but the CGIV makes no reference to this.  I would suggest that both Articles 55 and 56 needs to 
be significantly revised or additional articles need to be added to the GCIV that articulate the 
need for the occupying power to assist the host state with sewage disposal, trash removal, and 
electricity.  These basic services are essential to a state’s ability in safeguarding the core human 
rights of its people.  In addition, the civilian population must have access to potable water, food, 
and medical supplies that the occupying power is responsible for providing if the defeated state 
cannot.  But this means that roads, highways, bridges, and rail lines will have to be repaired in 
order to grant the civilian population access to these necessities.   
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 Article 64 of the GCIV states that, “Penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in 
force.”27  Just because these penal laws remain does not entail that they can be reasonably 
enforced when the infrastructure has been decimated.  Rather, the occupying power would have 
to assist in the repairing of infrastructure necessary to enable the rule of law, but the current 
GCIV does not address this.   
 Civilians should reasonably be immunized from harms that compromise their basic 
human rights.  Civilians should have potable water, food, shelter, physical security, sewage and 
trash removal, and access to medical attention.  In addition, civilians require a state that can 
effectively secure those rights for them, e.g. road networks, power grids, courts, police precincts 
(which enables the rule of law), etc. are going to have to be operational.  We cannot leave them 
without these institutional prerequisites to their human rights. 
  The 1977 Geneva Protocol I Additional to the Geneva Conventions (1949) and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts calls for additional protection of the 
civilian population of a war-torn state.
28
  Article 69 of Protocol I states, “In addition to the duties 
specified in Article 55 of the Fourth Geneva Convention concerning food and medical supplies, 
the Occupying Power shall also ensure the provision of clothing, bedding, means of shelter, and 
other supplies essential to the survival of the civilian population of the occupied territory.”29  
This is clearly an improvement, because the GCIV does not mention anything about the 
                                                 
27
     Ibid., 250. 
28
     Protocol I provides additional protections, such as Article 54 that states, “Starvation of civilians as a method of 
warfare is prohibited; it is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the 
survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs, crops, 
livestock, drinking water installations, and irrigation works” (Documents on the Laws of War (Protocol I), eds. 
Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), 417).  In addition, Article 55 states, “Care shall 
be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long-term and severe damage” (Ibid., 
418).  On a side note, in 1991 Iraq violated Article 55 of Protocol I by dumping oil into the Persian Gulf and igniting 
hundreds of oil wells in Kuwait.  Although Iraq claimed military necessity for these two actions (producing an oil 
slick to impede a possible Coalition amphibious landing operation and producing a smoke screen/haze in order to 
hamper Coalition bomber attacks), its actions were not proportionate to the environmental damage that was caused. 
29
     Documents on the Laws of War (Protocol I), 428. 
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occupying power being responsible for clothing, bedding, or shelter.  However, as stated 
previously, infrastructure needs to be operational in order for civilians to have their basic human 
rights reasonably secured.  Furthermore, neither the GCIV nor Protocol I address other serious 
issues such as the repatriation and resettlement of refugees and displaced persons, children 
returning to school, and integrating combatants into the civilian population.  Maybe it is believed 
that all of these issues will work themselves out in due time.  However, not addressing or 
implementing positive measures in order to accommodate these issues are a serious shortcoming.  
Civilians returning home, children attending school, and former soldiers and other civilians 
finding work are essential for a country to return to a state of normalcy.    
 
2) Ad Hoc Legal Arrangements 
 Historically, international law regarding the relationship between states has been 
basically broken into two categories: war and peace.  The problem is that this binary split does 
not properly account for the transition period from conflict to peace which creates a normative 
gap in the law of transition from war to peace.  20
th
 Century, pre and post-World War II 
international law focused on developing and demarcating two sets of rules (the law of war and 
the law of peace).  Consequently, “the transition from war to peace was not treated as a paradigm 
in terms of law.”30  International law should not be binary (war or peace), because both 
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law apply in war’s aftermath.31  
                                                 
30
     Stahn, 316. 
31
     Although human rights law applies before, during and after war, International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is a set 
of international rules which are specifically intended to solve humanitarian problems directly arising from 
international or non-international armed conflicts.  IHL’s main treaty sources are the four Geneva Conventions 
(1949) and their Additional Protocol I (1977).  International Human Rights Law (IHRL) is a set of international 
rules on the basis of which individuals and groups can expect and/or claim certain behavior or benefits from 
governments.  IHRL’s main treaty sources are the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) as well as the Convention on Genocide (1948).  While IHL and IHRL 
have historically had a separate development, recent treaties (the Participation of Children in Armed Conflict and the 
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The period from conflict termination to establishing a just and lasting peace cannot adequately be 
subsumed by the laws of war or the laws of peace because these laws do not adequately address 
the positive efforts needed in order to secure human rights in the postwar phase nor the moral 
right to political self-determination and international toleration needed to establish peace with 
justice.  Postwar is a confluence of both categories (war and peace) and needs its own division 
and classification of transitional law.        
 Attempting to address postwar issues by incorporating them into the laws pertaining to 
the conduct of war is insufficient because that corpus of law is centered on fighting and not on 
rebuilding.  Ad hoc legal arrangements are insufficient because constituting such legal 
arrangements after the conflict not only delays postwar implementation but also creates 
shortfalls.  In addition, states and international organizations (the UN, IMF, World Bank, WHO, 
etc.) are sometimes unaware of their respective postwar obligations and responsibilities before a 
war begins which creates inadequacies.  “These inadequacies have created complexities on the 
ground because the duties and obligations of the various international actors are uneven and 
often unclear.”32  Furthermore, because “there is not a consensus on the obligations that 
unilateral or multilateral actors incur when they engage in transformative occupations and 
interventions; powerful states jockey for resolutions that favor their own interests.”33 
 Working through and establishing a legal framework that can be implemented in all 
postwar scenarios would greatly reduce issues that surface in the postwar phase.
34
  In addition to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court) include provisions from both. (International Committee of the 
Red Cross, “International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law,” 2003, 1-2). 
32
     Boon, “Obligations,” 59.   
33
     Ibid., 57. 
34
     May states that, “reconciliation as a just post bellum concept involves a process of returning previously warring 
parties to a point not only where they do not engage in violence toward each other but also where there is sufficient 
trust so that a robust and just peace can be attained—and where a just peace means that human rights are protected” 
(May, 86).  I believe that having clearly defined and updated rules (legal embodiment of relevant moral norms) 
governing the obligations and restrictions of the parties to the conflict is essential to the reconciliation process.  
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its political or practical application of having a particular legal document that encompasses all 
specific rules, regulations, and responsibilities of all parties regarding postwar, an updated 
convention on postwar would bring international focus and emphasis on the importance of the 
postwar phase.  It would also provide a set of comprehensive requirements of what is required of 
warring parties before states ever resort to war instead of waiting to after the war to see and agree 
upon what is required.  Agreeing to postwar stipulations after the conflict seems too late.  Rather, 
rules need to be developed and articulated before the conflict. 
 Having an updated pre-existing legal document would (hopefully) guide a state’s actions.  
For example, if the US had been more aware of its obligation in the postwar phase, it would not 
have disbanded the Iraqi civil service.  Disbanding the civil service created a nonfunctioning 
government almost overnight which fostered animosity, chaos, fear, and lack of physical security 
which exposed the civilians of that state to greater harms than necessary.
35
 
 Additionally, not having a pre-established fixed legal framework gives way to the very 
real potential of undue influence of powerful states or a hegemon which has historically been the 
case during postwar negotiations.  That is, “peacemaking itself largely was conceived as a 
process governed by the discretion of states”36 with the victor having the largest degree of 
discretion.  Negotiation between victor and vanquished does not exactly facilitate a neutral, 
                                                                                                                                                             
Having an updated pre-established legal framework facilitates a working relationship in which each party not only 
understands its own obligations ahead of time but is also aware of the other party’s responsibilities and obligations.   
35
     It can be argued that the US did not adequately anticipate the consequences of disbanding the civil service.  But 
the decision that the US made was a problem of principle and not just misjudging the facts on the ground.  There 
was no pre-planning or planning for the postwar period until right before the six week war began.  This is way too 
late.  In addition, there was not any interagency planning and coordination between the State and Defense 
departments although the US State Department would oversee the political rehabilitation of Iraq.  For more detail 
please see Todd Burkhardt, “Reasonable Chance of Success: Analyzing the Postwar Requirements of Jus Ad 
Bellum,” in Routledge Handbook of Ethics and War: Just War Theory in the 21st Century.  On another note, Iraq is 
an example case of why it is important to have an updated pre-existing legal embodiment of relevant moral norms 
regarding occupation and postwar obligations.  In doing so, every state knows ahead of time was is required of it in 
the postwar phase.  If anything, an updated Fourth Geneva Convention regarding occupation law could quite  
plausibly have  informed the US planners that disbanding the civil service would have been catastrophic at any 
attempt to enabling any form of governance.      
36
     Stahn, 317. 
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even-handed approach to securing peace with justice.  As a result, the terms of agreement were 
essentially “set by a bargaining process of the victors of the rights and obligations of the 
vanquished.”37  Carsten Stahn posits, “Self-determination was not viewed as a binding legal 
principle, but as a flexible principle; it had to yield where it conflicted with overriding strategic 
interests of the victorious powers.”38  Victors have been prone to make extensive internal legal 
and institutional reforms of the vanquished state most of which had nothing to do with improving 
the war-torn state but because “the occupant usually wishes to export its own institutions, or to 
establish a regime that will be friendly to its security interests.”39 
 If anything, “the presumption of neutrality during occupations has generally been 
disproved in practice.” 40  Citizens of the war-torn state do not necessarily agree to the reform but 
welcome it as a “pragmatic desire for the rule of law.”41  Citizens want physical security so they 
acquiesce to the occupier’s reforms.  However, we need to put limits on powerful states in the 
post bellum context.  One way to do this is by having an updated, pre-established, and fixed legal 
framework that embodies the relevant moral norm of reasonable political self-determination 
which will foster political inclusiveness, popular legitimacy, and international toleration.  As it 
currently stands, resolutions (formulated ex post) cite outdated treaties which favor the victor.   
The GCIV was written shortly after the formulation of the UN Charter (Chapter 1, Article 1.2) 
which “calls for respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples.”42  
                                                 
37
     Ibid. 
38
     Ibid., 318. 
39
     Karen Boon, “Legislative Reform in Post-Conflict Zones,” in McGill Law Journal (Vol. 50: 2005), 297. 
40
     Ibid. 
41
     Ibid., 298. 
42
     United Nations Charter, <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter1.shtml>.  
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However, the norm of reasonable political self-determination has “evolved from a principle into 
a right under international law”43 and that evolution should be reflected in the GCIV. 
 After a conflict, a United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) is usually 
drafted and passed as a way to capture all of the necessary items that need to go into postwar 
justice.  However, these resolutions cite outdated and unhelpful regulations.  For example, both 
the 2003 UNSCR 1483 on Iraq and the 2009 UNSCR 1885 on Liberia “Calls upon all concerned 
to comply fully with their obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva 
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”44  But the issue is that the Fourth 
Geneva Convention and Hague Convention IV which are referenced specifically as the treaties 
that need to be fully complied with do not reflect human rights standards of the 21
st
 century 
(which I discussed previously in section1).   
 In addition, UNSCR 1483 “stresses the right of the Iraqi people freely to determine their 
own political future and welcomes the commitment of all parties concerned to support this.”45  
However, Article 54 of the Fourth Geneva Convention (which is the primary reference for an 
occupying power to abide by) gives “the right of the Occupying Power to remove public officials 
from their posts.”46  The GCIV does not provide any additional information for what would 
constitute reasonable removal of public officials from their positions; it just gives the occupying 
force permission to do so.  The GCIV allows the occupying power to decide what is best.  The 
authority given to the occupying force can clearly obstruct a peoples’ right to reasonable political 
self-determination.  Article 54 clearly favors the victor and the victor’s interests, because it 
allows for any public official to be dismissed based on the occupying power’s discretion.  Article 
                                                 
43
     “Indigenous Affairs: Self-determination,” International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs. <http://www.iwgia 
.org/human-rights/self-determination>, 2002, 7. 
44
     United Nations Security Council, <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml>, 2012.   
45
     Ibid. 
46
     Laws of War (GCIV), 247. 
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54 of the CGIV does not reflect Part I, Article 1 of both the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) which states, “All peoples have the right of self-determination; by virtue of that 
right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”47  In many cases, the defeated state or government does not itself express 
or constitute the reasonable political self-determination of the population over which it ruled, and 
so if the occupying force is to allow for reasonable political self-determination, it may have to 
remove officials, provide for some transitional process like a new constitutional convention, etc.  
However, the GCIV does not adequately address this concept.  It just states that the victor may 
remove public officials from their posts, instead of expressing that the victor may remove public 
officials from their post as a way to help facilitate a peoples’ right to freely choose their own 
reasonable form of governance.   
 I am not discounting the importance of a resolution(s) after a conflict, but these should be 
used to address specific case-by-case issues whereas an updated Geneva Convention could be 
used as a uniform legal document to regulate the postwar phase to the level at which the pre-war 
and war phases are currently regulated.  I suspect that there will always be a need for ad hoc 
legal arrangements that cover the specific issues of a given case.  However, currently ad hoc 
legal arrangements reference outdated treaties (CGIV and Hague Convention IV) as the primary 
legal documents to which belligerents must abide by.  But this is unhelpful, if we are trying to 
establish conditions for a just and lasting peace.  Rather, we need to allow for political self-
                                                 
47
     “ICCPR” and “ICESCR,” <http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b36c0.html>.  There is no recognized 
international legal definition of ‘peoples’ but the term refers to a group of persons that “enjoy some or all of the 
following common features: a common historical tradition, ethnic identity, cultural homogeneity; linguistic unity, 
religious or ideological affinity, territorial connection, and common economic life” (“Indigenous Affairs: Self-
determination,” 8).  In the context of an occupied territory the term ‘peoples’ applies to the entire population within 
the occupied territory.  The entire population has the moral and legal right to freely choose the type of government 
that they want without coercion or interference.  Because the state exists to serve and to protect the peoples of a 
given territory, those peoples should be permitted to reform their own government in their own way.   
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determination as well as protect the basic human rights of the civilian populace as well as enable 
(repair) institutions that can reasonably do just that.     
 Allowing for political self-determination is consistent with right intention and establishes 
conditions that aim at a lasting peace with justice.  In order permissibly to go to war, a state 
having right intention must not only have a just cause and limit its war-making activity to that 
necessary to vindicate the just cause, but it must also seek to vindicate its just cause in a manner 
likely to yield a just and lasting peace.  Vindicating a just cause with right intention means 
vindicating it in a way that brings about a lasting peace with justice and the only way to set a 
lasting peace with justice is to allow for a significant degree of political self-determination for 
peaceful peoples that respect human rights and by not fighting longer than necessary to vindicate 
the just cause. 
 Some scholars, lawyers, and politicians might suggest that substantive legal framework 
for post bellum obligations are not necessary on the grounds that every post bellum context or 
circumstance is so unique that only ad hoc responses make sense.  I grant that every war is 
different and has its own unique intricacies.  However, I would think that we could at least all 
agree that at the bare minimum the treaty (GCIV) that is referenced by ad hoc legal arrangements 
needs to be updated in order to better reflect the positive efforts needed in order to reasonably 
secure core human rights of the civilian populace.   
 
3) United Nations’ Postwar Obligations 
 The UN is the appropriate institution not only to facilitate this process but also to play a 
role in institutionally expressing and adjudicating the relevant treaty.  First, the UN is the global 
structure that specifically deals with fostering the cooperation of states regarding issues of peace 
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and security.  Second, the UN should monitor and report compliance failures much like the UN 
already does when it comes to grave human rights violations.
48
   
 Regardless of what states are involved in a conflict, the UN should oversee the postwar 
phase.  Although the international community (signatories to the UN Charter) has delegated to 
the UN this power in Article 39 (Chapter VII, UN Charter),
49
 which stipulates that the UN can 
decide what measures shall be taken in order to maintain or restore international peace and 
security, there are still shortcomings that need to be addressed.    
 For example, the UN primarily focuses on peace and security and not peace with justice.  
In addition, many of the states that comprise the UN have heterogeneous political perspectives 
which can lead to inaction, competing interests, and even adversarial relationships within the 
community of states.  Even members of the UNSC have very different conceptions of domestic 
and international justice which can be evidenced by the two most powerful states in the Council: 
US and China.  Although member-states of the UN clearly have different political perspectives, 
the UN is still the best international organization at overseeing the implementation of an updated 
and revised GCIV as long as we give some common content to the idea of international justice 
that all reasonable members of the UN might be expected reasonably to accept or affirm. 
 It might be difficult to exactly specify what a commitment to an enduring peace with 
justice requires in terms of the specific legal embodiment of noncombatant immunity and post 
bellum norms given the various disagreements between nations over what justice requires, either 
domestically or between states.  However, the GCIV should at least reflect a commitment to 
                                                 
48
     “The Security Council and the General Assembly can appoint fact-finding missions to investigate and report on 
alleged violations of international law” (“Summary of the Report of the Secretary-General on ‘Implementing the 
Responsibility to Protect,’” International Coalition for the Responsibility to Protect (ICRtoP), <http://www. 
responsibility toprotect.org/files/ICRtoP%20Summary%20of%20SG%20report.pdf>, 2009, 4). 
49
     Article 39 (Chapter VII, UN Charter) stipulates that, “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any 
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what 
measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and 
security” (United Nations Charter. <http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/>). 
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safeguarding the basic human rights to physical security, subsistence, and basic liberty as well as 
the right of peoples to self-determination in an occupied territory.  In a sense this would provide 
a baseline of what justice requires because a consensus on what justice demands beyond the most 
obvious cases would be difficult to formulate, adopt, and ratify in the international arena.   
 Although the international community adopted the Genocide Convention in 1948 as a 
way to define and punish genocide in legal terms so as better to prevent it, it still saw a need to 
develop the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) as a complementary legal doctrine in 2001.  
Implementing R2P is a holistic attempt to stop genocide by understanding all three phases of 
conflict (before, during, and after): the Responsibility to Prevent, React, and Rebuild.  The 
recognition of these three phases is very important because it “implies the responsibility not just 
to prevent and react, but to follow through and rebuild.”50  This means that if military 
intervention is taken “there should be a genuine commitment to helping to build a durable peace 
and promoting good governance and sustainable development.” 51  That is, R2P is not just a 
commitment to stopping egregious human rights abuses, but also a commitment to securing 
institutions necessary to peace with justice.
52
  This is important because the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) that was commissioned by the UN to 
find the best way to implement R2P recognized that, “Conditions of public safety and order have 
                                                 
50
     “The Responsibility to Protect,” International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), 
(International Development Research Centre: Ottawa, 2001), 39. 
51
     Ibid. 
52
     In Chapter 3 on R2P, I focused almost entirely on the 2nd tenant of the R2P doctrine (the responsibility to react 
using peaceful and/or coercive measures) and briefly mentioned the 1st tenant (the responsibility to prevent using 
sub-regional and regional education, awareness, and early warning signs). However, there is a 3rd tenant which is 
the responsibility to rebuild which addresses the securing of institutions necessary for peace with justice, and I think 
that this R2P doctrine is a good fit to explain that there is also a need for the Geneva Convention to address some of 
these essential postwar issues that the R2P doctrine has already recognized as essential in postwar rebuilding. 
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to be reconstituted by international agents acting in partnership with local authorities, with the 
goal of progressively transferring to them authority and responsibility to rebuild.”53   
 One can reasonably infer that this is not only essential to cases of genocide but to other 
conflicts in addition to R2P military intervention.  Non-R2P wars and conflicts will also have a 
rebuilding (postwar) phase in which there needs to be genuine commitment to building a durable 
peace and promoting good governance.  Conditions of public safety and order have to be 
reconstituted by international agents acting in partnership with local authorities, with the goal of 
progressively transferring the authority back to the host state.   
 If the UN and ICISS have recognized that there needs to be a genuine commitment to 
helping to build a durable peace and promoting good governance and sustainable development 
for R2P cases, then surely the same has to be done for all postwar scenarios.  The UN is the best 
organization to try to orchestrate a concerted effort of states to review, update, and amend the 
CGIV in order for that international treaty to readily articulate what the legal embodiment of the 
relevant moral norms are.  This would be much like what the UN and international community 
has done regarding its analysis on genocide and its preventing, reacting, and rebuilding doctrine 
in order to adequately deal with the situation from beginning to end.  R2P doctrine has 
significantly evolved from its original sourcing document (the 1948 Genocide Convention) and 
so must the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.     
 This does raise questions though regarding a ‘post-bellum’ legal order that aims squarely 
at peace with justice which might prove equally controversial or problematic as the R2P platform 
has.  Just as there are questions and concerns regarding what level of ‘justice’ R2P actually aims 
at so will there be concerns regarding an updated ‘post-bellum’ legal order.  However, a 
commitment to safeguarding civilians’ core human rights and a peoples’ right to political self-
                                                 
53
     “The Responsibility to Protect,” 39. 
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determination should not be controversial, and I believe that this level of justice is one that both 
liberal and decent well-ordered states could reasonably affirm.  Although the R2P doctrine is 
oriented toward peace with justice, it is centered on only intervening in order to protect persons 
form grave physical security rights violations.  However, the R2P doctrine would also have to 
protect other core rights (subsistence and basic liberty), as I have suggested in Chapter 3, if it is 
to be truly oriented toward peace with justice.   
 On a different but related note, the ICISS also recognizes, “Too often in the past the 
responsibility to rebuild has been insufficiently recognized, the exit of the interveners has been 
poorly managed, the commitment to help with reconstruction has been inadequate, and countries 
have found themselves at the end of the day still wrestling with the underlying problems that 
produced the original intervention action.”54  This is also analogous to postwar scenarios.  If the 
ICISS and UN recognize this shortcoming when it comes to military intervention, surely it 
recognizes these issues are commonplace in other types of conflicts as well and should position 
itself as the multilateral organization that is best situated to oversee postwar guidelines and as the 
appropriate institution at the center of this process—presumably its offices being used to 
monitor, report, and even adjudicate the relevant law. 
 The UN also recognized that it should assist in re-establishing the rule of law in post-
conflict situations outside of just R2P cases.  UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan stated, “The 
modern international legal system comprised of international human rights law, international 
humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international refugee law represents the 
universally applicable standards adopted under the auspices of the United Nations and must 
                                                 
54
     Ibid. 
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therefore serve as the normative basis for all United Nations activities in support of justice and 
the rule of law.”55 
 As a result, in 2005 the UN instituted the Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) as a way to 
help advance the rule of law in post-conflict states.
56
  The Peacebuilding Commission has a 
“mandate to integrate peacebuilding strategies from the outset of UN interventions and is 
emerging as a coordinating power dedicated to peacebuilding strategies that have a more 
representative basis than traditional UN activities.”57  Although this is a step in the right 
direction, the PBC has significant drawbacks.  First, the PBC needs to focus on peace with 
justice instead of peace and security.   
 In addition to helping with the securing of basic human rights the PBC also needs to 
support reasonable political self-determination and just institutions.  Second, the PBC is only an 
advisory board, and it is not designed to operate in an environment where security is lacking.  
“Therefore, they [the PBC] support countries in a situation of positive peace not those in a 
situation of negative peace, the latter being the starting point of application of a jus post bellum 
framework.”58  But in order for the UN to be able to effectively monitor and assist in all post-
conflict situations, the PBC would have to be implemented in a negative peace situation right 
after there is a cessation of major combat operations.  The occupation forces could provide 
security for the PBC and the PBC could help provide direction to both victor and vanquished. 
                                                 
55
     “The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-conflict Societies,” United Nations Rule of 
Law, <http://www.unrol.org/files/2004%20report.pdf >, 2004, 2. 
56
     The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) is an intergovernmental advisory body that supports peace efforts in 
countries emerging from conflict, and is a key addition to the capacity of the international community in the broad 
peace agenda.  The Peacebuilding Commission plays a unique role 1) in bringing together all of the relevant actors, 
including international donors, the international financial institutions, national governments, troop contributing 
countries; 2) marshaling resources; and 3) advising on and proposing integrated strategies for post-conflict 
peacebuilding and recovery and where appropriate, highlighting any gaps that threaten to undermine peace (UN 
Peacebuilding Commission, <http://www.un.org/en/peacebuilding/> , 2012). 
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     Boon, “Obligations,” 84. 
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 Although belligerents must abide by occupation law, it is outdated, vague, favors the 
victor, and fails to adequately address many issues that peacebuilding and establishing a just and 
lasting peace require.  The legal embodiment of the relevant jus post bellum norms ought to be 
welcomed by states committed to the idea that undergirding and unifying just war theory is the 
idea that military force must be deployed always and only with the right intention of aiming at an 
enduring peace with justice.   
 Updating the Fourth Geneva Convention would point parties more squarely toward 
justice but also would inform parties (states as well as international organizations) of their role 
and what is required of them.  If we do not have clear legal rules then justice becomes much 
more difficult to secure or maintain.  Without clear governing rules, a state’s duties, obligations, 
and restrictions are somewhat left to interpretation and bargaining.  An updated convention 
would articulate the conditions necessary for establishing a just and lasting peace, and would 
provide legal accountability for a state’s failure to abide by relevant governing norms.  Although 
ad hoc legal arrangements will most likely always be necessary, this does not entail that the 
Fourth Geneva Convention should not be updated in order to institute legal rules that would 
apply in all situations, e.g. the securing of basic human rights and allowing for political self-
determination.  
 The UN is the best organization to oversee the facilitation of a revised Fourth Geneva 
Convention because the UN specifically deals with fostering the cooperation of states regarding 
issues of peace, security, and international justice.  Second, the UN should monitor and report 
compliance failures much like the UN already does when it comes to grave human rights 
violations.  In addition to developing the Responsibility to Protect and the Peacebuilding 
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Commission as instruments that assist in the rebuilding of war-torn states, the UN has experience 
with postwar issues and provides a multilateral approach to rebuilding.  With some adjustments 
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